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‘In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing 
can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes 
deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and 
decisions possible or impossible to be executed. 
 
Abraham Lincoln 
 
 
 
‘By persuading others, we convince ourselves’ 
 
Junius 
iii 
 
 
 
Declaration 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than 
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent 
of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights 
of any third party. 
iv 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis is the history of an intense period of Israeli attempts to address the issue 
of how the state should communicate its national image, particularly on the 
international stage. Between 1966 and 1975, the Eshkol, Meir and Rabin governments 
invested far more time and energy in the management of Israel’s international image 
than the governments before or after. Those responsible for this policy were 
informed by a developing Israeli national political culture that bore the strong 
influence of pre-independence Jewish history and which reinforced the simple and 
pervasive concept of hasbara (literally ‘explaining’) as Israel’s communications 
strategy. At the same time external factors, particularly the wars of 1967 and 1973, 
made government information efforts and Israel’s international image far more 
politically important. Yet, by the end of the period, nothing much had changed. This 
thesis examines why that should be the case. Using newly-released archive material, 
personal interviews and existing research, this thesis presents a new assessment of 
the domestic determinants that shaped the formulation, institutionalization, and 
execution of Israeli policy in the period under review. 
Three themes emerge from examining the domestic sources of Israeli 
government communications strategy in the period under question. Together, they 
explain why such an intense period of activity should produce such limited results. 
Firstly, the political culture of hasbara, an instinctively defensive, tactical, persuasive 
and Jewishly-rooted approach to generation and maintenance of international 
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support for Israeli foreign policy aims, itself a residue of the pre-state period, proved 
an imperfect lens through which to view the world, and was an obstacle to cogent 
policy-making. Secondly, structural features of Israeli politics contributed to the lack 
of substantive progress in addressing the perceived failures of hasbara. The ruling 
Mapai party was split between the dominant ‘activist’ camp, which broadly dismissed 
the pursuit of international legitimacy in favour of the ‘practical Zionism’ of David 
Ben-Gurion, and the ‘diplomats’ who attached a much greater value to it. However, 
whilst the Mapai ‘diplomats’ were sometimes strong enough to limit ‘activist’ policy, 
they lacked the power to articulate or pursue a real alternative. Given Mapai’s 
unchallenged leadership at a national level, the sporadic bursts of opposition – in 
parliamentary or public debate - on this issue in the period under review produced 
very little real change. In addition, the environment in which these issues were 
discussed accentuated the role of personality in foreign policy decision-making. 
Finally, in the absence of clear political leadership, policy was often decided by 
bureaucratic ‘muddling through’, a model that describes incremental change from a 
limited set of options, an already-familiar feature of Israeli political culture.   
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Ahdut Ha’Avoda – Unity of Labour (Hebrew); an ‘activist’ left-leaning political party 
which joined the Maarach and later the Labour Party 
CZA – Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem 
Gahal – Gush Herut-Liberalim (Hebrew); the Liberal-Herut bloc; largest right-leaning 
political party whose constituent parties were in opposition from 1948 until 1977 
Hagana – Defence (Hebrew); the main Jewish defence force of pre-State Palestine.  
HaKibbutz HaMeuchad – United Kibbutz (Hebrew) – grouping of kibbutzim 
represented politically by Ahdut Ha’Avoda 
Hasbara – explaining; Israeli term for government communications, government 
information and press liaison 
Hofjude – Court Jew (Yiddish) 
IBA – Israel Broadcasting Authority 
IDF – Israel Defence Forces 
IDFA – IDF Archives, Ramat Gan 
JAFI – Jewish Agency for Israel 
JTA – Jewish Telegraphic Agency 
kehilla – community (Hebrew, Yiddish); Jewish communities of Central and Eastern 
Europe, often with some level of autonomy 
LPA – Labour Party Archive, Beit Berl 
Ma’arach – Alignment (Hebrew); the political party formed in 1965 from the union 
of Mapai and Ahdut Ha’Avoda. In 1968, Rafi joined the Ma’arach to form the Labour 
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Party. In 1969, Mapam joined the Labour Party, which was once again known as the 
Ma’arach 
Maki – Israeli Communist Party (Hebrew) 
Mapam – United Workers’ Party (Hebrew); left-wing party which joined the second 
Maarach in 1969 
mamlachtiut – statism (Hebrew) 
Mapai – Workers’ Party of the Land of Israel (Hebrew); largest left-leaning political 
party, in power from 1948 until 1977 
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Palmach – Plugot Machatz or ‘strike units’ (Hebrew); semi-professional standing 
force of the Hagana 
poretz – non-Jewish landowner or local power (Yiddish) 
Rafi – Israeli Workers’ List (Hebrew); breakaway party from Mapai founded by 
David Ben-Gurion in 1965 
shlilat haGalut – ‘denigration of exile’ (Hebrew); Zionism’s highly negative 
perception of diaspora life 
shtetl – little town (Yiddish) 
shtadlan – intercessor (Yiddish) 
TNA: PRO – The National Archives of the United Kingdom: Public Records Office, 
Kew 
YTA – Yad Tabenkin Archives, Ramat Efal
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Introduction 
 
‘The Israeli public relates to the problems of hasbara, particularly at times of crisis 
and danger, in a way that seems to have become a matter of obsession which is not 
easy to explain. In any event, it has no parallel in any other country in the world,’ 
wrote Professor Yehezkel Dror as Israel’s war in Lebanon ground on, further 
sapping the country’s international support.1 On the precipice, as Israelis so often 
feel themselves to be, the shortcomings of hasbara are an easy target. If only we 
could explain ourselves better, runs the argument, perhaps ‘they’ would understand 
us. If only the right words could be found, how much better would our position be. 
If only. 
Israel’s search for international support and sympathy is as integral and 
natural an element of its foreign policy as it is in almost every other modern state. A 
positive national image is a cornerstone of the rational pursuit of international 
legitimacy. However, Israeli hasbara (‘explaining’), the local variant of this 
unremarkable element of international diplomacy, is the subject of endless, often 
heated and unresolved domestic debate. The success of the Israeli government in 
communicating its message to the wider world is triumphed in ideological-historical 
terms as proof of the normalisation of the Jewish people. Failures to do so, which 
appear far more frequently, are a cause for deep existential gloom. It is hard to 
imagine another society in the world that attaches such strong value to the issues of 
international legitimacy, but is so dissatisfied with its record.  
                                            
 
1 Moshe Yegar, History of the Israeli Foreign Information System [Hebrew] (Herzliya: Lahav, 
1986) 12-17. 
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 This thesis examines efforts to address the domestic determinants that 
shaped the formulation, institutionalization, and execution of Israeli policy on 
question of international legitimacy between 1966 to 1975, a period bounded by the 
appointment of a minister with responsibility for government communications and 
the dismantling of the Ministry of Information. This was a period of unusually 
intensive attention to the issue but has not yet been the subject of scholarly 
research. The three Israeli governments during this period, of Levi Eshkol, Golda 
Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, attempted to formulate domestic policy to address concerns 
regarding Israel’s national image and its international legitimacy in ways that had not 
been done under the long premiership of David Ben-Gurion. During this period, 
Israel appointed a minister with responsibility for government communications, 
fought one war which fundamentally altered its domestic politics and its international 
image, introduced television broadcasts after many years’ delay, appointed a 
government commission of inquiry into government communications, fought another 
war which shook the foundations of its political system and further damaged its 
international image, and established and then quickly dismantled a Ministry of 
Information.  
Yet, by the end of the period under review, Israel had only been able to 
‘muddle through’ questions of policy and structure in the pursuit of a more solid 
basis of international support, limited – primarily – by domestic factors. There was 
no greater sophistication in Israeli thinking on the subject, and the many 
organisational changes left no stronger administrative structure. 1975 looked a lot 
like 1966. The central inquiry of this thesis, then, is why did Israel fail to convert 
Introduction 
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good intentions and sustained attention to an acknowledged weakness into a new 
policy approach?   
 The political culture which influenced policy-making during the period can be 
best understood by noting two deeply-held and conflicting perceptions of the 
importance of international legitimacy. On the one hand, as the inheritor of 
Zionism’s doctrine of the ‘negation of exile’, Israeli political culture called for the end 
of Jewish dependency on outside legitimisation.2 Given the accumulated experiences 
of diaspora Jewish life, this is not entirely surprising. On the other hand, Israel and 
the Zionist movement have never entirely disregarded world opinion, as David-Ben 
Gurion made clear: ‘We are dependent on the whole world like every country and 
more so than every other country’.3 Indeed, Israel has, at times, granted almost mythic 
power to ‘what people say’4, and systematically – and quite rationally - pursued 
securing the support of the international community in order to improve its chances 
of achieving and maintaining independence. To care, or not to care about what ‘they’ 
think, say and do? This unresolved paradox formed the context for Israel’s inability 
                                            
 
2 David Ben-Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959) 137-8. 
Speaking to a Mapai youth rally in 1944, Ben-Gurion said ‘Exile is one with utter dependence 
- in material things, in politics and culture, in ethics and intellect, and they must be 
dependent who are an alien minority, who have no Homeland and are separated from their 
origins, from the soil and labour, from economic creativity. So we must become the captains 
of our fortunes, we must become independent - not only in politics and economy but in 
spirit, feeling and will.’  
3 Ben-Gurion’s diary entry for 22.7.1950, quoted in Uri Bialer, "Facts and Pacts: Ben-Gurion 
and Israel's International Orientation, 1948-1956," David Ben-Gurion: Politics and Leadership 
in Israel, ed. Ronald W. Zweig (London: Frank Cass, 1991) 216-17. 
4 There is nothing irrational about paying attention to what people say. A 1951 study 
explored children’s attitude towards foreigners. A Swiss child, who described the French as 
‘not very serious’, the Russians as ‘bad – they always want to make war’ and the Americans 
as ‘ever so rich and clever. They’ve discovered the atom bomb’, was asked how he knew 
these things. He answered ‘I don’t know… I’ve heard it… that’s what people say.’ Jean Piaget 
and Anne-Marie Weil, "The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of 
Relations to Other Countries," International Social Science Journal 3 (1951). 
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to articulate coherent policy or to implement structural changes to its government 
machinery.  
 Three specific arguments are advanced in this thesis in order to explain why 
Israeli attention to the issue yielded such limited results. First, the Israeli conception 
of hasbara was an obstacle, rather than an aid to cogent policy-making. Rooted in the 
experience of Jewish Diaspora life of highly circumscribed power, it was ill-fitted to 
the realities of modern Israeli statecraft. Second, within the dominant Mapai party, 
the security-minded ‘activist’ camp was powerful and largely dismissive of attempts 
to improve Israel’s international standing. A smaller ‘diplomat’ faction fought 
unsuccessfully for more consistent and productive attention to the issue. Third, given 
the first two factors, policy options were severely limited. Israeli decision-makers 
‘muddled through’, repeatedly returning to a limited set of possible remedies. It 
should be noted that the empirical analysis within this thesis highlights the 
bureaucratic politics, the dynamics of state formation and personal rivalries which 
were ultimately more influential than the residues of Jewish history in determining 
Israeli government information policy in the period under review, 
 
The limits of Hasbara 
The first argument posits that hasbara, the political culture determining Israeli 
approaches to the generation and maintenance of international support, acted as an 
imperfect lens through which to view the world and ensure cogent policy-making. 
For the purposes of this thesis, Fein’s definition of political culture is adopted:  
Introduction 
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 …how people think and feel about the political world, what they 
believe and what they believe in, how they behave, and how all these beliefs, 
behaviours and feelings are distributed among the groups in society.5 
 
Hasbara is a concept unique to the Zionist movement and the State of Israel. 
Its roots are in the Biblical expression sever panim, meaning countenance or facial 
expression6 which was familiar in 1960s Israel, the period under review in this thesis, 
as a slogan for encouraging incoming tourism.7 According to Kouts, Nahum Sokolow 
brought the term hasbara into the Zionist lexicon, bringing a uniquely Jewish 
character to an emerging term of art in the field of propaganda and public relations.8  
 However, hasbara is a term difficult to render satisfactorily in English. Its 
literal translation - ‘explaining’- is insufficient to cover the full range of meanings it 
carries in Hebrew. It has been described as ‘soft propaganda and public relations’ and 
as ‘government advocacy’9, and as ‘public relations [that implies] an information 
offensive’.10 According to Even-Shoshan, in modern Hebrew usage hasbara is defined 
                                            
 
5 Leonard J. Fein, Politics in Israel (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968) 32. 
6 The phrase appears in Tractate Avot of the Mishna, a transcription of Jewish oral law dating 
from around 200 BCE. See, for example, ‘Shammai said: Make your study of the Torah a 
fixed habit. Say little and do much, and receive all men with a cheerful face’ [my emphasis]. 
Avot, 1:15. The phrase reappears in the Jerusalem Talmud, a later exposition of the oral law 
dating from around 350 – 500 CE. ‘Let not the judge be well-disposed to one and ill-disposed 
to the other’ [my emphasis].  Talmud Yerushalmi, Yoma, 32:2. 
7 The advertising campaign picked up on this theme, using ‘Hasber Panecha le-Tayyar!’ (Be 
Welcoming to Tourists!) as its slogan. See, for example, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kaqLIZMrJuY 
8 Gideon Kouts, "'The Sokolow Document': The First Strategic Working Paper of Zionist 
Hasbara [Hebrew]," Kesher 41.Winter (2011): 65. 
9 Margalit Toledano and David  McKie, "Social Integration and Public Relations: Global 
Lessons from an Israeli Experience," Public Relations Review 33 (2007): 390, 96. 
10 Patricia A. Curtin and T. Kenn Gaither, "International Agenda-Building in Cyberspace: A 
Study of Middle East Government English-Language Websites," Public Relations Review 30.1 
(2004): 28. 
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as ‘shedding light, interpreting something, clarifying’.11 A more modern Hebrew 
dictionary refers to hasbara in its entry on public relations: 
Public relations: hasbara, advertising, and propaganda on behalf of someone (a 
state, an institution, a public entity, public figure and such) that is intended to 
create positive image in public opinion.12 
 
However difficult it is to pin down a precise definition, hasbara is undoubtedly 
a communicative act, a form of diplomacy. Diplomacy itself can be defined as ‘a 
regulated process of communication’, or as ‘the communication system of the 
international society’.13  ‘Yet,’ notes this author’s first teacher on the subject,  
traditional diplomatic historians, and indeed many practitioners, have too 
often failed to appreciate the extent to which the media are actually an 
integral part of an informed understanding of the foreign policy making 
process. They have tended to see the study of the media as a somehow 
separate activity, almost as a sideshow divorced from their own central 
concerns.14  
 
Social scientists have produced a large body of work on national image and 
international legitimacy, with early work by Lippmann and Boulding supplemented 
and refined by Kunzcik in light of the emergence of a more intrusive and ubiquitous 
mass media.15 Since this thesis deals explicitly with government communications, 
                                            
 
11 Avraham Even-Shoshan, New Dictionary [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1947) vol 1, 
288. 
12 Yaakov Shvika and Uzi Friedkin, Rav-Milon: A Complete, Comprehensive and Updated 
Dictionary of Contemporary Hebrew [Hebrew], 6 vols. (Jerusalem: Steimatzky, 1997) 776. 
13 Costas M. Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996) 25, Alan James, "Diplomacy and International Society," International 
Relations 6.6 (1980): 942. 
14 Philip M. Taylor, "Back to the Future? Integrating the Press and Media into the History of 
International Relations," Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 14.3 (1994): 321. 
15 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1922), Kenneth E Boulding, 
"National Image and the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution III.2 (1959), 
Kenneth E Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," International Politics and 
Foreign Policy, ed. James Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1959), Kenneth E Boulding, The 
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recent research on the business of modern news management is also illuminating, 
building on earlier research by Bernard Cohen.16 However, following Taylor’s 
exhortations, this thesis seeks to take a historian’s approach to understanding 
hasbara. As one historian has described it, ‘it’s the collecting of data, it’s the collating 
of data, it’s thinking about it, piecing it together, trying to extract meaning from it 
and trying to establish patterns out of thousands of little scraps of information’.17  
 So, hasbara is a form of diplomacy. According to Shenhav, Sheafer and Gabay, 
‘hasbara can be seen as the Israeli interpretation of the larger field of public 
diplomacy,’18 which Manheim describes as ‘efforts by the government of one nation 
to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the 
foreign policy of the target nation to advantage’.19 At first glance, this seems a logical 
and convincing assertion. It has been adopted by the State of Israel, whose current 
incarnation of the Ministry of Hasbara is formally titled the Ministry of Public 
Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs in English.20 However, it is ultimately unsatisfactory.  
 The contention that hasbara should be considered an element of diplomatic 
practice is contrary to Gilboa’s critique of hasbara and his recommendation that it be 
                                                                                                                             
 
Image (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1959), Michael Kunczik, Images of Nations and 
Public International Relations (Mawah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1997). 
16 Barbara Pfetsch, "Government News Management," The Politics of News: The News of 
Politics, eds. Doris Graber, Denis McQuail and Pippa Norris (Washington: CQ Press, 1998), 
Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1963). 
17 Barbara C. Orbach, "The View from the Researcher’s Desk: Historians’ Perceptions of 
Research and Repositories," American Archivist 54.Winter (1991): 29-30., quoted in 
Margaret Stieg Dalton and Laurie Charnigo, "Historians and Their Information Sources," 
College & Research Libraries 65.5 (2004): 400. 
18 Shaul R Shenhav, Tamir Sheafer and Itay Gabay, "Israeli Public Diplomacy During the 
Disengagement and the Elections in the Palestinian Authority," Israel Studies 15.3 (2010). 
19 Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution 
of Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 4. See also: Kunczik, Images of 
Nations and Public International Relations. 
20 www.hasbara.gov.il  
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replaced with public diplomacy, ‘the missing component’ in Israeli foreign policy.21 
Gilboa’s clarification is extremely valuable. It is true that hasbara shares many of 
Nye’s characteristics of ‘soft power’ - of which public diplomacy is an element - 
which include attraction, seduction and persuasion, using the attractiveness of a 
nation’s values, cultures and policies to act in a spirit of cooperation, rather than 
coercion.22 However, there is an important difference between hasbara and public 
diplomacy: where public diplomacy is – or should be – strategic and proactive, 
factoring the effect of a particular policy choice on international public opinion 
before it is taken, hasbara tends to be tactical and retroactive, contributing to what 
Gilboa describes as a ‘limited, defensive and apologetic’ outlook.23 In a similar vein, 
according to Medzini – a practitioner, as well as an analyst - hasbara carries 
connotations of passivity, defensiveness and an instinctively apologetic stance.24 In 
the period under review in this thesis, the disparity between public diplomacy and 
hasbara will be clearly evident. It is here, particularly, that hasbara is an obstacle to 
cogent decision-making.  
 If hasbara is not public diplomacy, it must also be distinguished from 
propaganda. Despite Driencourt’s assertion that ‘toute est propagande’, some 
definition is important.25 The Zionist movement did not always insist on such a 
                                            
 
21 Eytan Gilboa, "Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel's Foreign Policy," Israel 
Affairs 12.4 (2006). 
22 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004) 5-11. 
23 Gilboa, "Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel's Foreign Policy," 735. 
24 Meron Medzini, Changes in Israeli Foreign Communications since the Six Day War 
[Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Levi Eshkol Institute for Social, Economic and Political Research in 
Israel, 1972), 4. 
25 Jacques Driencourt, La Propagande, Nouvelle Force Politique [French] (Paris: Colin, 1950) 
26. 
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distinction. Kouts notes that in the early years of the Zionist movement, its official 
bodies used the terms interchangeably.26 Sokolow, the ‘father’ of hasbara used the 
Hebrew term ta’amula, or propaganda, as a synonym. In this period – the early 
twentieth century - the terms ‘explanation’ and ‘clarification’ (from the German 
‘Aufklärung’ and ‘Erklärung’) were also interchangeable with ‘propaganda’ in English 
usage:  
Propaganda is likewise disguised 'explanation'. Spokesmen for the 
administration in power are frequently given free use of broadcasting stations 
and the recent tendency of such spokesmen has been to gain favour by 
'explanation’.27 
 
According to Kouts, ‘hasbara is, therefore, propaganda in disguise’.28 This 
interpretation is unsatisfactory. Firstly, it is difficult to find a settled definition of 
propaganda in the scholarly literature, although there is a rich seam of attempts to 
do so.29 At least one researcher has claimed that ‘a clear-cut definition of 
propaganda is neither possible nor desirable’.30 If hasbara is indeed propaganda, as 
Kouts asserts, we still need to agree on which interpretation of propaganda.  
                                            
 
26 Kouts, "'The Sokolow Document': The First Strategic Working Paper of Zionist Hasbara 
[Hebrew]," 73. 
27 Hadley Cantril and Gordon W Allport, The Psychology of Radio (New York: Harper, 
1935) 65.See also: Hadley Cantril, "Propaganda Analysis," The English Journal 27.3 (1938). 
‘Another method for building up public attitudes regarding someone's pet idea is to disguise 
propaganda as 'explanation’. 
28 Kouts, "'The Sokolow Document': The First Strategic Working Paper of Zionist Hasbara 
[Hebrew]," 73. 
29 One widely accepted definition is that of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis: 
‘Propaganda is the expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals 
or groups with a view to influence the opinions or actions other individuals or groups for 
predetermined ends through psychological manipulations’. Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The 
Formation of Men's Attitudes (New York: Vintage Books, 1965) xii. 
30 Leonard Doob, "Propaganda," International Encyclopedia of Communications, ed. Erik 
Barnouw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), vol. 3, 4 vols., 375. 
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 Propaganda has a bad reputation. Tainted by its association with the 
totalitarian regimes of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, it had already had a ‘bad 
odour’ for some analysts by the 1930s.31 That odour is persistent, with Jowett and 
O’Donnell noting that ‘words frequently used as synonyms for propaganda are lies, 
distortion, deceit, manipulation, psychological warfare and brainwashing [emphasis in the 
original]’.32  
Whilst Lasswell characterised propaganda as a tool, ‘no more moral or 
immoral than a pump handle’, Israel of the 1960s was not nearly as agnostic.33 
Hasbara was largely seen as legitimate and necessary; propaganda was its antithesis, 
carrying unwelcome associations with totalitarian regimes from which many Israelis 
had recently escaped. Two examples of the special sensitivity Israelis exhibited 
towards the issue appear in this thesis. Firstly, in the opening episode of this thesis, 
the appointment of Yisrael Galili as minister with responsibility for hasbara, drew 
comparisons with the Josef Goebbels’ Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and 
Propaganda.34 Secondly, the 1969 Peled Commission on Government 
Communications explicitly opposed the creation of a separate Ministry of 
Information, since it was a feature of totalitarian regimes that ‘as a democracy, the 
State of Israel would find it difficult to adopt’.35 In that sense, if in no other, a 
distinction must be drawn between hasbara and propaganda. 
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 However, other studies have noted that ‘propaganda itself is neither evil nor 
sinister’36, and that ‘propaganda and information management are normative aspects 
of modern democratic societies’.37 This may be a feature of a departure from earlier 
psychologically-oriented studies by social scientists, placing the study of propaganda 
‘firmly in the camp of the modern professional, empiricist historian’.38 If that is the 
case, the questions raised in this thesis fit within in a body of work which James 
Chapman refers to as ‘the new propaganda history’, and which looks at structures 
and policies that determine the nature of propaganda39. ‘New propaganda history’ 
has focussed largely on the period of the Second World War, both the period when 
propaganda was most widely used in the pursuit of popular support for national 
goals, and for which archival material held under a thirty-year rule has become 
available. With archival material for the 1960s and 70s now open, Israeli decision-
making from that period can now be analysed in that light.  
 Since some definition is desirable, this thesis will understand hasbara as a 
persuasive communication effort, using O’Donnell and Kable’s definition of ‘a 
complex, continuing, interactive process …through which the persuader attempts to 
influence the persuadee to adopt a change in a given attitude or behaviour because 
the persuadee has had perceptions enlarged or changed’.40 Toledano and McKie 
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suggest similarities between hasbara and voorlichting, or enlightenment, the term used 
in the Netherlands for government communications and public relations.41 Their 
research concludes that the two terms share characteristics of ‘soft-selling 
“persuasion”’, and ‘dialogue, negotiation, and consensus-building’. This is a valuable 
contribution, correctly understanding that hasbara was initially aimed inwards – that 
is to say, as a tool for enlisting Jewish support for the Zionist movement.   
 As Avineri has shown, Herzl’s decisive contribution – ‘the breakthrough’ - 
was to turn the efforts of the Zionist movement outwards, seeking the support of 
international powers for the cause of Jewish national independence.42 This, according 
to Taylor, was evidence of the essentially rational nature of Zionism.43 Yet, as 
Schleifer and others argue, hasbara continued to bear the stamp of Jewish communal 
life from which it emerged.44 This should not deter us from considering hasbara as a 
legitimate element of foreign policy analysis.  According to Femenia, ‘emotion-laden 
concepts – specifically, national self-images – are an often ignored but essential tenet 
of every nation’s foreign policy-making.’45 Sokolow, Herzl’s successor and the ‘father’ 
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of hasbara never decisively broke with the values and cadences of Jewish communal 
life in the way that Herzl – whose leadership of the Zionist movement lasted less 
than a decade – attempted to.46 Liebman and Don-Yehiya note the very strong 
influence of the consensual and consociational politics of the shtetl and the kehilla on 
Israeli political culture as a whole.47 This thesis, then, will examine hasbara as an 
instinctively defensive and tactical, persuasive and Jewishly-rooted attempt to obtain 
and maintain international support for Israeli policy. It also acknowledges that the 
political culture of hasbara was an influence, rather than a final determinant, of policy.  
It is those characteristics which also form the basis for the critique of hasbara that 
runs through this thesis. The genesis of hasbara will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter 1.  
 One final comment on hasbara: where the word appears in Hebrew – in 
official documents, scholarly literature, press reports, parliamentary transcripts or 
interviews – it appears in transliteration. In my own writing, I have used the word 
where appropriate, but also used phrases such as ‘government communications 
policy’, ‘information efforts’, ‘press liaison’ and variants of them where the Hebrew 
would be less clear.  
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Structural weaknesses: ‘activists’, ‘diplomats’ and the role of personality 
The second argument of this thesis is that structural features of Israeli politics 
contributed to the lack of substantive progress in addressing the perceived failures of 
hasbara in the period under review. Two features of the Israeli political system are 
germane in this regard. Firstly, and despite ‘the political party’s pre-eminence’, the 
adoption of proportional representation and consequent multi-party coalition 
governments, all of which might have produced a more dynamic political system, 
Israeli governments in the period were remarkably stable.48 The most notable 
feature was that one party – Mapai – formed all Israeli governments from 
independence until 1977. As the largest single faction within government coalitions, 
and often with smaller parties that placed less emphasis on foreign policy, it 
determined policy in this sphere almost unopposed.49 The second-largest party – 
Herut, later Gahal – was a genuine opposition, with an equally cogent ideological 
outlook and a stable constituency, but was not able to form a government during the 
country’s first three decades.50 Mapai’s dominance allowed it to determine which 
issues were on the national agenda, and with what intensity. Hasbara fell some way 
down the list of national priorities, particularly during the long premiership of Ben-
Gurion.  
 The second feature derives from the first. Whilst Allison and others 
downplay the role of personality in foreign policy decision-making, there are 
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circumstances in which it would be expected that individuals would exert a 
significant influence.51 Jensen identifies four criteria for an individual to have a strong 
influence on policy: a high level of interest in foreign affairs; high decisional latitude; a 
non-routine situation; and ambiguous, insufficient or overwhelming information on 
the situation.52 Those criteria are met as a matter of course in Israel. Israeli political 
discourse is strongly inclined towards foreign affairs and defence issues, and the 
electoral system encourages ‘decisional latitude’ – or a lack of political discipline - 
whilst perpetual crisis and information ‘gaps’ are also commonplace. It is important 
not to overstate this, however. Schulze argues that groupthink, rather than the 
overweening influence of Sharon over Begin is the most satisfactory explanation for 
the Lebanon War of 1982, whilst the conceptzia – the rigid thinking of the politico-
military establishment in the run-up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War – was a dominant 
feature in that ‘fiasco’.53 In the period under review, though, personality did play a 
significant role in the search for cogent government information policy 
One of the most influential and pervasive orthodoxies was that of the 
dominant ‘activist’ camp, led by Ben-Gurion, and which was largely dismissive of the 
importance of international opinion.54 A smaller ‘diplomat’ camp which followed 
Moshe Sharett was more disposed to engage with international opinion, and whilst 
not often strong enough to determine policy, was sometimes able to block the 
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‘activists’. This ‘maladroit admixture of military activism and diplomatic immobility’ 
was, according to Shlaim and Yaniv, a recipe for a foreign policy that was 
unsystematic, directionless and ‘singularly reactive’.55 This argument, then, resonates 
with a core proposition of the previous theme – the essentially reactive nature of 
hasbara. 
 Ben-Gurion and Sharett, the pre-eminent figures of the formative years of 
Israeli politics, personified the ‘activist’ and ‘diplomat’ strands of Israeli foreign-policy 
attitudes. Their outlook was rooted in differences in personality, character and 
outlook: where Ben-Gurion was decisive and single-minded, Sharett was hesitant and 
careful.56 According to Shimon Peres, although Ben-Gurion respected Sharett’s 
personal qualities ‘he felt that Sharett lived in an artificial world where gestures, 
words, were given great importance’.57 Ben-Gurion’s outlook was different, placing 
almost exclusive emphasis on Jewish action, encapsulated in his well-known phrase 
‘our future does not depend on what the goyim say, but on what the Jews do’.58 
Abba Eban later wrote: 
The difficulties between Ben-Gurion and Sharett went far beyond quarrels 
over ‘turf’. In theory, they should have constituted a balanced harmony. Each 
possessed some virtues and had some faults that the other lacked: Ben 
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Gurion was impulsive, imaginative, daring, dynamic; Sharett was prudent, 
rational, analytical, realistic. Had they been able to work in close harness, an 
ideal equilibrium might have been achieved. But the contradictions that 
divided their characters also created an incompatibility of emotion... Far from 
moving toward a sense of partnership, they had become unable to bear the 
sight of each other. Ben-Gurion thought that Sharett was talented, but 
pedantic, excessively meticulous, and inclined to confuse the vital with the 
incidental. Sharett, with all his admiration for Ben-Gurion, considered him 
demagogic, tyrannical, opinionated, devious, and, on some occasions, not 
quite rational. Their complementary virtues should have been harnessed for 
the national interest, but their antipathies were too strong for those 
potentialities to be fulfilled.59 
 
According to Sheffer, the fundamental incompatibility of their two outlooks 
was that of the search for ‘conflict resolution’ (Sharett) as opposed to ‘conflict 
management’ (Ben-Gurion).60 The two clashed repeatedly throughout the four 
decades during which they were the dominant voices in Israeli politics, but the 
difference was perhaps clearest during the campaign for Israel’s independence in 
1947-8. Whilst Sharett the ‘diplomat’ sought the support of the United Nations for 
its partition plan61, Ben-Gurion the ‘activist’ was single-minded in his belief in the 
military route: 
I find it difficult now to understand any other language than the language of 
war. Any other language sounds to me like a foreign tongue which I heard 
once and which has since, as it were, sunk into oblivion.62 
 
The activist-diplomat schism was far more pervasive than a difference in outlook 
between the two men. Disagreements over Israel’s policy of retaliation against cross-
                                            
 
59 Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel through My Eyes (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 
1992) 249-50. 
60 Gabriel Sheffer, Resolution vs Management of the Middle East Conflict: A Reexamination 
of the Confrontation between Moshe Sharett and David Ben-Gurion [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: 
Magnes Press, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1980). 
61 Gabriel Sheffer, Moshe Sharett : Biography of a Political Moderate (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996) 244-70. 
62 Zeev Sherf, Three Days (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962) 191. 
Introduction 
18 
 
border raids, the Lavon Affair of 1954 and the Suez War of 1956 can all be traced to 
this fundamental difference in thinking. It was a primary factor in the ousting of 
Sharett from the foreign ministry, and from front-line politics in 1956.63 And 
crucially, the next generation of Israeli leaders maintained the distinction. Amongst 
the ‘activists’ Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres rose to prominence, whilst Yigal Allon 
and Abba Eban continued in Sharett’s more moderate ‘diplomat’ style.64  
 Two additional aspects of Israeli political life which limited policy innovation 
must also be factored into this argument. From June 1967, the question of what to 
do with the territories captured during the Six Day War became a dominant – if not 
the only – determinant of Israeli foreign policy. Competing ‘activist’ and ‘diplomat’ 
approaches were replicated, intensified and sometimes complicated by the 
emergence of ‘hawk’ and ‘dove’ camps on the Palestinian question.65 According to 
Aran, ‘political divisions stretched across a multidimensional dove-hawk spectrum’.66 
The crowded political agenda had even less room for an already marginal discussion 
regarding the importance of international opinion. And, as Freilich notes, the central 
administration of Israeli politics, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Secretariat 
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and the prime minister’s private office, generally lacked ‘the capacity to conduct 
systematic policy formulation and coordination’.67 
 It is important not to overstate the claim, however. Despite the constraints 
of the political system, Israel was a fully-functioning society and polity in the period 
under examination. Indeed, according to Dror, Israel was able to confront 
extraordinary challenges partly because of its unique political system.68 Shlaim and 
Yaniv’s proposition is valuable here: ‘a severely constrained and reactive foreign 
policy, while not conducive to success in attaining national goals, is not doomed to 
perpetual failure either’.69 This thesis will examine the development of one element 
of Israeli foreign policy – its efforts at obtaining and maintaining international support 
– in light of that proposition.  
 In order to do so, it locates itself within a broader debate on Israeli foreign 
policy. Several themes emerge from the scholarly literature. Firstly, to what extent 
does the regional environment influence the way Israel conducts its foreign policy? 
According to Harkabi, sustained external threat is a strong determinant of Israeli 
foreign policy, whilst Inbar notes that a more benign international environment can 
result in a lowered Israeli threat perception.70 Dror has proposed that Israel’s 
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environment is so threatening as to be sui generis, and that in such circumstances, 
uncertainty is a norm and crises are expected.71 Shlaim and others also note that 
regional uncertainty calls for high levels of flexibility and improvisation.72 Aran 
identifies a second theme in the literature, that Israeli foreign policy is determined by 
ideological predispositions.73 Finally, researchers have written extensively on the 
relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in Israel, which ‘is 
particularly profound because foreign policy involves existential questions and 
questions of national identity which weigh much more heavily on the mind of the 
Israeli public than on that of most other countries.’74 In other words, according to 
Henry Kissinger, ‘Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics’.75  
 Yet, as Brecher pointed out, these themes are complementary, rather than 
competing. His pioneering work on Israeli foreign policy remains the most 
comprehensive study of the subject.76 The three approaches outlined above are 
described as the ‘Operational Environment’ (Part I), the regional setting, as well as 
domestic military, economic and political structures; the ‘Psychological Environment’ 
(Part II), the ideological or ‘attitudinal prism’ of decision-makers; and the impact of 
domestic politics on foreign policy in ‘Process’ (Part III).  
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The political culture of ‘muddling through’  
Given the conceptual and practical limitations placed on decision-makers, this thesis   
advances a third argument: changes in Israeli government communications policy in 
the period under review conform to Lindblom’s assertion that ‘democracies change 
their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move 
in leaps and bounds.77 In Etzioni’s terminology, policy-making is a process of 
‘disjointed incrementalism’78. ‘Muddling through’, as the theory was titled, was 
described and developed in a well-known series of articles and books79. The original 
article has been reprinted in some 40 anthologies80; Lindblom’s two books on the 
subject are ‘classics’81. His claim that small and incremental policy changes are 
characteristic of pluralistic societies, as opposed to the centralised planning of 
totalitarian societies, is relatively uncontroversial. However, his assertion that such 
‘muddle’ is often preferable to radical change, has drawn critical responses82 and 
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remains largely speculative.83 Other elements of the model – the beneficial effects of 
repeated attempts to solve policy problems (‘seriality’) and of several policy-makers 
working on a problem in parallel (‘redundancy’) – are also relevant to the subject of 
this thesis.84  
 This thesis does not engage any further with the theoretical discussion of the 
applicability of Lindblom’s work, and adopts the concept of ‘muddling through’ in its 
descriptive, rather than its prescriptive term. However, two words of caution are 
necessary here. Firstly, it would be unwise to ignore the generally conservative 
nature of government decision-making, and its natural resistance to radical change. 
The absence of sweeping policy initiatives is the norm, rather than a regrettable 
exception or a particular Israeli weakness. Secondly, it is inherent in the adversarial 
nature of politics that ‘competing values and groups reach agreement through 
compromise’.85  
 In Lindblom’s own words, there are six indicators of ‘muddling through’, 
which are useful in assessing whether Israeli government information policy 
conforms to the model:  
1. Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey and evaluation of all 
alternatives, the decision-maker focuses only on those policies which differ 
incrementally from existing policies. 
2. Only a relatively small number of policy alternatives are considered. 
3. For each policy alternative, only a restricted number of "important" 
consequences are evaluated. 
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4. The problem confronting the decisionmaker is continually redefined: 
Incrementalism allows for countless ends-means and means-ends adjustments 
which, in effect, make the problem more manageable. 
5. Thus, there is no one decision or "right" solution but a "never-ending 
series of attacks" on the issues at hand through serial analyses and evaluation. 
6. As such, incremental decision-making is described as remedial, geared 
more to the alleviation of present, concrete social imperfections than to the 
promotion of future social goals.86 
 
In another article, he compares the ideal of fully rational decision-making (the 
‘Rational-Comprehensive’ model) with the far more realistic model of Successive 
Limited Comparisons: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Lindblom’s model of Successive Limited Comparisons, or ‘muddling through’.87 
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Rational-Comprehensive model 
 
Successive Limited Comparisons 
1a. Clarification of values or objectives 
distinct from and usually prerequisite to 
empirical analysis of alternative policies 
 
1b. Selection of value goals and empirical 
analysis of the needed action are not 
distinct from one another by are closely 
intertwined 
2a. Policy-formulation is therefore 
approached through means-ends 
analysis. First the ends are isolated, then 
the means to achieve them are sought. 
 
2b. Since means and ends are not distinct, 
means-end analysis is often inappropriate 
or limited 
3a. The test of a ‘good’ policy is that it 
can be shown to be the most 
appropriate means to desired ends.  
 
3b. The test of a ‘good policy’ is that 
various analysts find themselves directly 
agreeing on a policy (without agreeing 
that it is the most appropriate means to 
an agreed objective). 
4a. Analysis is comprehensive; every 
important relevant factor is taken into 
account.  
 
4b. Analysis is drastically limited: 
Important possible outcomes are 
neglected 
Important alternative potential policies 
are neglected 
Important affected values are neglected 
5a. Theory is often heavily relied upon. 5b. A succession of comparisons greatly 
reduces or eliminates reliance on theory.  
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Given the disdain for formality which derives from Zionism’s attempt to forge 
a decisive break with a Jewish history characterised by the need to conform to other 
peoples’ rules, discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, a political culture characterised 
by creative improvisation, intensive short-term planning and a lack of reliance on 
theoretical models seems entirely historically consistent.88  
 
The existing literature and historiography 
The central question of this thesis – why did the intense period of Israeli attention to 
hasbara yield so little conceptual or organisational change – is not well covered in 
the secondary literature. Moshe Yegar’s History of the Israeli Foreign Information System 
is the most complete, but was written before the opening of official archives on the 
period, and so relies on extensive quotations from limited primary sources, primarily 
the parliamentary protocols, Divrei HaKnesset.89 However, his long experience of 
working on these issues at the Foreign Ministry makes it a useful practitioner’s 
account. Medzini accurately describes the impact of the Six-Day war on Israeli 
government communications, although his research only covers until 1970.90 Neither 
the Peled Report of 1969 or the establishment and dismantling of the Ministry of 
Information have been the subject of research.  
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 There is a distinct body of research on the introduction of television to 
Israel. Oren establishes the case that, after some deliberation, Israeli created a 
television service that would serve political-security, rather than cultural and 
educational, ends.91 The autobiography of Chaim Yavin, Israel’s ‘Mr Television’, Gil’s 
memoirs, and Katz’s shorter article on the subject, represent the insiders’ views on 
the establishment of television.92 Two unpublished PhD theses predate the opening 
of archives, but contain useful anecdotal material.93 However, none of these existing 
studies places the establishment of television in Israel within the context of foreign 
policy-making or as an example of national image-making.  
 Of the three central personalities covered in this thesis, Shimon Peres is the 
most prominent and has been the subject of biographies by Matti Golan and Michael 
Bar-Zohar, as well as an autobiography edited by David Landau.94 However, these 
accounts all refer to Peres’ tenure as Minister of Information only in passing, raising 
questions regarding the importance that Peres himself attached to this phase of his 
political career. As Ben-Gurion’s protégé, his reservations about the importance of 
hasbara are a well-established theme in this thesis. Yisrael Galili is the subject of a 
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PhD by Amos Shifris, subsequently published as the first political biography of Galili.95 
A second biography was published soon afterwards.96 Again, and entirely consistent 
with Galili’s own views on his work in this field, these studies largely sidestep Galili’s 
work in government communication, as do three volumes of Galili’s own writings 
published after his death.97 Aharon Yariv is also yet to attract the attention of 
researchers or biographers, although this is more surprising considering his very 
considerable contributions in the field of Israel national security as Director of 
Military Intelligence from 1964-1972 and his public role as military analyst during the 
1973 war. 
 As this thesis covers the period in which Israel fought two wars – 1967 and 
1973 – the literature on these wars and the key historiographical debates it has 
sparked also need attention. Much of the very extensive scholarly debate on the 
foreign policy aspects of the 1967 war has revolved around the question of 
inadvertency. Did misperception and miscalculation produce a war ‘that neither side 
wanted’, that ‘neither Israel or her enemies were able to control’, as Shlaim and 
others contend?98 It is worth noting that this debate straddles the often-unbridgeable 
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divide between Israel’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ historians99; older research, written without 
the benefit of access to the official archives, struck a similar tone.100 More recently, 
additional themes of research have opened up. Firstly, the role of the Soviet Union is 
attracting attention with new evidence shedding light on the ‘Soviet warning’ 
intelligence report of 13 May 13, 1967.101 This fits into an existing body of work on 
the impact of the Cold War on Israeli foreign policy.102 Secondly, Oren has focussed 
attention on the role of Egypt in precipitating war.103 Finally, as an antidote to the 
David-and-Goliath myth-making of early Israeli history, recent work on the early 
settlement enterprise gives a more rounded picture of the consequences of the 
war.104  
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 Study of the 1973 war has focussed on the inaccurate intelligence estimate 
immediately preceding the war. Bar-Joseph notes that the Agranat Commission’s 
main conclusion - the intelligence fiasco was the responsibility of senior Military 
Intelligence officers - was initially widely accepted.105 The erosion of that consensus, 
initially by those accused of failure106 has produced a range of answers on the causes 
of the war.107 With most of the documents scheduled to be opened to the public 
only after 50 years, the diplomatic aspects of the war have been less well covered, 
leaving the wider question of whether there was a political alternative to the war 
unanswered.108 
Largely absent from these scholarly discussions is the role that hasbara played 
during these wars. A rare exception, Medzini has looked at hasbara during the Six-
Day war, as well as the changes in government communications in its wake.109 
Susser’s edited volume of conference proceedings marking thirty years since 1967 
devotes some attention to the role of media and public opinion in 1967, but does 
not discuss the Israeli government’s efforts to secure and maintain international 
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support during war.110 While this thesis does not focus on wartime hasbara or 
information warfare per se, it addresses this gap in the literature. Given the 
considerable interest in the questions of inadvertency, miscalculation and 
misperception in the historiography of the 1967 war, it is tempting to speculate what 
the effect of a clearer presentation of Israel’s interests and intentions would have had 
in the critical ‘waiting period’ before the war. The discussion of this missed 
opportunity in Chapter 2 is an additional aspect of Israel’s ineffective diplomatic 
signalling and a new contribution to the study of the Six Day War. The Peled 
Commission, discussed in Chapter 4 looks at the information aspects of the Yom 
Kippur War, particularly as a trigger for the establishment of the Ministry of 
Information, which have thus far been neglected in the scholarly debate. 
 
Sources and methodology 
In order to avoid the kind of historical research Lord Chesterfield derided as ‘just a 
confused heap of facts’, some methodological rigour is needed.111 This thesis is based 
on primary source material as far as is possible, held in a number of different 
archives. The main body of official papers relating to the State of Israel is held at the 
Israel State Archives. They include those relating to Galili’s tenure as minister 
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without portfolio between 1966 and 1970 (Record Group 44/G) under the heading 
of ‘Ministers without Portfolio’, and include the day-to-day paperwork of a 
ministerial office. Since much of Galili’s time was spent on other matters, particularly 
his championing of building Israeli settlements following the 1967 war, there was a 
good deal of sifting to find material relating to his work relating to hasbara. However, 
since Galili was part of both Levi Eshkol and Meir’s inner circle of advisers, useful 
insights were to be found throughout the files. Similarly, the files of the short-lived 
Ministry of Information (also held in RG 44/G) under Peres and Yariv was crucial. 
The most complete files from the Ministry of Information are those of the minister’s 
private office, and of the department headed by Alouph Hareven. Some material in 
Hareven’s private collection was not to be found in the Ministry’s files, raising 
questions about their completeness.  
 Other relevant documents from the Israel State Archives were in the files of 
the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government 
Press Office. For the pre-State period, the Central Zionist Archives of the World 
Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for Israel hold the papers of the various 
organizations and institutions from the inception of the Zionist movement. Use is 
made of the files of the Hasbara Department (S23) and the Political Department 
(S25) of the Jewish Agency for Israel, as well as those of the London office of the 
World Zionist Organisation (Z4) and the WZO office in New York (Z5). It also 
holds some three hundred personal archives, containing the private papers of leaders 
and functionaries. This thesis makes use of the archives of Gershon Agron (A209), 
and of Moshe Yegar (A468). Documents and papers are held at number of other 
archives in Israel, including the Israel Defence Force Archive (Ramat Gan), the Yad 
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Tabenkin research and documentation centre of the United Kibbutz Movement 
(Ramat Efal), Yad Ben Zvi (Jerusalem), Yad Eshkol (Jerusalem), the Ben-Gurion 
Archives (Sde Boker), the Lavon Archives (Tel Aviv) and the Israel Labour Archives 
(Beit Berl). In London, the National Archives (Kew) and the Liddell-Hart Centre for 
Military History at King’s College were sources of supplementary information. 
 The parliamentary protocols, Divrei HaKnesset, are a valuable source, as are 
the annual reports of the State Comptroller, a national ombudsman, and the 
published comments on those reports issued annually by the Minister of Finance. The 
issue of hasbara was raised frequently over the period, both on matters of procedure 
– such as the appointment of ministers, shifting of ministerial responsibility from one 
ministry to another and on questions of budget – as well as debates that invited 
broader perorations on the issue. As Ihalainen and Palonen note, reference to 
parliamentary debates, side-by-side with the study of archival sources and secondary 
literature, produces ‘a first-hand picture of the particular time in focus, of its political 
constellations and of the contemporary political language’.112  
 In some cases, special permission was required to view archival material that 
had not yet been seen.113 In the case of the papers held at the Israel State Archives 
relating to Yisrael Galili, his involvement in other areas of high national security 
sensitivity required a detailed review of each file before access was granted. In 
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almost all cases the material was made available, and redactions in files were not a 
major obstacle to the research. An application to view the long-lost Karni Report of 
1973 was eventually approved and, subsequently, the IDF Archive has made this 
important and hitherto unseen document available online to the public.114  
 The Jewish National and University Library (JNUL) at the Hebrew University 
in Jerusalem was a valuable source for contemporary newspapers and journals, as 
was the Beit Ariella Library in Tel Aviv, the Central Zionist Archive and the British 
Library’s Newspaper Library in Colindale, London. The Journalists’ Yearbook, 
published annually by the Association of Journalists, is useful in giving an insight into 
the attitude of the domestic and international press. 
 The private papers of a number of individuals were consulted, and this thesis 
makes use of those of Yisrael Galili, held by the Yad Tabenkin Archive of the United 
Kibbutz Movement, and some of Aharon Yariv’s papers, made available to me with 
the kind permission of his family. Repeated attempts to access the Abba Eban 
Archive were unsuccessful. In the absence of that material, the files of the Foreign 
Ministry at the Israel State Archives and the secondary sources were sufficient to 
give a rounded account of the foreign minister’s views on the matter. Similarly, the 
author was unable to access the private papers of Ambassador Abraham ‘Abe’ 
Harman, who headed an early incarnation of the Israeli government information 
service. However, since his work was only of marginal importance to the main area 
of inquiry, this is a minor discrepancy.  
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 This research is also based on some forty interviews, as well as a number of 
informal conversations, with many of the key personalities involved in government 
decision-making in the period in question. The interviews followed a loosely-
structured interview guide in pursuit of qualitative insights, rather than a single 
questionnaire that might produce a quantitative body of data. In some cases, there 
were return interviews, later in the research phase. Miles and Huberman encourage 
this approach, since ‘analysis during data collection lets the field worker cycle back 
and forth between thinking about the existing data and generating strategies for 
collecting new - often better quality - data’.115 Some interviewees also shared written 
material, often undisturbed in private collections since the early 1970s, and allowed it 
to be used in the writing of this thesis.  
 The use of oral sources in historical research is not without its challenges. 
According to Taylor and Bogdan, the essential characteristics of interviewing for 
qualitative research are ‘repeated face-to-face encounters between the researcher 
and their informants directed towards understanding informants’ perspectives on 
their lives, experiences or situations as expressed in their own words’.116 That is 
quite true, but there is more. Interviews are, uniquely, ‘pieces of evidence which 
historians create and produce’.117 Creating historical evidence carries responsibility, 
particularly if the transcripts remain as a researcher’s private hoard, conveniently 
unverifiable. This thesis follows the excellent example of Brecher, making use of 
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interviews as a valuable source, but avoiding using them as a single source to 
establish or verify a significant argument.118 
 
Structure  
This thesis analyses Israel’s failure to convert good intentions and sustained attention 
to the acknowledged problems of its international image into a new policy approach.  
It will start by examining the historical roots of the political culture of hasbara 
which produced a paradox within Zionist thinking regarding the importance attached 
to international legitimacy. An understanding of this context is critical when drawing 
a distinction between the commonplace pursuit of projecting a positive national 
image and its particularly Israeli variant, hasbara. The second section of this chapter 
considers early attempts to organise communications functions within the Zionist 
movement and in the first years of independence.  
The following five chapters examine episodes in the period under review in 
order to illustrate the thesis’ main arguments, introduced above. Consistent with 
those arguments, they focus on the domestic sources of Israeli government 
communications policy, rather than Israel’s place on the international stage. 
However, it is clear that the policy deliberations were aimed – largely unsuccessfully 
- at improving Israel’s image on the international stage.  
Chapter Two will examine the appointment of Yisrael Galili as minister 
without portfolio with responsibility for government communications, a sign of wider 
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change under new prime minister Levi Eshkol. However, Galili’s personal suitability 
for the job was an obstacle to constructive policy-making and did not positively 
impact Israel’s capacity for diplomatic ‘signalling’ in the three-week ‘waiting period’ of 
May 1967. The outbreak of war in June1967 marked a critical turning point in the 
value attached to Israel’s international image by the government, marked initially by 
successful ‘muddling through’ by bureaucrats and officials, and later by a sharp 
deterioration in Israel’s international image. Galili’s ‘activist’ influence on the 
establishment of a security-oriented national television service, spurred on by its 
assumed influence on Israel’s international position, is considered in Chapter Three. 
However, and perhaps paradoxically, Galili’s work on television is revealing as a 
departure from hasbara thinking, rather than its successful implementation. 
 Chapter Four considers the Peled Commission of Inquiry on Government 
Communications, conceived primarily as a way of salvaging Eshkol’s damaged 
reputation. Stubbornly non-political and clear-sighted in its analysis, its key 
recommendation, to establish a strong national information agency but to refrain 
from establishing a Ministry of Information, was ignored.  Personal politics played 
their role in this missed opportunity.  
Chapter Five deals with the long gestation period of the Ministry of 
Information during Golda Meir’s premiership. Having rejected the Peled Report in 
1970, strong domestic opposition to her and her government in the wake of the 
1973 war strongly affected her decision-making. Despite the unsuccessful opposition 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to its establishment, Meir pressed ahead. The final 
chapter considers the short tenure of Shimon Peres as Israel’s first Minister of 
Information. Whilst Peres laid important ground-work, Aharon Yariv’s stewardship 
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of the Ministry of Information in the 1974 Rabin government foundered on personal 
disagreements and political gridlock, and the decision to close it after only eight 
months of operation was greeted neither with surprise nor regret. The thesis 
concludes by assessing the short distance Israel travelled over the period in its 
thinking on government communication policy. 
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Chapter 1 
The Genesis of Hasbara 
 
Israel is a Jewish State. The only Jewish State in the world, it was re-
established deliberately by the Jewish people as a Jewish solution to the 
Jewish problem, which has scarred the history of mankind for over 2,000 
years. This is the cardinal feature dominating all Israel’s policy, domestic and 
foreign. This makes Israel unique. Without appreciation of this elemental 
factor, it is impossible to understand Israel or any aspect of Israel’s policy – 
domestic or foreign.1  
 
Zionism conceived of itself as a decisive break with the history of the Jewish people, 
an entirely novel method of displacing the isolation and particularism of the past and 
rejoining history by resetting Jewish life in modern ideological constructs. In the 
words of Nahum Goldmann, ‘everything has changed. Our generation is therefore 
the first to have the opportunity of laying down a Jewish policy, and it has everything 
to learn in this field’.2 However, even its revolutionary vanguard never fully 
disconnected from the historical experience of sustaining Jewish life for centuries 
within a non-Jewish setting. The Jewish masses certainly did not. Whether 
consciously or not, the Zionist movement and the State of Israel looked through the 
lens of Jewish history. Older scholarship, particularly that favoured by the founding 
generation of the Zionist leadership, reinforced the concept of an essential 
discontinuity of Jewish history. By compartmentalising ‘Jewish’ history on one hand, 
and the history of the Zionist movement on the other, the Zionist movement was 
detached from millennia of Jewish life that preceded it. Modern studies have also 
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continued this theme, insisting that the inception of the Zionist movement required 
the creation of ‘new Jewish diplomacy, a field in which Jews, owing to their lack of 
statehood, had not been previously active’.3 This chapter rejects that distinction, and 
argues that there are essential continuities in the history of Jewish life. In doing so, 
they preserved and modified many elements of the political culture that Jews had 
refined in asserting their collective interests during centuries of diaspora. According 
to Michael Brecher, Jewish history served as ‘attitudinal prism’ through which Israeli 
political discourse of the 1960s and 70s was filtered.4 According to Brecher, ‘societal 
factors, such as ideology and tradition, which derive from the cumulative historical 
legacy’ are amongst the ‘psychological predispositions’ that exert an influence on 
decision-makers. According to Klieman, ‘Jewish statecraft may often have proved to 
be failed statecraft, and for the longest time stateless statecraft, but it was statecraft 
nonetheless’.5 
Of course, independence also called for new conceptions of relations with 
the outside world. In moving from diaspora to political sovereignty, the Zionist 
movement and the State of Israel was forced to innovate a system of foreign 
relations where one had not previously existed. ‘Confronted constantly with 
unforeseen situations, Israeli foreign policy perfected the art of improvisation rather 
than that of planning’.6  
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Thus, the political culture of Israel in the 1960s and 70s under review here, 
and specifically its attempts to articulate coherent policy in the sphere of its 
international image, exhibits inherited traits from the way in which diaspora Jewish 
communities managed their relations with the outside world as well as more newly-
learned patterns of policymaking.   
This chapter, then, sets the stage for the later examination of Israeli 
government communications policy in the 1960s and 70s by discussing its ideological 
and historical roots. The first section describes three themes on the question of 
external relations that emerge from the experience of two millennia of diaspora. The 
first is an intense mistrust of the outside world, where Jewish life was often 
precarious. Secondly, when contact with figures of external authority was necessary, 
the intercessor – both Jewish and non-Jewish – inhabited a well-defined role, 
although sometimes suffered from contempt for authority both outside and within 
communal life. Finally, in order to minimize friction between Jewish communities and 
the outside world, it was important to be able to articulate the interests of the 
community in an appropriate way. The second section takes up the narrative of how 
the Zionist movement, and later the State of Israel, addressed the considerable 
challenges of articulating and implementing cogent policy in this field.  
 
The inheritance: from Diaspora to the birth of Zionism 
The destruction of the Second Temple in 70CE by the Romans is a watershed event 
in Jewish history, marking the end of sovereignty and the start of two millennia of 
diaspora. In his contemporary account, Flavius Josephus wrote: 
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And thus was Jerusalem captured …From King David, the first of the Jews 
who reigned therein, to this destruction under Titus were one thousand one 
hundred and seventy-nine years …but neither its great antiquity, nor its vast 
riches, nor the diffusion of its nation over all the habitable earth, nor the 
greatness of the veneration paid it on a religious account have been sufficient 
to preserve it from being destroyed.7 
 
Traditional accounts of Jewish history after the destruction of the Second Temple 
paint a picture of enforced passivity and powerlessness. As Salo Baron notes, ‘no-one 
was more eloquent in describing the sufferings of the Exile and the disgrace of living 
in subjection to foreign rulers than were the Jews themselves, beginning with the 
ancient rabbis’.8 Diaspora life was not a neutral experience; it was life lived in a state 
of galut, or exile.  
Max Weber brought the self-perception of the Jews as exiles to wider 
audiences, casting them as Gastvolk living on foreign soil. ‘Sociologically speaking, 
what were the Jews? A pariah people.’9 He claimed they had a lack of autonomous 
political organisation, and described the tabooistic prohibitions against intermarriage 
as roots of political and social disprivilege.10 Central to Weber’s conception of Jewish 
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pariah status was that it was self-imposed – ‘voluntarily and not under pressure of 
external rejection’.11 
The belief that diaspora was synonymous with powerlessness was also 
enthusiastically adopted by the Zionist movement, accentuating the contrast 
between the powerlessness of the Jewish past with the promise of independence and 
sovereignty ahead. Under the leadership of Theodor Herzl, the Zionist movement 
disassociated itself from traditional Jewish life, caricaturing it as politically impotent 
and as the manifestation of the powerlessness of exile. In this, Herzl largely accepted 
the voguish anti-Semitism that portrayed Jews as parasitic, vulgar and unprincipled, 
while arguing that it was Christian oppression that had deformed Jewish character. In 
its place, the Zionist movement argued for a new Jew – a Hebrew.  
Shilat HaGalut, or the ‘denigration of the diaspora’ was a central tenet of 
Zionism and was vigorously – and sometimes violently – applied.12 Ben-Gurion 
described Zionism as a revolutionary movement, not only against political, social and 
economic systems, ‘but against destiny, against the unique destiny of a unique 
people’: 
What, therefore, is the meaning of our contemporary Jewish revolution--this 
revolt against destiny which the vanguard of the Jewish national renaissance 
has been cultivating in this small country for the last three generations? Our 
entire history in the Galut has represented a resistance of fate--what 
therefore, is new in the content of our contemporary revolution? There is 
one fundamental difference! In the Galut the Jewish people knew the courage 
of non-surrender, even in the face of the noose and the auto-da-fe, even, as 
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in our day, in the face of being buried alive by the tens of thousands. But the 
makers of the contemporary Jewish revolution have asserted: Resisting fate is 
not enough. We must master our fate, we must take our destiny into our 
own hands! This is the doctrine of the Jewish revolution - not non-surrender 
to the Galut, but making an end of it.13 
 
 
Yet this revolutionary strain of Zionism was a minority voice. Herzl’s 
leadership of the Zionist movement was short-lived, barely outliving the ‘daring 
breakthrough’ of the first Zionist Congress in 1897, which brought the movement 
international attention.14 After his death, the centre of influence swung from west to 
east, with Herzl’s top-hatted ‘political Zionism’ eclipsed by the ‘practical Zionism’ of 
the settler pioneers. It was rare for Russian and Polish Jews to have grown up 
without some familiarity – and in many cases a very solid education – in Jewish law, 
tradition and history.15 Their Zionism was selective in its reading of history, taking 
what might be useful in building in the future, and freely rejecting unhelpful themes, 
‘but on the whole few Zionists rejected all connection with Jewish history’.16 
Traditional Jewish life was indeed largely closed off from the outside world; the 
requirements of Jewish religious life did set these communities apart. But, as David 
Biale powerfully argues, Jewish communities were not inherently powerless.17 Exile 
did not exempt the Jews from political activity. In order to survive, Jewish 
communities had to manage their internal affairs, their relations with the outside and 
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balance the needs of one against the other. In fact, their survival under these 
unpromising circumstances is an indicator of ‘a wide spectrum of persistent and 
ongoing political activism’.18  
Jewish communities never lived in total isolation from the outside world. The 
history of self-preservation in Jewish and Zionist history produces three dominant 
characteristics – a defensive posture, profoundly mistrustful of the outside world; 
the delegation of external relations to Jewish and non-Jewish intercessors coupled 
with a contempt for authority; and the imperative of having a clear answer to an 
accusatory ‘other’. These themes will be developed below. 
 
‘Seek no intimacy with the ruling power’19 
Jewish life in the diaspora was tenuous. Political activity – the advancement and 
preservation of the interests of the community - and sometimes the physical security 
of the community itself, was dependent on the tolerance of the larger community in 
which it existed: 
On the one hand, the Jews, as an alien minority, demonized by the Gospels 
and Christian doctrine as Christ-killers, were utterly beholden to the prince. 
Their well-being rested on his good will. On the other hand, should he 
choose to withdraw his protection, complete disaster loomed. So the poritz 
[Yiddish for local potentate] was both benefactor and potential tormentor at 
one and the same time.20 
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Basic rights, such as residence and the conduct of trade, were subject to 
petition and negotiation with local rulers. The ever-present danger of outside 
intervention in the community’s internal affairs, sometimes as the result of the 
actions of ‘informants’ from within the community itself, set limits to the extent and 
assertiveness of political activity. The only reliable allies were other Jewish 
communities. Michael Brecher refers to this deep-seated attitude as the ‘two-camp’ 
thesis: the bifurcation of the world into Jewish and non-Jewish camps, with the latter 
seen as essentially hostile.21 Jews were ultimately dependent on themselves. Self-
reliance encouraged internal cohesion, and, despite a tradition of scepticism for 
authority, strong leadership. Since there was little recourse to coercive authority, 
voluntarism was critical. Since it was voluntary, Jewish self-government had to be 
inclusive, accountable, representative and pluralist. Separation was also paramount, 
with special contempt for the informer (malshin) and protection for those who 
prevent damaging information from reaching external authority (din moser). As a last 
resort, excommunication was a real threat to those who threatened the community 
from within.    
That sense of insularity permeated the politics of the Zionist movement as it 
began to articulate the demand for Jewish independence, ‘veering from the heights of 
elation to the depths of depression [and] …burdened with a deep-rooted suspicion 
of foreign powers’.22 The need for secrecy transmuted into a predisposition for 
‘backstage diplomacy’, with unofficial envoys negotiating issues as critical as post-
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Holocaust reparations from Germany, the release of Soviet Jews and the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. At an official level, Israel’s relations with pre-revolutionary 
Iran, apartheid-era South Africa, Ethiopia, and Jordan before the 1993 peace treaty 
were conducted primarily behind closed doors.  
Zionism’s chosen strategy of placing the fate of the Jewish people largely in 
the hands of the international community was, and perhaps remains, an 
uncomfortable gamble with history. Ben-Gurion’s well-known phrase ‘our future 
does not depend on what the goyim say, but on what the Jews do’ may have been as 
much wishful thinking as a clear-sighted analysis of the dependence of Israel on 
international opinion.23 Indeed, according to Abba Eban ‘Ben-Gurion’s rhetoric of 
contempt for world opinion did not reflect his real view. He had an almost reverent 
belief in the necessity for Israel to have a strong position in the eyes of the world, 
and especially in the United States’.24 Contrary to all intentions, the establishment of 
the State of Israel did not fully displace the deep-rooted sense that Israel remains ‘a 
people that dwells alone’.25  
 
Hofjude, Shtadlan, diplomat 
Separation from the outside world also resulted in the need for intercessors to 
maintain and advance their interests with external powers. However, given the 
suspicion of a process in which Jews had little experience, and the limited resources 
Jews had for engaging in the diplomatic game, these representatives were often 
                                            
 
23 Speech to IDF Independence Day Parade, Ramat Gan, 27.4.1955. BGA. Goyim is a mildly 
denigrating term for non-Jews, or the non-Jewish world.  
24 Avi Shlaim, "Interview with Abba Eban, 11 March 1976," Israel Studies 8.1 (2003): 155. 
25 Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: October, 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975). 
Chapter 1 
46 
 
caught between the two worlds of the traditional Jewish society they claimed to 
represent and the secular powers they served.  
From the early medieval period, the intercessor was typically a wealthy 
‘useful’ Jew who acted as a financier at the court of a local ruler. The position of 
Hofjude or Hoffaktor (‘court Jew’) was precarious, protected only so long as they 
were useful and always vulnerable to the denunciations of rivals and to criticism from 
within the Jewish community for failing to ensure its safety or falling prey to the 
temptation of apostasy. A variant, the shtadlan, was less likely to bring financial skills 
to the task of representing the Jews’ interests. They were, in effect, diplomats.26 
The Zionist movement accentuated the fundamental precariousness of 
representing Jewish interests, vilifying the ‘court Jew’ and the business of shtadlanut, 
stereotyping him as ‘a bearded, somewhat sinister medieval figure, cringing and 
deferential, alternatively grovelling and fawning before pashas and princes in begging 
for scraps of mercy on behalf of that potentate’s helpless Jewish wards’.27 Aaron 
Klieman argues for an essential continuity between the shtadlan of traditional Jewish 
life and modern Israeli diplomacy:  
Strong traces of traditional shtadlanut still characterize Jewish affairs because 
neither post-modernism nor Israel’s founding have resolved the basic 
acceptance-rejection duality of the Jewish relationship to the non-Jewish 
world, and of the world to Jewish ascendancy.28 
 
However, Israeli diplomats have often enjoyed a profile not much higher than 
that of the shtadlan, despite representing a sovereign foreign government rather than 
being the subject of historical forces. Foreign affairs have been subordinated to 
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security affairs, and foreign ministers further from the centre of power than defence 
ministers. Indeed, for most of the period under review, the position of defence 
minister was held by the prime minister, whose office became ‘the principal venue 
for shaping Israel’s foreign policy’, rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.29 In 
some cases, the foreign minister was completely excluded from foreign policy 
discussions, including the direct contact between Prime Minister Golda Meir and her 
ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli-Romanian relations under 
Rabin’s premiership.30 Neither foreign ministers Eban or Allon were able to assert 
the ministry’s role on these occasions.  
There is a wider issue at play here, though. The inherited suspicion of power 
discussed above also contributed to a politics that was contentious in style and 
hostile to hierarchy.  
 
The Jewish People throughout the ages was essentially a class-less society. 
The Diaspora had its sages, its millionaires and its beggars. But, broadly 
speaking, there was no Jewish ruling class and no Jewish proletariat. A Jewish 
equivalent of Pope or Bishop is unthinkable. …After two thousand years 
there is again a Jewish Government. But the intervening gap has done much 
to discredit Government as such in Jewish eyes. Government was always 
Their Government and usually Public Enemy Number One. Every Jew 
criticized the Government in his heart and openly where he dated, whatever 
the Government did. It is difficult to throw over the habits of twenty 
centuries in two years.31 
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According to Amos Oz, who also remarked on the absence of a Jewish Pope, 
‘throughout their history, the people of Israel have disliked obedience’.32 In its 
modern manifestation, Ehud Sprinzak described theme this as ‘illegalism’ in Israeli 
political culture, or expediency towards the law.33 The rules of international 
diplomacy, the conventions and manners of diplomats, are not easy bedfellows with 
the political culture Israel inherited from traditional Jewish communal life.  
 
Know what to reply 
In the Ethics of the Fathers, a post-Biblical commentary, R. Eleazar b. Arach says: ‘Be 
alert to learn Torah and know what answer to give to an Epicuros’34 Knowledge has 
a value beyond one’s own erudition; presenting it to the outside world is also 
important. In Rabbinic literature the term epicuros, derived from the Greek name 
Epicurus, denotes a non-believer.35 The Babylonian Talmud develops the point 
further, distinguishing between the Jewish and the non-Jewish epicuros.36 According 
to Rashi, a leading rabbinic authority, since the Jewish non-believer does so 
knowingly, further discussion is unlikely to alter his attitude, and may even encourage 
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him to develop his views further. On the other hand, ‘knowing what to say’ to the 
outside world has a greater potential for change.37  
Examples of Jewish apologia, defences against a range of allegations, are 
threaded through history. The most important work of the classical period is Contra 
Apionem (Against Apion) by Flavius Josephus, a refutation of claims that Judaism was no 
more ancient, and thus no more authoritative, than the Greek pagan religions of the 
time. In the medieval and modern period, learned Jews were compelled to debate 
Christian theologians and answer accusations. These disputations or vikuchim, 
notably the Paris Disputation of 1240, the Barcelona Disputation of 1263 and the 
Tortosa Disputation of 1413-14, were also barely-disguised attempts to proselytise.38 
Knowing what to say was a delicate balance. ‘Since 'winning' a debate could well 
jeopardize the security of the Jewish community at large, political considerations 
certainly entered into what Jewish disputants publicly said or refrained from saying’.39 
Knowing what to say became a key feature of Jewish communal life. 
Israel enthusiastically adopted the notion that words could be a powerful 
form of defence. Safran approvingly notes the place of ‘passion, oratory and zeal’ in 
Israeli political culture, making an explicit link to Jewish religion: ‘the fury and 
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splendid invective of the prophets seem to echo again in the land’.40 The phrase ‘Da 
ma sh’tashiv’ (‘know what answer to give’) re-appeared in 1967 as the title of a series 
of handbooks in English and Hebrew in the form of a series of questions and 
‘recommended’ answers. For example:  
 
Q: In the days preceding the 5th June all the world powers warned Israel 
against a conflagration in the Middle East and requested Israel and Egypt not 
to take any military action. Why, then, did you start the war in spite of these 
warnings? 
A: Israel did not start the war. She fought because she had to, after she was 
attacked…41 
 
 
As Schleifer argues, ‘One thousand and eight hundred years of submissive hasbara 
…has left its mark on the Jews’.42 That mark, in sum, was a strong legacy in dealing 
with the ‘outside world’. It was based on an assumption that life was to be led in a 
profoundly hostile environment, and consequently featured an easily-evoked sense of 
insecurity and a deeply-rooted pessimism. Yet Jewish life was also characterised by a 
high level of communal organization for self-reliance, a strong sense of community, 
habits of separation and secrecy from the outside and a tradition of diplomatic 
intercession with outside authorities. Those qualities persisted even as Jewish life 
underwent its most fundamental change since biblical times, with the inception of 
Zionism.   
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Hasbara in practice: From the inception of the Zionist movement 
At the inception of the Zionist movement, there was propaganda whose aim 
was to bend hearts towards the idea of redemption; afterwards, we turned 
to publicity; in the phase of realisation we reached information – conveying 
reports, announcements, communiqués, declarations, press corrections etc. 
With the state, we reached a new stage – hasbara.43 
 
 
This section looks at the key developments in the development of the practice of 
Jewish foreign media relations, from the inception of the Zionist movement, through 
the years of British Mandatory control of Palestine, Israeli independence and the first 
twenty years of government communications policy. This is a critical period, in which 
the political culture of hasbara emerged, and where the limitations on Jewish politics 
and the limitations of Jewish politics in the transition from diaspora to independence 
began to exhibit the characteristics of ‘muddling through’ as a policy-making 
preference. 
 
Herzl and Sokolow 
Theodor Herzl initiated a breakthrough in the affairs of the Jewish people, 
establishing the Zionist movement that would successfully lobby for Jewish self-
determination. His contribution, though, was neither in the originality of his ideas, 
nor in the mobilisation of mass support. Others had been articulating the imperative 
of Jewish nationalism for decades; it would be decades before Zionism gathered mass 
support, and then only when there was no other choice. However, Herzl 
transformed the desire for self-determination from a marginal phenomenon of Jewish 
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life into ‘a subject for world opinion …on the canvas of world politics’.44 He was ‘a 
theoretician and practitioner of persuasive communications’.45 
Addressing the First Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897, its tail-coated and 
top-hatted spectacle itself a production of political theatre calculated to draw 
international attention, he articulated his approach: 
From time immemorial the world has been misinformed about us. 
…Doubtless there will be discussions on the subject of an organization the 
need for which is recognized by all. Organization is an evidence of the 
reasonableness of a movement. But there is one point which should be 
clearly and energetically emphasized in order to further the solution of the 
Jewish question. We Zionists desire not an international league but 
international discussion. Needless to say this distinction is of the first 
importance in our eyes. It is this distinction which justifies the convening of 
our Congress. There will be no question of intrigues, secret interventions, 
and devious methods in our ranks, but only of unhampered utterances under 
the constant and complete supervision of public opinion. 46 
 
For Herzl, the principle challenge was to drag Zionism out of the world of 
ideological disputation and erudite discussion in obscure publications. He wished to 
push the Jewish question on to the world stage, correcting non-Jewish distortions 
and misunderstandings, benign or malignant, of the Jews and their demand for 
national independence. Lacking state power or armed force, his strategy was to 
lobby emperors and kings. In his ‘aristocratic republic’, ‘politics must take place in 
the upper strata and work downwards’.47 He toured the courts of Europe, seeking 
an international charter of support from the Pope, Emperor Wilhelm II, the 
Ottoman Sultan, the Archduke of Baden and the British Colonial Secretary, 
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motivated by a ‘profound understanding that the efforts of a small and persecuted 
people could become successful only if they were thrust directly, without mediation, 
with unrelenting simplemindedness, straight into the commanding heights of world 
power and international opinion’.48 It was a powerful legacy, and perhaps the key 
weapon in the Zionist organisation’s campaign for independence.49 Unable to bring 
genuine and significant economic or political power to bear, and with only minority 
support from within the Jewish community, they relied on the ‘intellectual and 
spiritual resources of a highly literate and vocal people, adept at polemics, loquacious 
and oriented toward public debate’.50 
Herzl did not develop a specifically Jewish or Zionist approach to his pursuit 
of international support for the movement. His lobbying for Zionism shared many of 
the characteristics of his journalistic writing – a flashy, superficial brilliance which 
drew attention but lacked real depth. It was one of his successors, Nahum Sokolow, 
who synthesised his own experience of Jewish diaspora life and Herzl’s determined 
pursuit of international opinion to become the ‘first strategist and professional of 
Zionist hasbara’.51 For Sokolow, hasbara was an essentially Jewish undertaking, a 
theme he developed in an article ostensibly about the German-Jewish industrialist 
Emil Rathenau and his son, the politician Walther Rathenau.  
 
Emil Rathenau was not an inventor or an original creator: he used to explain 
… a world invented by others. This role of hasbara, accomplishment and 
expansion, has a special Jewish quality. …We have, in amazingly large 
numbers, messengers-apostles, spreaders of knowledge, transmitters of 
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genius, conductors of plenty, bearers of huge containers, bright moons, 
without whom the world would be dark and chaotic, and all the discoveries 
and novelties would be hidden and buried. …This role, of the man in the 
middle, he who elucidates and mediates and explains between nations and 
peoples, is the special ability of the Jews. Very few praise him, while many 
condemn.52 
 
But for Sokolow hasbara was more than a cultural or national predisposition 
for mediation. It was a profession requiring training, expertise, and formal 
instruction. ‘This is a science, and we must study it,’ he told Zionist emissaries in 
1934. He called for ‘logical hasbara …not rainbow-coloured decorations of the 
wonderful panorama of our country, things that evoke enthusiasm for a moment, but 
prove nothing, except the need to widen and deepen the understanding’.53  
Sokolow introduced the term hasbara into the Zionist lexicon, alongside the more 
generally-used ‘propaganda’.54 A journalist by profession, and from a rabbinic family 
he was deeply rooted in the cultural and political life of European Jews. In his early 
career he edited the Zionist newspaper HaTzfira in Warsaw, whose readership 
included both traditional Jews and those attracted by the haskala or Jewish shift to 
modernity. Located at the heart of this debate he was able to clarify his own 
thinking, and influence that of others: 
 
In the Monday parties in his home and in gatherings of college students, he 
explained the nature of Zionism, refuted its opponents, considered its 
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principles and the doubts raised about it, preached its new doctrine and 
converted many students.55 
 
 
Debating the merits of Zionism within the Jewish community was important 
groundwork, but it was not the outward-facing advocacy that Herzl had demanded 
when he dismissed the Fourth Zionist Congress with the words ‘time for arguments 
and speeches has passed; now is the time for deeds, for propaganda, for work!’  
Initially, that work continued to follow Herzl’s model of high-level diplomacy. Taking 
up a formal position of leadership - Secretary-General of the World Zionist 
Organisation – in 1906, Sokolow moved around Europe, seeking opportunities to 
advance the movement’s interests. In 1908, following the Young Turk Revolution, he 
was in Constantinople, exploring the possibility of obtaining the Turkish support for 
Zionism.56 But the mission was fruitless, leading Sokolow to conclude that ‘in the 
near future, public opinion will play a decisive role regarding the government, the 
constitution and everything else, and our organization, on its part, can do nothing 
more effective than focusing all the time on fundamental and extensive hasbara on its 
aspirations’.57 
In fact, the Zionist movement was beginning to develop a dual strategy of 
conventional diplomacy aimed at political leadership combined with broader-based 
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public diplomacy aimed at opinion-formers. In 1912, Sokolow moved to London, 
where he would remain, working for the Zionist movement, for the rest of his life. 
Pursuing this dual strategy, he was instrumental in obtaining the Balfour Declaration 
in 1917, the formal acknowledgment that the Zionist movement was the 
representative of the Jewish people in all affairs relating to the ‘establishment of a 
national home for the Jewish people’ in Palestine.58 At the same time, he continued 
to reach out to Jewish and non-Jewish audiences.59 Sokolow was Zionism’s first 
masbir.   
 
The public diplomacy of the Zionist movement 
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the capture of Palestine in late 1917, 
Britain was in a position to implement the rather vague pledge of support for 
Zionism contained in the Balfour Declaration. The Zionist movement, now headed 
by Chaim Weizmann, dispatched a Zionist Commission under David Eder to advance 
its interests from Jerusalem.60 In 1922, Colonel Frederick Kisch was appointed as 
Director of the Political Department of the Zionist Organisation and to head the 
Palestine Zionist Executive (PZE) in Jerusalem. The Executive, which replaced the 
Zionist Commission, was intended to serve as ‘a kind of cabinet’ for the Jewish 
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Agency, the Jewish proto-government in Palestine under British Mandatory rule.61 
Kisch, an engineer officer in the British Army, ‘a British Jew and a great patriot’, was, 
in effect, Jewish Palestine’s first foreign minister.62 Gershon Agronsky (Agron), who 
headed the PZE’s press bureau from 1924, wrote that Kisch ‘believes in publicity not 
just to disseminate information, but as a way to spark constructive criticism and 
proposals for change. The press has a vital role to play, and it is the duty of Zionist 
officials to assist the press to fill this role’.63 Kisch himself met the press infrequently, 
but when he did, his aim was ‘neither to interfere with liberty of the press, nor to 
gain any personal favours from it’.64 
Agronsky, who had ‘a flair for such things’, quickly established an Association 
of Foreign Press Correspondents in order to develop relations with the international 
press in order to ensure greater understanding of the Zionist movement.65 He also 
began to publish a weekly bulletin, News from Eretz-Yisrael, which came out in 
Hebrew, Arabic, English, German, Spanish and French editions.66 The anti-Jewish 
riots of 1929 were the background to the first major clash between the Jewish 
community in Palestine and the British authorities. The resulting revision of British 
policy, the Passfield Report, was a major blow to the Zionist movement. Kisch’s 
position – ‘the indignation of Palestine Jewry at what it considers the virtual abolition 
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of the Balfour declaration and the death knell of the Jewish homeland’ - was carried 
in the international press to support his claims that the British had failed in their duty 
to protect Jewish life and property.67  
Chaim Weizmann’s leadership of the Zionist movement ended in 1931. A 
younger generation, predominated by the socialist Zionists, took up the mantle. In 
place of Kisch, Chaim Arlosoroff of Mapai (the Workers of the Land of Israel Party) 
took over the Political Department. His deputy, who replaced him in June 1933 
when Arlosoroff was murdered in Tel Aviv, was Moshe Shertok (Sharett).68 Sharett 
would remain a leading figure in the foreign relations of the Zionist movement and 
the State of Israel until the late 1950s and an important, if largely unsuccessful, 
advocate for cogent government communications policy.  
In 1934, the now-enlarged Jewish Agency for Palestine moved the World 
Zionist Organisation’s hasbara department from London to Jerusalem, with the aim 
of engaging with Jews and non-Jews, in Palestine and overseas.69 It also established a 
news agency, the Palestine Correspondence Agency or Palcor.70 Close relations 
developed between the local Hebrew press and the Jewish Agency.71 The press saw 
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itself as an active participant in the pursuit of independence, whilst the Jewish Agency 
lobbied against the restrictions placed on the press by the Mandatory.  
 
‘The journalists themselves were very willing to take instructions from the 
national institutions, at least on issues that were not politically contentious. 
The assumption that they were expected to take such instructions did not 
concern the newspapers at all’.72 
 
Indeed, so compliant was the local Hebrew press, that in 1942, in the wake of 
the Struma incident, they formed an editors’ committee, a forum in which leading 
journalists and the Zionist leadership shared information and agreed common 
strategy.73 With no fear that its independence might be compromised, the editors 
expressed hopes that the arrangement would be ‘an appropriate and desirable tool 
for influencing public opinion in the spirit of Zionist policy at this time’.74  
Success with bringing the Hebrew media in line with Zionist policy was not 
mirrored in relations with the international press. Having suffered a significant defeat 
with the promulgation of the May 1939 Palestine White Paper, the Jewish Agency 
stepped up its overseas efforts, re-establishing an information department at its 
offices in London.75 Moshe Shertok asked Gershon Agronsky, who had left public 
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service in 1932 to found the Palestine Post, to prepare a memorandum for the Zionist 
Executive regarding the establishment of a government information service76. 
Agronsky had remained engaged in political life, with his newspaper ‘regarded by all 
as [the Jewish Agency’s] semi-official mouthpiece’.77 Agronsky’s proposals were 
modelled closely on the British wartime Ministry of Propaganda, headed by Lord 
Beaverbrook and then Brendan Bracken. Agronsky thought that it would appeal to 
Ben-Gurion, who he thought would be flattered by the implicit parallel with 
Churchill.78 However, the memorandum was ignored, at least for the time being.  
With the end of the war, the Zionist movement renewed its demands for 
independence in earnest. There was disappointment that Britain’s new Labour 
government maintained pre-war limits on Jewish immigration to Palestine, and 
frustration that the Palestinian Arab case was being more forcefully made by Arab 
Offices in London and Washington.79 In October 1945, the Jewish Agency Executive 
headed by Ben-Gurion, agreed on a campaign of armed opposition to British rule. In 
his plans for the insurgency, Ben-Gurion considered ‘explaining Jewish retaliation to 
world public opinion was as important as the retaliation itself’.80 This was no simple 
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task; whilst international opinion opposed the British blockade of Palestine for 
Holocaust survivors, it would be harder to justify attacks against British military and 
civilian targets. The Jewish Agency was drawing up plans to open a public relations 
office in the summer of 1946, when the British launched Operation Agatha, a 
countrywide ‘cordon and search’ operation to seize arms and arrest the top Zionist 
leadership.81 Agatha, or the Black Shabbat, launched ‘an intensive media war’ which 
‘severely tested the propaganda capability of the Jewish Agency’.82  
The planned public relations office was hurriedly established, headed by the 
extremely able Walter Eytan (Ettinghausen), an Oxford lecturer who had worked on 
breaking German codes at Bletchley Park during the war.83 He came to Palestine in 
1946 with the brief of establishing the Institute for Higher Studies, a training school 
for the future state’s foreign service.84 However, he was diverted into hasbara affairs 
as soon as he arrived. He got to work quickly, issuing printed bulletins and 
establishing a daily press briefing.85 He also developed a critique of ‘Zionist 
propaganda’, which suffered from improvisation, a lack of long-term planning, a 
multiplicity of organisations and not enough funding, as well as the failure to 
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distinguish between Jewish and non-Jewish audiences. Eytan called for the 
professionalization of Jewish information efforts, requiring that those who spoke for 
the Zionist movement had an understanding of news agendas and the power of visual 
images.86  
Eytan was initially on the back foot, with the leadership of the Yishuv in some 
disarray. Responding to Operation Agatha, he remarked only that ‘Jews are 
disinclined to look to anyone else but themselves for defence’.87 However, after the 
July 22 bombing of the King David Hotel by the Irgun, his denial of British allegations 
that the Jewish Agency was involved in the outrage was reported in the international 
press as credible.88 He was on easier ground when dealing with a non-fraternisation 
order issued by the commander of British forces in Palestine, Lt-Gen. Sir Evelyn 
Barker, after the bombing. The order, which was posted in the Jerusalem officers’ 
mess, called for ‘punishing the Jews in a way the race dislikes as much as any, by 
striking at their pockets and showing our contempt of them’ by forbidding any 
contact with them. Major Aubrey Eban, an intelligence officer at the time, saw the 
order in his officers’ mess and passed the text to Jon Kimche, a pro-Zionist British 
journalist who was working for Reuters, from where it was widely and 
unsympathetically reported.89  
The Jewish Agency’s decision in August 1946 to renounce armed insurgency 
put Eytan’s public relations office on the offensive. In September, he opened his own 
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press centre, opposite the British Press Information Office.90 His small staff included 
his deputy Gershon Hirsch, who gave daily briefings in his absence.91 Michael Comay 
and Daphne Trevor, both South-African born, produced written material in English, 
whilst Nahum Sternberg arranged hospitality and press tours.92 To prevent 
‘duplication and disorder’ Eytan took charge of all foreign press work, bringing the 
press departments of the Keren Kayemet, the Keren Hayesod and the Vaad Leumi 
under his control.93 He gave an additional, more detailed briefing, for journalists who 
wrote both for the domestic Hebrew press and the international press, since some 
of their questioning was so probing that he ‘dare not reply’ to the whole press 
corps.94 
London was also an important focus of Eytan’s efforts, as tension with Britain 
rose. The London office of the Jewish Agency sent him regular reports on how 
events in Palestine were reported in the British press.95 At the suggestion of Teddy 
Kollek, who was already in London, the press department was reorganised, with 
Aubrey Eban – now out of British uniform – appointed its new head.96  Eban’s task 
was ‘to capture some islands of sympathy and understanding’, writing articles, 
pamphlets, booklets, lunching with editors, reporters, and MPs and pursuing ‘my 
information work with more show of self-confidence than I felt’.97 
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Once Britain had passed the Palestine question to the United Nations in February 
1947, the Zionist movement also shifted focus. Moshe Shertok, the head of the 
Jewish Agency’s political department travelled to New York and ‘plunged into a 
dizzying whirlpool of activities and meetings, aimed at counterbalancing British 
actions and denigrating [British foreign secretary] Bevin himself’.98 The Jewish Agency 
had opened a press office in Washington in 1943. Now, Isaiah Kenen was recruited 
from the American Jewish Conference to head a new press office in New York. 
Kenen’s approach was ‘not merely to react to events, but to assist in creating them’, 
and ‘to put the British on the defensive’.99  
In fact, Britain was already conclusively on the defensive. The Labour 
government unsuccessfully attempted to deny the unique status of hundreds of 
thousands of Jewish refugees and survivors in Europe, and to present them as 
‘participants – some willing, some duped – in a nationalistic struggle’.100 Speaking at a 
press conference in November 1945, Bevin had warned ‘the Jews, with all their 
sufferings’ against wanting ‘to get too much at the head of the queue’ when their 
claim for immigration to Palestine was only one element of the upheaval of European 
post-war reconstruction.101 World opinion felt differently. It was the story of 
clandestine immigration of holocaust survivors to Palestine, often on boats of 
dubious safety and with highly evocative names, which provided a rich vein of 
material for journalists.  The most notorious, the Exodus 1947, ‘became such a 
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British publicity disaster that little had to be done by the Jewish Agency other than 
providing background material and statements from the sidelines’.102 And it was 
against this background that the United Nations voted on the partition of Palestine 
were taken in November 1947.103  
 
Press relations after independence 
Substantive discussions of Agron’s proposal for the establishment of an information 
ministry took their place behind negotiating the British withdrawal, Israel’s 
declaration of independence in May 1948, and the consequent outbreak of war. In 
the meantime, information activity was characterised by improvisation with little 
clear organisation during the period of the war.104 For the fifty-five foreign 
correspondents who were accredited to Tel-Aviv, as well as the ‘parasitical fringe of 
novelists, columnists, poets, children’s book authors, producers, dramatists and part-
time pundits’, the transition from British rule to Israeli was quite a shock.105  
According to Kenneth Bilby, the correspondent for the New York Herald 
Tribune, ‘the Arab-Jewish squabble had been a newspaperman’s dream, truly unique 
in the annals of foreign correspondence’ before the British left. Journalists were free 
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to roam between Arabs and Jews, and to seek an official view from the British Press 
Information Office. The PIO was headed by Richard Stubbs, and offered the press 
congenial surroundings, cable facilities and constant access to officials.106  Indeed, the 
journalists were welcomed wherever they went. 
 
From November 29, 1947, when the United Nations adopted partition, until 
May 14, 1948, when the British departed, the war was as much propaganda as 
bullets, and the foreign journalist, particularly American or British, found 
himself a very important person indeed. For the American, it was never too 
late at night to rout prominent Jewish Agency officials out of bed for specific 
comment or general discussion; for prominent British journalists, Sir Henry 
Gurney, chief secretary of the mandate government was generally available.107 
 
This all ended with the departure of the British. Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime 
minister had an uncomplicated outlook on the question of press relations: ‘I’m 
interested in guns, not in stories,’ he is reputed to have told journalists.108 Certainly, 
during the war of 1948-9, he spent no time dealing with the question of Israel’s 
international image, or briefing foreign journalists. Ben-Gurion was determined that 
he should have administrative responsibility for setting the government’s information 
policy, but since he was so firmly focussed on the military and diplomatic aspects of 
the war, that policy remained ‘packed away in the great brain of the chairman, as if it 
were sealed in a box’.109 
Perhaps this was preferable. When Ben-Gurion did voice his opinions about 
the press, it often complicated matters. In November 1950, the editors’ committee – 
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by any measure a friendly audience - cancelled its annual dinner with the prime 
minister to commemorate the 1947 UN partition plan in protest at his dismissive 
attitude. In an act apparently calculated to smooth things over, Ben-Gurion invited 
the editors to meet him in January 1951, but then berated them for responding only 
to ‘the impression of today, the event of today, the sensation of today, the public 
mood of today’.110 In the Knesset, he was even more scathing: 
 
What is a newspaper? Someone who has money hires some workers to print 
what he thinks. Is the thought more important because it is printed on paper? 
Is there any difference between a written comment and a spoken one? What 
does it mean ‘it’s written in the paper’? It means it was said by someone. 
Someone said it. Do you think that the ‘someone’ who said it is more 
important than you?111 
 
Feeling that the issue of press relations was ‘horribly neglected’, Sharett 
arranged with Ben-Gurion that he would take responsibility for government 
information activities until a more formal decision was taken.112 Sharett, whose 
earlier career included membership of the editorial board of Davar, was also capable 
of offending journalists, this time in the guise of collegial advice. During a trip to Paris 
in 1951, Yediot Ahronot’s Paris correspondent reported that ‘the foreign minister of 
Israel thinks it appropriate to devote his valuable time … to teach them, the 
journalists, a lesson in professional journalism’.113 Sharett was, at least, convinced that 
the press was an integral element of foreign policy. ‘He believed that an 
understanding and even supportive public opinion was an important component 
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aiding Israel’s government to pursue its policies’.114 Whilst he did not cavil at the use 
of military force, he believed that ‘the possession of arms in itself and the show of 
military muscle, indispensable as they may be, were not sufficient to ensure Israel’s 
security’.115 
His initial intention was to establish a unified government information service. 
He hoped the foreign department would be headed by Moshe Perlman, a journalist 
with military experience from the wartime British army and press experience from a 
posting as an attaché to the British Embassy in Athens after the war, whilst the 
domestic department would be headed by a journalist on loan from Haaretz. To 
head the service, he recalled Gershon Agronsky, whose 1944 proposal to establish 
an information ministry had yet to be discussed. 
Writing to Agron, he remembered that ‘somewhere in one of the protocols 
there is a decision that regarding an ‘information bureau’ – whatever that means – 
that is to be subordinate to the Minister of Internal Affairs’.116 Indeed, officials from 
the information department of the Jewish Agency had already set up an information 
service at the Ministry of the Interior, headed by Yitzhak Regev, which was intended 
to assist local journalists.117 Sharett told Agronsky that he did not want to clash with 
minister of the interior Yitzhak Greenboim ‘which would certainly turn into a 
personal dispute’, and so asked Agronsky to establish a ‘government information 
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service’, run jointly by the defence and foreign ministries, to provide information for 
the foreign press. However, the offer did not include Agronsky attending cabinet 
meetings, which had been a key element of his original proposal. Agronsky declined 
the offer, and – for the time being - remained in Jerusalem.118 
The foreign press certainly needed information. On 14 May, the Blue Train 
telegraph apparatus, which had sped copy over the imperial wireless system to 
London in a matter of minutes, was packed up and sent to Amman. Assured by the 
Jewish Agency that they could continue to file from Jerusalem, a dozen foreign 
correspondents remained in the city. But no-one was able to get new telegraph 
machinery into Jerusalem. For two weeks, the journalists were stuck in the besieged 
city, neither able to file their copy, or to leave. When they did manage to leave 
Jerusalem, they went to Tel Aviv, via Amman and Cyprus, where they found similar 
problems. The city was ‘teeming with correspondents, all acutely unhappy about the 
lack of press facilities and the over-burdened wireless system’.119 It was, though, 
relatively safe.120 
The foreign press liaison department, based first at the Scopus Club on 
HaYarkon Street and then at the Ritz Hotel in Tel Aviv, was headed by Moshe 
Pearlman. According to one of the foreign journalists in Tel Aviv in 1948, Pearlman 
‘uninhibitedly fell to converting Tel Aviv’s sandbagged Hotel Ritz in to the most 
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wideawake press camp in the dreamy Middle East’.121 He was assisted by another 
British-born spokesman, Jewish Agency official Avraham Harman, and by Lionel 
Peyton. Initially, they struggled, with Perlman giving irregular and unscheduled press 
briefings.122 Yaakov Dori, the IDF’s first chief of staff, did not grant a single interview 
during his term of office. According to the editor of Maariv, Dr Azriel Carlebach, the 
foreign correspondents in Israel suffered a great deal: 
 
They suffered from disruptions to the post, and the failure of the minister of 
transport to even connect Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. They suffered from power 
struggles between ministers’ offices and their ministries and from restrictions 
on travel. From the lack of manners of clerks and military commanders …and 
from the stupidity of the censors. How do we want to win on the 
propaganda front at home and abroad if those appointed are clerks with no 
experience, no training and no understanding of journalism? Why weren’t 
press men called up to serve on the press front?123 
 
In fact, Perlman was a credible spokesman and his briefings were popular 
enough with both foreign and Israeli journalists that Harman worried that the Israelis 
were attending Perlman’s briefings and asking questions ‘about matters we are not 
interested in the foreigners hearing about’.124 In September 1948, Pearlman was 
appointed as the first IDF spokesman, leaving Harman to run the international 
communications department alone. By the autumn of 1948, and with the 
encouragement of foreign minister Sharett, a more effective Israeli press liaison 
system was in operation. Harman was responsible for issuing credentials, whilst 
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Peyton acted as an escort on press trips to the front.125 New telegraph equipment 
was brought in. Press trips were organised.126 An information office was opened in 
New York.127 
As Carlebach noted in Maariv, the Arab states, and Jordan in particular, had 
taken a more amenable attitude to foreign journalists during the war, offering access 
to the front and to senior political and military figures so that it was possible, ‘within 
twenty-four hours of arrival to meet cabinet ministers, senior statesmen or army 
chiefs’.128 However, both Arabs and Israelis enforced strict censorship on what 
journalists could publish.  
The Zionist leadership, transitioning into statehood, was concerned about 
preventing the release of information that may have been of use to the enemy, but 
the few professionals who could guide them lacked clear authority or clear policy to 
follow. In the absence of such policy, they ‘muddled through’, both limiting access 
and censoring publication. As the war continued, the military censors, ‘a well-
educated group of young men, [who] treated the foreign press amicably but suffered 
from the prevalent spy bogey and from the security concept of the old underground 
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days’, imposed harsh restrictions on the press.129 Apart from the chief of staff, the 
chief of operations and the commander of the Jerusalem front, no IDF officer could 
be named, nor could the designation of any military unit be mentioned. They blocked 
publication of major stories, such as the Altalena incident and the friendly-fire death 
of Colonel ‘Mickey’ Marcus, who was commanding the Jerusalem front.130 
The censors also tried to prevent foreign reporting of the assassination of 
UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in September 1948, during the second 
ceasefire of the war. Whilst Bilby of the Herald Tribune thought Israeli censors were 
‘as gentle as a Mediterranean breeze’ compared to their Jordanian counterparts, 
Carlebach of Maariv was horrified: 
 
They sit here, about a hundred or more people, bored. There’s a ceasefire, 
there’s nothing to report …and on Friday afternoon at 5pm, Bernadotte is 
assassinated. An event with a capital ‘E’. The most important event in the 
world …That’s what they were sitting here for. …They listen and they write 
their despatches. Very urgent. Double-urgent.  And they go to the table of 
the censor in Tel Aviv and present their copy, and he doesn’t accept it. Stop. 
Total black-out. You may not say that Bernadotte was murdered. … In the 
meantime, the enemy’s radio is reporting the event, along with their English 
commentary …and later the entire world hears the enemy’s version. Only 
Israel keeps quiet. …The newsrooms telegraph their correspondents in 
Israel, and the correspondents ask to send an absolutely private reply, just to 
let them know that the censor is blocking them, but the censor blocks even 
this correspondence. They try to explain to the Israeli clerk how great the 
damage they are causing; everyone will see suspect motives in blocking 
publication, and we only want to dispel those suspicions.131  
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The domestic press had an altogether easier time, so long as they complied 
with the government.132 The editors’ committee, which had been established before 
independence, continued to meet senior politicians and security figures regularly and 
receive briefings on matters of a sensitive nature. The Israeli media accepted self-
censorship as preferable to the interference of the military censor, whose powers to 
prevent the publication of sensitive security information and to preserve public order 
under the 1945 Defence (Emergency) Regulations were extensive.133 There was also 
a semi-official censorship where senior officials would ‘discuss’ the next day’s 
coverage of news with editors and journalists.134 In some cases, officials simply 
dictated the news to the press: “On Saturday morning I would walk into the radio 
station of Kol Israel, which was controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office and just 
dictate the news to the reader, reporting about the lectures given by ministers and 
government officials on Friday evening.’135 In other instances, the press actually 
reported what politicians wished they had said, rather than what they said in reality: 
‘Moshe Sharett …delivered an important speech in the Knesset. Hearing it 
reported on the radio, he regretted some of his remarks, telephoned 
Jerusalem Post editor Gershon Agron, and dictated a different text to him. 
The fact that his speech had been recorded in the Knesset chronicles and 
broadcast in Hebrew throughout the country did not deter him from 
rewriting it after the event. However, the most interesting aspect of this 
story was the newspaper editor’s response. After all, who would know better 
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than the minister himself what was good for the country, and who was 
Agron, a newspaper editor, to argue with the minister?136 
 
In April 1949 the Israeli government returned to Agronsky’s proposal for an 
information ministry. Commenting on the improvised wartime system, Agronsky 
wrote to Sharett that ‘the division of the task into two, with two conductors for the 
information services and two ministries – internal affairs and foreign affairs – brings 
little benefit and a great deal of complication’.137 Sharett endorsed the proposal and 
recommended Agronsky should establish and head the government press and 
information department, subordinate to the Prime Minister’s Office.138 This time, 
Agronsky accepted on condition that he would attend cabinet meetings, although 
without ministerial rank.139 
He established an information office that served all government ministries, 
and divided it into six units: domestic press, foreign press, broadcasting services, 
public opinion research, the defence ministry’s public affairs department and the IDF 
spokesperson’s unit.140 The first Israel Government Yearbook shows that by June 
1949, all the information services of different units had indeed been concentrated in 
the Prime Minister’s Office, as Ben-Gurion had ordered.141 His plans included a staff 
                                            
 
136 Yoram Peri, Telepopulism: Media and Politics in Israel (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2004) 84. 
137 Agron, Slave of Duty [Hebrew]. 183-185. 
138 Moshe Yegar, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Structure, Administration and Lessons 
from Moshe Sharett's Diaries [Hebrew]," Kivvunum 10 (1981): 43-45. See also: CZA 
A209/111/3, Moshe Perlman to Agron, 25.5.1949. Perlman corrected the typist’s rendering 
of Agron’s surname, striking out the redundant letters ‘sky’. 
139 CZA 209/111/2, Contract of employment, 2.8.1949. See also: "Gershon Agronsky 
Assumes Duties as Israeli Information Chief; Changes Name to Agron," JTA 10 June 1949. 
140 Yegar, History of the Israeli Foreign Information System [Hebrew]  38. 
141 Israel Government, Israel Government Yearbook [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Government 
Printer, 1949). 
Chapter 1 
75 
 
of 164, split between a unified press office that would deal with foreign and domestic 
journalists, and the broadcasting service which oversaw Kol Yisrael radio.142 He also 
called for a large increase in expenditure, although he noted that ‘the governments of 
America and England devote a much higher percentage of their budget on hasbara’ 
than he was requesting.143  
But Agron made little headway. HaDor, the evening paper of the ruling Mapai 
party – recently established at his recommendation - carried an article in March 1950 
which noted ‘a few months ago an institution called the Information Service was 
established in Israel, and its head is a pleasant and capable man. But for some reason, 
there has been very little progress in this area’.144 Replying to an earlier letter from 
Agron in which he apparently shared his frustrations, the director-general of the 
foreign ministry, Walter Eytan, suggested a solution:  
 
Why don’t you ask the Govt. to devote one of its weekly meetings (or a 
special meeting) to public and press relations? I am sure M.S. would support 
such a suggestion, + it would give you the opportunity to lecture them on the 
A.B.C. of the problem. I quite agree with you – at present there is scarcely a 
single member of the Govt. who has the remotest notion of the press (local 
+ foreign), nor (what is worse) of the vast harm which is done as the direct 
result of this ignorance or contempt of the subject. So you’ll have to teach 
them.145 
 
Two weeks later, Agron did brief the cabinet. Ben-Gurion was less than 
enthusiastic, remarking that ‘once a stable government is formed I hope it will 
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discuss this’.146 Offended, Agron resigned in early 1951, and returned to the 
editorship of the Jerusalem Post. 147 In his letter of resignation, he listed a series of 
administrative changes he had been unable to implement.148 He later wrote to Ben-
Gurion of his frustrations: 
 
I am not leaving with a sense of disappointment because I was able to learn 
that a system needs definition, and that without such clarity productive work 
is impossible; my disappointment is with myself and that I thought I could 
manage without it, that I found that in government work, as in civil society, 
the value of definition, authority etc. to someone faithfully carrying out his 
job are so unimportant.149 
  
 
There now followed a series of re-organisations. In January 1952, Agron’s six 
units were rationalised into three – the Government Press Office to deal with 
foreign and domestic press, the Broadcasting Service which ran Kol Yisrael radio and a 
new domestic hasbara department whose target audience was the Israeli population, 
and which became the Minhal haHasbara (the Hasbara Administration) in 1954.150 
Meanwhile Sharett considered establishing a department within the Foreign Ministry 
that would send material to diplomatic missions in order to help them explain 
Israel’s positions to Jewish and non-Jewish audiences.151 He continued to ‘lavish 
attention on the press’ and was distressed by ministerial colleagues who did not 
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share his belief that international public opinion was a valuable component of the 
country’s standing.152  
In 1954, Ben-Gurion appointed Zalman Aranne as minister without portfolio, 
and asked him to deal with the domestic aspects of government information. Aranne 
was given responsibility for the Hasbara Administration, which was responsible for 
organising political outreach events to Israeli citizens, the Israeli Film Service, which 
produced and distributed educational and public service films for domestic and 
foreign audiences, and the Government Publications Service, which printed and 
distributed official publications. Under Aranne, the three were combined into the 
Hasbara Directorate, and were transferred to the Ministry of Education and Culture 
in late 1955, when he was appointed minister. This was the case until 1960, when the 
three bodies were once again separated from each other, and returned to authority 
of the Prime Minister’s Office. Foreign information efforts, apart from the liaison 
with foreign journalists in Israel, were the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry for 
the entire period.  
This frequent shifting of responsibility, the multiplicity of agencies and the lack 
of central authority over the issue as a whole did not improve Israel’s ability to 
articulate a clear message to international audiences. These problems were not 
unique to the challenges of formulating policy in the sphere of government 
communications. In late 1949 and early 1950, Edwin Samuel gave a series of lectures 
to directors-general of government ministries, entitled ‘How to Improve the 
Efficiency of the Israel Government Administrative Machine’. He noted the many 
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problems the new administration faced, including the pressure of external events, a 
shortage of experienced senior civil servants, over-centralisation, inadequate 
integration of the former Mandate government officials with the Jewish Agency 
officials, and the malign influence of party politics in senior appointments.153  
 In 1956, during Operation Kadesh in the Suez, Israel’s ambassador to Paris, 
Yaakov Tsur, wrote in his diary: 
 
The people at the French foreign ministry are worried about the weakness of 
our hasbara. All the provocation by Egypt has been forgotten. …All that 
remains is the (Israeli) attack and Nasser has quickly been able to get his 
version of events out to the world. Because of the secrecy and speed of the 
operation, there was no way we could prepare opinions and we are going to 
pay the price for it.154  
 
The perceived weakness of the system was debated in the Knesset soon 
afterwards, when Aryeh Alterman (Herut) tabled a proposal for a debate on the 
government’s information activities overseas, remarking that ‘there is almost no 
hasbara overseas. Whenever we do explain, we do it late, and whatever we do 
explain, we do it badly’. Chaim Ariav (General Zionists) noted that the deficiencies in 
the system existed before the war, and that ‘it is clear to me from contact with 
those who deal with this issue that there is no higher authority whose responsibility 
it is to set hasbara policy’. In response, Ben-Gurion admitted that more could have 
been done, but that  
it is something of a naïve illusion to assume that everything depends on 
hasbara …we cannot explain things to people if they, for political or 
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economic reasons, take a position against us, and not everything is related to 
the quality of hasbara.155 
 
Foreign Minister Meir offered a different explanation for the perceived 
weaknesses of Israeli information efforts. ‘Many of the critics of hasbara frequently 
ignore, deliberately or not, the objective limitations in which hasbara must operate,’ 
she told the Knesset in April 1957.156 By this, she meant the small budget granted to 
overseas information efforts, as well as the false distinction between domestic and 
foreign work. There was some progress. In March 1959, Meir was able to report to 
the Knesset that ‘despite the meagre resources available’, her ministry was reaching 
audiences in more countries and in more languages, although they faced the 
formidable force of individual Arab states and the Arab League in many places.157 A 
year later, she announced the establishment of Israel Information Centres in Paris 
and in Buenos Aires, to join the New York office that had opened in 1949, and the 
start of Kol Yisrael broadcasts to Africa. Meir also identified another problem. She 
warned the Knesset, ‘the next person to assess our hasbara should remember that 
the nature of this work is that there is no way to measure or quantify it’.158 
Ben-Gurion continued to pay scant attention to the issue, and became no 
more enthusiastic about press freedom. In 1957, the government passed the Penal 
Reform Act (State Security), which strictly limited official contact with journalists, 
with only ministry spokespeople allowed to brief the press.159 When Elimelech Rimalt 
(General Zionists) submitted a written question to the prime minister, asking if there 
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were any truth to the notion that ‘a national hasbara authority was to be established, 
that would include all Israeli hasbara departments, both domestic and foreign,’ Ben-
Gurion gave a single word answer. ‘No,’ he replied for the record.160  
 
Conclusions 
Jewish diaspora life was never, and could never be, lived in total isolation. Indeed, the 
lessons learnt through dealing with the outside world, however troubled those 
relations were, were vital to the success of Zionism in achieving political 
independence for the Jewish people in 1948. It is from here that Israel drew the 
characteristics of self-reliance, a strong sense of community, and a long tradition of 
diplomatic intercession with outside authorities, as well as the habits of separation 
and secrecy. However, Herzl’s decisive intervention in pulling Zionism onto the 
agenda of the world at large was, and perhaps remains, an uncomfortable gamble 
with history. Given the assumption that Jewish politics must be played out in a 
profoundly hostile environment, it was possible for Israelis in the period under 
review to couple engagement with the international system with an easily-evoked 
sense of insecurity and a deeply-rooted pessimism.  
This is the context from which the political culture of hasbara emerged, and 
where the limitations on Jewish politics and the limitations of Jewish politics in the 
transition from diaspora to independence – the ‘imperfect lens’, described above - 
began to exhibit the characteristics of ‘muddling through’ as a policy-making 
preference. And, as Israel moved into independence, the difficulties of hasbara did 
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not diminish. The focus, though, shifted from the ‘explanations’ of a national 
liberation movement to the policies of an independent state. Whilst Ben-Gurion’s 
dismissive attitude towards the press and to international opinion may be somewhat 
overstated, his attention was fixed firmly on the creation of the state.161 His doctrine 
of mamlachtiut (statism) emphasised the transformative role the state could have in 
producing strong, rooted and fierce Israelis out of the remnants of Jewish exile.162 In 
order to do so, the use of military force became a key characteristic of Israel’s early 
foreign policy.163 Foreign Minister and leading ‘diplomat’ Sharett, who ‘took hasbara 
seriously’, did not succeed in bringing considerations of international image into 
national policy-making, particularly in the security sphere.164 Finally, the considerable 
demands of the early years of independence, and the fact that neither man devolved 
power easily, meant that the issue was not given priority.165 
This discussion relates to the paradox which forms the basis of the argument 
of this thesis, which is explained in the Introduction: whilst Zionism is predicated on 
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the rejection of Jewish life that is not independent, it adopted a rational strategy to 
achieve its aims – primarily the creation of Jewish political autonomy or 
independence - which was highly dependent on the support of the international 
community. That was, and remains, an uncomfortable position. The following 
chapters analyse why a concerted attempt in the 1960s and 1970s to resolve this 
paradox by articulating clear policy to explain Israel’s policies to international 
audiences was largely unsuccessful. 
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Chapter 2 
Government Information Policy under the Minister without 
Portfolio, 1966-1967 
 
‘Until 1967, it was easy to explain – everyone believed you.’1 
 
 
With the retirement of Ben-Gurion from front-line politics in 1963, a new phase of 
Israeli government communication policy could begin.2 In late 1966, his successor, 
Levi Eshkol, appointed Yisrael Galili as Minister without Portfolio. Later in the same 
year, he asked Galili to take ministerial responsibility for government 
communications. This was the first time that the issue of hasbara had been put under 
ministerial authority, and the timing – several months before the outbreak of war in 
June 1967 - was opportune. However, as this chapter will show, Galili’s mandate was 
limited and he was personally unsuited to the job of recasting the concept of hasbara. 
Indeed, had it not been for the Six Day War, the appointment of Israel’s first 
minister with responsibility for hasbara would have been more quickly revealed as an 
essentially defensive and tactical attempt to cultivate the image of the prime minister 
in the domestic press. As it was, his ‘activist’ outlook hampered effective attempts to 
obtain and maintain domestic and international support for Israel in the strongly 
critical post-war environment.  
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However, the appointment of Galili did mark the beginning of a period of 
intensive attention to the issue of national image cultivation and public diplomacy. 
The ‘muddling through’ of decision-making – the third theme of this thesis – was not 
all ineffective. The issue was brought from periphery into the heart of government 
business, with ministerial authority. Thus, this chapter will argue that 1966 was a 
critical turning point in the history of Israeli government communications. It was the 
moment at which Israel acknowledged the need for addressing the problems that had 
emerged in the first years of independence, though not yet the obstacles it would 
face or the difficulties of articulating cogent policy or creating the apparatus of 
government communications.  
 
Appointment of Galili to take responsibility for information efforts  
Galili had been at the heart of the military-political elite for two decades, but 
determinedly resisted offers of ministerial office when joining the government. 
Eshkol tempted him into government by persuading him that the way Israel was 
perceived, particularly by international observers, had a direct contribution to its 
national security.3 However, appointing an ‘activist’, whose clear preference was for 
doing rather than saying, only sharpened the clash with the ‘diplomat’ faction of the 
government, and particularly with Foreign Minister Abba Eban. 
 Levi Eshkol, the ‘last of the first’ generation of Zionist leaders, was more 
disposed to consider Israel’s international image than his predecessor.4 He was also 
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more effective at devolving power to ministers and granted real authority to his 
foreign minister, the erudite British-educated former diplomat Abba Eban. Eban 
needed no convincing of the value of Israel’s international image. ‘The image and 
reputation of Israel overseas are not determined only by discussions of international 
policy. They are also constantly being shaped by the way the country presents itself 
and the way in which it conceives of itself in all that it does,’ he told the Knesset in 
early 1967.5  
When Eshkol turned to Galili to bring the existing machinery of government 
communications under centralised control, the prime minister may have assumed 
that it would be a simple task, a shuffling of the administrative deck. Galili took 
responsibility for the Government Press Office which was responsible for press 
liaison, the domestic information services and the newly independent Israeli 
Broadcasting Authority, bringing an element of coordination between them and 
clarifying the division of responsibilities amongst them. But he did not have authority 
over the Foreign Ministry’s network of embassies and consulates, critical for 
managing Israel’s international image. This false distinction between domestic and 
overseas communications was to dog his efforts and reflects the second theme of 
this thesis, the way in which the ‘activist’ and ‘diplomat’ camps neutralised each other 
and the possibility of real change to Israeli government information policy.  
Yisrael Galili was far from an obvious candidate for the job. Largely 
uneducated, not well-travelled and with little grasp of the world at large he was, as 
one of the people who worked closely with him said, fundamentally a ‘local 
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politician’.6 Others were even less complimentary, describing him as an ‘anachronistic 
politruk trapped in the past’ and his appointment as ‘the strangest in the history of 
Israeli politics’.7 One person who worked closely with him noted that ‘he was 
mentally very strong, but operationally very weak’, and that his management skills 
were very poor. Yet Sini Azaryahu, his chief of staff during his political career, 
insisted he had a great deal of political wisdom, even if he lacked formal education 
beyond primary school level.8 
His early career was in the pre-state Hagana militia. Rising quickly through 
the ranks, he joined the Hagana’s national leadership in 1935 and ended up as the 
Head of the National Command, the organisation’s commander, during the 1947-8 
War of Independence. But, in May 1948, he was summarily dismissed from his 
position, with Ben-Gurion assuming direct control over the newly unified armed 
forces of the State of Israel.9 The move, nicknamed the ‘war of the generals’, was 
Ben-Gurion’s response to growing political opposition emanating from within the 
Hagana, justified under the guise of purging pro-Soviet influence.10 Yigael Yadin, the 
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soldier-scholar operations chief of the Hagana accused Ben-Gurion of attempting ‘to 
transform the army as a whole into an army of one political party’.11 
Characteristic of Ben-Gurion’s often brutal transition from national liberation 
movement to independent state, it left Galili on the political sidelines for close to 
twenty years.12 It also left him with a lifelong grudge against Ben-Gurion, and by 
extension, against his protégés Moshe Dayan, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin.13  
With the establishment of the state, Galili moved into politics, a highly influential and 
skilled political operator, with a skill for writing.14 He was particularly close to Levi 
Eshkol and Golda Meir, and shared their relaxed toleration of Yiddish, which was 
frowned upon by Ben-Gurion and the Mapai ideologues. According to one observer, 
‘Golda relied on Galili absolutely.’15 Years after independence, he retained the 
characteristics of the underground fighter. His telephone manner was particularly 
disarming. When making a call, he would remain silent when the other party picked 
up the phone until they had identified themselves to him.16  
                                            
 
11 Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983) 55. 
12 Although a member of Knesset from 1948 and of its influential Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee from 1955, Galili was the biggest victim of the ‘War of the Generals’. 
Of his Ahdut Ha’Avoda colleagues, Moshe Carmel was a minister by 1956, Yitzhak Ben-
Aharon by 1959 and Yigal Allon by 1961, all appointed by Ben-Gurion. Only Galili was frozen 
out until Ben-Gurion retired.  
13 Interview with Meron Medzini, 30.11.2011. 
14 Although most remember Galili as the consummate drafter, he was not without his critics, 
one government minister writing: ‘Galili had a wonderful capacity for drafting ‘in plain 
Hebrew’ hazy reasoning that looked ‘cleaner’ and more aesthetic than the Prime Minister’s 
objectionable views.’ Victor Shem-Tov, One of Them [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1997) 
94. 
15 Interview with Meron Medzini, 30.6.2008. 
16 Interview with Elad Peled, 3.6.2008. 
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Galili was a member of the Ahdut Ha’Avoda-Poalei Zion (Unity of Labour-
Workers of Zion) party, led by Yitzhak Tabenkin.17 Springing from the common 
roots of the socialist Zionist movement articulated by its ideologues Ber Borochov 
and Berl Katznelson, the party was distinguished from the David Ben-Gurion’s Mapai 
(Workers of Israel Party) by its pro-Soviet orientation, a greater ‘activism’ in military 
affairs, and was most closely associated with the Palmach, the elite, full-time, forces 
of the Hagana. Ahdut Ha’Avoda was also known for its refusal to countenance the 
division of the land of Israel to allow both Jewish and Arab independent states. 
Tabenkin had strongly opposed partition when it was first mooted by Britain in the 
early 1930s. In 1937, following the report of the Peel Commission that 
recommended the partition of mandatory Palestine into Jewish and Arab areas, the 
Twentieth Zionist Congress debated the matter. The bitter disagreement between 
Tabenkin and Ben-Gurion over partition was directly responsible for the later split in 
Mapai in 1944. 
With Ben-Gurion’s split from Mapai in June 1963, the way was clear for 
Yisrael Galili to enter government, under new prime minister Levi Eshkol. Following 
the January 1966 general elections, in which Mapai and Ahdut Ha’Avoda ran together 
as the Labour Alignment, his party colleagues Yigal Allon and Moshe Carmel 
                                            
 
17 Ahdut Ha’Avoda underwent three distinct phases of its existence. Founded in 1919 by Ben-
Gurion and Berl Katznelson as a successor to Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion), the ‘historical’ 
party merged with HaPoel HaTzair (the Young Worker) in 1930 to form Mapai. In the early 
1940s, a faction emerged within Mapai to challenge Ben-Gurion’s moderate social 
programme. Led by Yitzhak Tabenkin of Kibbutz Ein Harod, it was known simply as Siah Bet 
(Faction B). In 1944, it split completely from Mapai, and took the name Ahdut Ha’Avoda-Poalei 
Zion Movement. Between 1948 and 1954, the party merged with HaShomer HaTzair (the 
Young Guard) to form Mapam (the United Workers’ Party). Splitting once again in 1955 as 
Ahdut Ha’Avoda-Poalei Zion, it was an independent party until 1965, when it re-aligned itself 
with Mapai in the Labour Alignment, which itself united with Rafi in 1968 to form the Israeli 
Labour Party.  
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accepted the offer of government ministries.18 But Galili, not wishing either the 
exposure or the restrictions to his freedom of movement that running a ministry 
would bring, did so as minister without portfolio.  
Eshkol was keen to decentralise some of the responsibility that he held as 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, and to achieve greater clarity in Israel’s 
foreign press relations. Under Ben-Gurion, a weekly meeting chaired by the 
director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, Teddy Kollek (the ‘Teddy Forum’) 
had formulated press policy, mostly directed at the domestic media. A separate 
forum, held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealt with Israel’s image in the foreign 
press. This division had not been successful; in both the Ben Barka affair and the 
attempted assassination of German scientists who were advising Egypt on long-range 
missiles, Israel’s muddled explanations damaged her foreign relations.19 Eshkol had 
already made one change to the business of government communications, appointing 
a spokesman for the Prime Minister’s Office.20  
Now, Eshkol began discussion with Galili about him taking responsibility for 
hasbara issues. His adviser, Sini Azaryahu, was stunned to find out just how much 
responsibility for formulation of government information policy resided in the hands 
of the Prime Minister’s Office. It included direct authority over the domestically-
oriented Hasbara Centre, the Government Press Office and the Israel Broadcasting 
                                            
 
18 Cecil Roth, ed., Encyclopaedia Judaica, 17 vols. (Jerusalem: Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1972). 
Entry on ‘State of Israel: Political Parties’, vol. 9, p.950. 
19 Medzini, "Government Communications for Overseas Audiences in the Six Day War 
[Hebrew]," 147. 
20 Ben-Gurion had had no spokesman, often sending Yitzhak Navon to brief the press on his 
behalf. It should be noted that Eshkol’s appointees – first Avraham Avichai, then Yossi Sarid 
and from the summer of 1965, Meron Medzini – spoke with the authority of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, but not on behalf of Eshkol himself. Interview with Meron Medzini, 
9.4.2006. 
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Authority, yet to receive its independence. Allon, the leader of Ahdut Ha’Avoda and 
deputy prime minister, agreed with Eshkol – but for different reasons. He felt it was 
inappropriate for Galili to enjoy the perks of ministerial rank – a car and a salary – if 
he had no public responsibility. He told Azaryahu ‘we know his value, but they 
don’t’.21 In October, Galili gave Eshkol an answer:  
I am sending you the summary that you were looking at during our meeting 
on October 4th, on the subject of hasbara, and the matter is now in your 
hands. Let me again stress: if you have any reason to withdraw from the 
issue, you should feel free to do so, and there will be no distress on my 
part.22 
 
The following day, Galili wrote to Eshkol agreeing to take responsibility for 
hasbara on his behalf. He stressed that he was doing so to ‘lighten the load’ on the 
Prime Minister.23 Galili had shown no real interest in the questions of government 
information policy, even when the issue of state control over broadcasting was a 
central concern during the debates over the creation of the IBA in the early 1960s. A 
rare reference to the issue was in the late 1950s when he wrote a memo on leaks to 
the press:  
 
The media outlets belonging to coalition parties should not attack each other, 
and should maintain a cultured and comradely tone in their disagreements. In 
order to ensure this, a committee will be established consisting of the 
editorial boards of the newspapers of the coalition parties24 
                                            
 
21 Interview with Sini Azaryahu, 19.6.05 
22 ISA/RG 44/G/344/6270. Galili to Eshkol (handwritten note), 6.10.1966.  
23 YTA 15/57/2/1. Galili to Eshkol, 7.10.1966.  
24 YTA 15/22/8/13. Undated memo by Galili. The memo apparently dates from the coalition 
negotiations of 1958, and was a response to a leak to the press regarding the visit of ‘the 
security personality’ to Germany. This referred to a controversial visit by the IDF Chief of 
Staff, Moshe Dayan, and was leaked to Lamerchav, the paper of rival party Ahdut Ha’Avoda. 
For further details on the ‘security personality’ leak, see Avner (Walter) Bar-On, The Stories 
That Were Never Told: The Diary of the Chief Censor [Hebrew], ed. Aviezer Golan 
(Jerusalem: Idanim, 1981) 99-102.The newspapers in question were Davar, the newspaper of 
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Galili was installed in the office of Teddy Kollek, who had been elected as 
mayor of Jerusalem, with its connecting door to the prime minister’s private office. 
Direct access to Eshkol was vital to Galili, which he made a written precondition for 
his appointment, adding ‘I hope that if I take up the position, you will ensure that this 
is the case’.25 Galili added that his agreement was also conditional on Eshkol’s 
assurance that no Ministry of Information would be established, and that 
administrative authority would remain in the Prime Minister’s Office.  
He did not demand a title, budgets or a large staff. It was far more important 
for him to ensure that his close relationship with Eshkol continued, and that he 
continued to have access to sensitive and confidential material relating to matters of 
defence and foreign affairs. For his part, Eshkol mostly wanted Galili to neutralise the 
influence of Rafi on the domestic media. Ben-Gurion, supported by a younger 
generation of politicians including Dayan, Peres and Kollek, was sniping at Eshkol 
from the opposition, and in the pages of the domestic press.26 Using their 
considerable residual influence, they criticised Eshkol for allowing American 
inspectors to visit the nuclear facility at Dimona, for souring relations with De 
Gaulle, for his handling of the visit of Konrad Adenauer in May 1966 and for his 
handling of the Ben Barka affair.27  
                                                                                                                             
 
Mapai, Lamerchav (Ahdut Ha’Avoda), Al Hamishmar (Mapam) and HaTzofe (National Religious 
Party). 
25 YTA 15/57/2/. Galili to Eshkol, 7.10.1966.  
26 Haaretz was strongly identified with Rafi, and promoted Dayan as Eshkol’s successor. 
Rubenstein, "Haaretz and the Eshkol Government." 
27 On US inspections of the Dimona nuclear reactor, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 222. On the Adenauer visit, see Hans-Peter 
Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, 
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Prime Minister Levi Eshkol announced to the Knesset on 19 October 1966 
that Galili was to take responsibility for the Information Centre, the Government 
Press Office and for radio and television affairs.28 The appointment did arouse some 
suspicion that the government was creating a ministry of propaganda, but it was 
hoped that Galili would be able to create a more consistent and effective approach 
to government communications.29 It would not be the last time that the Knesset 
debated the precise scope of Galili’s appointment, and what it was intended to 
achieve.30  
From the outside, the principal problem with government information efforts 
before 1967 was the lack of coordination between the various government bodies 
responsible. Apart from the period between 1953 and 1955 when Zalman Aranne 
took responsibility for the information administration, there was a distinction 
between information activities that were directed towards Israel’s citizens, and which 
fell under the ministerial responsibility of the Prime Minister, and foreign information 
efforts, which were the responsibility of the Foreign Minister.  
However, with the Prime Minister also holding the defence portfolio, apart 
from Sharett’s premiership in 1953 – 55, no real attention was given to creating 
joined-up policy. In its absence, political considerations dominated. There was a high 
                                                                                                                             
 
Revolution and Reconstruction. Vol. 2: The Statesman, 1952-1967 (Oxford: Berghahn, 1997) 
787-90.On tension regarding relations with France, see Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign 
Policy  123, note 84. On the Ben Barka affair, see Shalom, Ben-Gurion's Political Struggles, 
1963-1967: A Lion in Winter  Chapter 3. 
28 Levi Eshkol to the Knesset, 17.10.1966. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 47, col. 1; See also Eshkol to 
the Knesset, YTA, 15/64/2/5, Cabinet Secretary Yael Uzai to Yisrael Galili, 18.18.1966. 
ISA/RG 124/G/344/6270. Uzai wrote to Galili to explain the transfer of authority from the 
Prime Minister to Galili under the Broadcasting Authority Law (1965).  
29 Nathan Ribon, “Is the Information Centre a Ministry of Propaganda?”, Haaretz, 2.12.1966. 
The second part of the article was published two days later.  
30 Eshkol to the Knesset, 19.10.1966. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 47, cols. 53-67; 78-90 
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level of political influence over the state-controlled Kol Yisrael in the early years of 
the state. Ben-Gurion dictated who would be interviewed and who would not, 
through his aides Teddy Kollek and Yitzhak Navon.31 Politicians who held views 
contrary to the ‘Old Man’, either from Ahdut Ha’Avoda, Mapam on the left or from 
Herut, Liberals on the right had a hard time getting their voice heard.32  
Moreover, each government ministry and non-governmental organisation had 
its own information department and spokesperson. Consequently, there was no one 
minister who was responsible for considering how a policy decision might be 
received by domestic and international audiences. Such considerations were often 
neglected in the policy-making process. Galili, the newly-appointed Minister with 
responsibility for information services, did not have to wait long for the cracks in the 
system to be exposed.33  
 
Waiting for Nasser34 
On 14 May 1967, as Israel was celebrating its 19th Independence Day, Egyptian forces 
crossed the Suez Canal and entered the Sinai Peninsula, quoting a Soviet intelligence 
                                            
 
31 Derek J Penslar, "Transmitting Jewish Culture: Radio in Israel," Jewish Social Studies 10.1 
(2004). 9-10. 
32 Nissim Mishal, "Israel Broadcasting Authority: Political Dynamics [Hebrew]," Bar-Ilan 
University, 1978, 40-48.  
33 Some of the cracks were already evident. Meron Medzini, the director of the Jerusalem 
branch of the Government Press Office, wrote some 350 foreign policy editorials for the 
Jerusalem Post newspaper, as well as regularly broadcasting - under an assumed name – on 
Israel Radio’s foreign language service. Galili knew of this, and demanded only that Medzini 
not directly criticise the government.  
34 The title refers to the popular Mike Burstyn song of the time, ‘Nasser is Waiting for 
Rabin’. Haim Hefer’s words include lines such as ‘Nasser’s waiting for Rabin/Let him wait/let 
him sit tight/’cos we’ll be there all right’ and ‘Nasser’s waiting for Rabin/You’ll all see/ the day 
will come/he’ll be begging for peace.’ http://mp3music.gpg.nrg.co.il/lyrics/9410.html 
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report that Israel was amassing troops on its border with Syria.35 Egypt began to 
move large numbers of troops and armoured vehicles into the Sinai Peninsula, ending 
a ten-year truce period. While Egyptian troops massed along Israel's border in the 
south, the Syrian army prepared for war on the Golan Heights in the north. Two 
days later, General Fawzy, the Egyptian Army’s Chief of Staff, demanded a partial 
withdrawal of UNEF - the United Nations Emergency Force peacekeepers - from 
Sharm el-Sheikh, where they had been stationed since 1956. Secretary-General U 
Thant complied with what Israel considered to be indecent haste, leaving Egyptian 
forces unopposed.36 On 23 May, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran, a declared casus 
belli. Israel was alone and encircled by armies whose leaders had vowed to bring 
about its annihilation.  
The coming conflict was popularly presumed to be a war of survival for Israel. 
Speaking to the Egyptian parliament on 25 May, Nasser declared his intention ‘to 
exterminate the state of Israel for all time’.37 The following day, speaking to Arab 
Trades Unionists, he said ‘the battle will be a general one and our basic objective will 
be to destroy Israel’.38 Other Arab leaders, including President Atafi of Syria and Iraqi 
President Abdul Rahman Aref, as well as government controlled radio and 
                                            
 
35 ‘Egyptian Battle Order No. 1, Issued by Field Marshal Abdul-Hakim ‘Amer, 14 May 1967’. 
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newspapers, called for a united Arab front to redress the mistakes of the 1948 war 
and predicted the elimination of Israel.39 
Historians continue to debate whether Nasser’s military moves, and his 
rhetoric, were intended as a show of strength40, and to deter Israel from escalating 
tension with Syria, and whether the war that followed was the result of mutual 
miscalculation.41 Van Creveld, on the other hand, suggests that it was a set of 
coincidences that resulted in Israel’s victory.42 Either way, it marked the start of a 
tense ‘waiting period’, with Israelis and international observers conscious that war 
was likely.43 
 
Government information policy in the ‘waiting period’, May 1967 
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s continued search for a diplomatic solution to the crisis 
during the ‘waiting period’ may have exhibited sound political judgement, but he 
                                            
 
39 World Zionist Organization Information Department, What to Answer? Questions and 
Answers on the Six-Days War and Its Consequences  28-32. 
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appeared indecisive to Israelis.44 Foreign journalists also struggled to hear Israel’s 
voice. Eshkol, Galili, Meir, Ben-Gurion and Begin all refused to talk, since they were 
unsure of how events would unfold. Foreign Minister Abba Eban and General Aharon 
Yariv, the head of IDF military intelligence, were prepared to speak but only in non-
quotable and non-attributable briefings. Peres, who had excellent relations with 
journalists, did agree to brief the foreign press but would not discuss the discussions 
within the IDF general staff regarding Israeli preparations for war.45 These details, in 
any case, would have been removed by the military censor.  
Yisrael Galili, with ministerial responsibility for government information 
efforts was caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, it was important that domestic 
and international audiences should be reassured by Israel’s capacity to contain 
aggressive Egyptian and Syrian postures, even after it had become clear that Israeli 
deterrence had failed. On the other, Israel also needed international support – 
particularly from the United States and European allies – with the collapse of the 
security regime in place since the end of the 1956 Suez War. Galili failed to fully 
grasp that the way Israel was perceived in the international arena was of supreme 
consequence.46  Instead, he remained absorbed with domestic affairs, trying to 
prevent the establishment of a national unity administration that would bring Rafi and 
Herut into government. His principle target was Haaretz, whose editorial line was 
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strongly supportive of Rafi and, by implication, the replacement of Eshkol with 
Dayan.47 
One incident illustrates his grasp of media affairs. With the closure of the 
Straits of Tiran on May 23rd, it was clear that there would be war. Eshkol, who had 
restricted his public comments since the Egyptian entry into Sinai to two statements 
in the Knesset, now felt he should speak. On 28 May, after a cabinet meeting in 
which all but one minister agreed to continue the diplomatic process, Eshkol decided 
to inform the nation of the decision.48 He was physically exhausted by the weeks of 
intense attention to the threat of war, had a bad cold, and was presented with a draft 
statement prepared by Galili and cabinet secretary Yaakov Herzog, which he then 
heavily amended in pencil.49 Although Eshkol had intended to record the speech from 
his office for later broadcast, there was now no time, and he travelled to the Kol 
Yisrael radio studio. Fearing that delaying the broadcast to allow a typist to 
incorporate the changes into the text would be interpreted as further weakness, 
Eshkol went on live radio from a studio with only one bulb lit over the microphone.50 
But he stumbled and stuttered over his own corrections to the text, stopping at one 
                                            
 
47 Rubenstein, "Haaretz and the Eshkol Government." The Jewish Observer and Middle East 
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point to ask his political secretary, Aviad Yaffe, ‘what does this mean?’, referring to 
the phrase ‘retreat of forces’. 
 
Yaffe went white. Eshkol put on his glasses, picked up a pencil and struck out 
the words ‘retreat of troops’, wrote ‘redeployment of forces’, and continued 
reading until the end. The pause only lasted a few seconds, and the people in 
the studio didn’t grasp its significance. But the listeners, waiting for a 
Churchillian address, heard a laconic and static speech, littered with mistakes 
and confusion. The disgrace was enormous.51   
 
Eshkol was badly shaken.52 The impact on domestic public opinion was 
calamitous.53 Hearing the broadcast, soldiers in the Negev desert were said to have 
burst into tears.54 The IDF General Staff, which he briefed later that evening, was in 
uproar.55 Eshkol, perhaps unaware of the tension the high command was under, 
instructed them to speak plainly to him. They did. General Ariel Sharon predicted 
that Eshkol’s indecision would cost thousands of deaths. As Eshkol was leaving, Chief 
of Staff Yitzhak Rabin told his colleagues, ‘It looks as if the only strength the country 
can rely on is in the army’.56 As well as bringing Israel close to a coup d’état, the 
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‘stuttering broadcast’ was also the butt of jokes. Writing the next day in Maariv, 
Israel’s leading satirist, Ephraim Kishon, quipped ‘we don’t remember the exact 
wording of the official announcement because Mr. Eshkol only broadcast it five times 
last night over Kol Yisrael’.57 
Yet, as Gluska notes, the real problem was not the delivery of the speech, 
but rather its content. Eshkol had revealed the horrible truth: Israel’s fate was 
dependent on external forces, not on its own power: 
The entire Zionist Israeli ethos was on trial: independence, self-reliance, 
national pride and, above all, the invincible IDF which had been elevated to 
the status of myth. All this appeared to have been abandoned in an instant in 
light of the threat, and the new Jew seemed to be reverting to being the old, 
Diaspora Jew, namely helpless and begging for protection by foreigners.58 
 
 Eshkol’s failing credibility had a direct impact on the composition of the 
government. Two days later, he bowed to public pressure and, with the greatest 
possible reluctance, appointed Dayan to replace him as Minister of Defence.59  He 
hoped keep the defence portfolio for himself, but also considered Allon as an 
alternative to avert bringing Dayan into government. Justice Minister Yaakov 
Shimshon Shapira came up with a creative solution: in order to make space for 
Dayan in the cabinet, he proposed promoting foreign minister Abba Eban to Deputy 
Prime Minister, with responsibility for foreign affairs and for foreign information 
efforts. Eban refused, sending Shapira a note saying simply ‘I am prepared to resign 
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from the government, but not to change my job’.60 Eshkol also invited leader of the 
opposition Herut party Menachem Begin – utterly demonised during Ben-Gurion’s 
long dominance of Israeli politics - to join a government of national unity.61  
If the ‘activists’ were struggling to deal with domestic information efforts, the 
‘diplomats’ were also struggling on the international front. Foreign Minister Abba 
Eban’s diplomatic mission at the end of May 1967 to secure international support for 
an Israeli pre-emptive strike was unsuccessful. He returned empty handed. 
Addressing a joint meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security and the IDF 
General Staff on June 2, Major-General Ariel Sharon mocked Eban: ‘Our scurrying 
about – and I won’t use the word shtadlanut [asking for support from those in 
power] – among the superpowers is not part of our stance in protection of our 
rights’.62 Rebuking Sharon for mocking Eban, Eshkol reminded him that ‘Everything 
that the IDF has with which to fight is a result of this ‘scurrying about’. Let us not 
forget that, and let us not regard ourselves as Goliaths as a result’. It was Meir Amit, 
head of the Mossad and the archetypal ‘activist’, who got the green light from the 
United States for pre-emptive action.63  
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The three-week waiting period in May 1967 did allow time to organise an 
effective structure for dealing with the large influx of foreign journalists who wanted 
to cover the war.64 Based around the Government Press Office, and relying in part 
on the hundreds of foreign volunteers who came to assist Israel, facilities were made 
available for some eight hundred foreign journalists.65 Given the very limited access 
to senior military and political figures, foreign correspondents were given access to 
civilians and army units as they prepared for war. ‘The sense of impending 
annihilation encouraged the correspondents to write articles supportive of Israel, 
and in particular to compliment Israelis who were trying to carry on with normal life 
whilst preparing for the worst.’66 Foreign correspondents on assignment to Israel 
were much taken with Israel’s image of pioneering independence in the face of Arab 
opposition, and with institutions of Israeli society such as the Kibbutz and the IDF.67 
Israel was seen by many as a success story.68 Public opinion in the West firmly 
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supported Israel in the face of the build-up of Arab aggression.69 According to one 
account, support for Israel in the West was around 60 percent, whereas only 2-3 
percent expressed support for the Arabs.70 
Hollywood had played its part in establishing a positive international image. 
Popular films such as Exodus (1960), Judith (1965) and Cast a Giant Shadow (1966) 
presented Israel as ‘normal’ and easily identified as a western-style nation. As Ella 
Shohat argues in her analysis of Exodus, the casting of (non-Jewish) Paul Newman as 
the heroic Zionist pioneer Ari Ben-Canaan suggested that ‘the Israeli experience has 
normalised the Jew’.71 
In Israel, foreign news organisations were provided with constant material, 
special communications liaisons and information officers.72 Moshe Pearlman, who had 
led Israeli press services in 1948, and remained involved in the field in various 
capacities, was recalled. ‘It’s as if you were asleep for 10 years and then opened your 
eyes and there was Colonel Pearlman again, doing the briefings,’ said one foreign 
correspondent.73 Briefings were held at 6:30pm so that European correspondents 
could make the following morning’s deadlines; Americans had until early the next 
morning to file. Journalists were taken to the sites of border incidents, flew on 
military planes and were allowed to interview combat soldiers. Foreign media access 
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was orchestrated with a certain amount of sophistication, as one IDF liaison officer 
recalled at the end of the war: 
 
One particular problem …was how to organise the foreign journalists’ tours 
so that they would be in the right place at the right time …without thinking 
that they were being herded like sheep.74  
 
The attention lavished on foreign reporters and the seemingly casual attitude 
towards access reinforced Israel’s advantage in international public opinion, ensuring 
further interest and sympathetic coverage once the war began. Writing on the first 
day of the war, the Jerusalem correspondent of the New York Times, James Reston, 
captured the mood:  
These people have gone to war with remarkable calm and kindliness to one 
another. There is a curious combination of sadness and determination in their 
manner.75  
 
Galili, who had ministerial responsibility for liaison with foreign journalists but 
had devoted very little time to the issue, basked in the reflected glory, telling the 
Knesset after the war that ‘[journalists] were deeply impressed by the IDF’s unique, 
rare and special qualities and expressed it in thousands of articles, radio and 
television broadcasts; they praised Israel all around the world’.76 
The generally open access offered by Israel stood in sharp contrast to the 
Arab’s refusal to allow foreign coverage and their notoriously unreliable reports77. 
Arab states were apparently conscious of the deficiencies. In September, Tunisian 
                                            
 
74 Levitan, "The IDF Explains Its Exploits to the World,"   50. 
75 James Reston, "A War's First Hours," New York Times 6 June 1697. 
76Galili to the Knesset, 19.7.1967.  Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 49, col. 2661.  
77 Oren, Demon in the Box: Jews, Arabs, Politics and Culture in the Making of Israeli 
Television  119. Oren suggests that Nasser was dismayed to find out that Radio Cairo’s 
reports of Tel Aviv being in flames on the second day of the war were untrue.  
Chapter 2 
104 
 
Secretary of State for Information Chaldi Klibi told a dozen of his colleagues, 
gathered for an Arab Information Ministers’ Conference, that their ‘verbal excess’ 
was such that ‘no one any longer pays more than relative attention to what we have 
to say’.78 One consequence may have been the establishment of a joint Arab 
information ministry.79 
The relative successes of May and June 1967 masked the unanswered 
question of authority. Without clarity on this issue, the problem of coordination that 
was endemic to Israeli government information efforts would soon return. During 
the war, though, Israel ‘muddled through’, finding immediate, concrete, incremental 
solutions for problems. The Government Press Office, the Foreign Ministry’s press 
department, and the IDF Spokesperson’s unit devised a rough division of labour, with 
the Foreign Ministry and the IDF responsible for briefings and escorting journalists to 
the front, and the Press Office offering technical support to ensure that material 
reached the correspondents’ home organisations. As Oren notes, the intensive work 
and commitment of stretched resources yielded results. ‘By the time the war broke 
out, foreign journalists already had their story’.80 
  
Radio broadcasts in the Six-Day War 
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In the early hours of 5 June, Israel’s air force launched a surprise attack on Egypt’s 
airfields, destroying the Arab world’s most advanced fighting force on the ground in a 
little over two hours. The ensuing war, which lasted six days, brought significant 
areas of land under Israel’s control, tripling its territory. But alongside the Old City 
of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Desert, Israel’s population of some 2.6 
million was swelled by another million Arabs.  
On the morning 5 June, the newly-appointed Minister of Defence Dayan 
addressed the nation. ‘We are a small people, but a brave one,’ he said. ‘We seek 
peace, but are ready to fight for our land and our life’.81 In fact, by 10:30 in the 
morning, when he spoke, the IAF had completed Operation Moked, and the Egyptian 
air force lay ruined in its bases. His speech, designed for both domestic and 
international consumption, indicated that radio was both an element of the military 
effort, and a tool for soothing public fears. As Oren notes, wartime domestic radio 
was ‘doubly addressed to friend and foe, Israeli and Arab, here and there’.82 
In fact, this was already the case before the war. In 1964, Kol Yisrael radio 
broadcast 34 hours each week overseas in Arabic and eight other languages. Each 
week, 52 hours of domestic broadcasting were in Arabic, for the Arabic-speaking 
citizens of Israel and the surrounding countries. The programming was considered 
reliable, objective and informative.83  Now, the most memorable element of Kol 
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Yisrael’s wartime schedule was the nightly broadcast by Chaim Herzog.84 Herzog 
began his talks on the evening after Eshkol’s infamous ‘stuttering speech’, amid falling 
morale and flying rumours. His calm, professional analysis, earned him the nickname 
of ‘the national soother’. Herzog was to reprise the role in 1973. Speaking on the 
second night of the war, he reassured Israelis, many of whom spent the nights in 
bomb shelters for fear of Arab aerial assault that ‘If I were faced with the choice of 
sitting in an Egyptian plane headed to bomb Tel Aviv, or to sit at home in Tel Aviv, 
on purely selfish considerations of the good of my health I would prefer to sit in Tel 
Aviv’.85 It is worth noting that by this point, the IDF had comprehensively destroyed 
the Egyptian air force, the only force likely to have posed a significant aerial threat to 
Tel Aviv. He also encouraged a sense of historic, if not epic, perspective to the war:  
Generations of Jews for thousands of years will think of us, this small and 
select handful of Jews in the State of Israel, who lived and created these 
moments steeped in historical significance for the Jewish people.86 
 
Israeli radio broadcasts were not only used to shore up Israeli domestic 
opinion during the war. According to van Dam, they were also used to undermine 
the positions of its enemies.87 Kol Yisrael’s Arabic broadcasts used local dialects, 
rather than ‘classical’ or ‘standard’ Arabic, in order to reach illiterate or semi-literate 
listeners. The Arabic broadcasts encouraged dissent within Arab states, for example 
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drawing attention to the power of the minority Alawites within the post-1963 Syrian 
regime, and more generally to crises in inter-Arab relations. When, on 8 June 8, the 
main Jordanian transmitter in the West Bank fell into Israeli hands, Kol Yisrael used it 
to carry its Arabic programming.88 There is little reliable data on how intensively 
Israeli broadcasts were listened to during the war, although ‘in periods of crisis 
…there seems to be a special desire to compare the news content of the Arabic 
service of Radio Israel [sic] with the news content of the broadcasting services of 
Arab states, which often has been of rather poor quality’.89 
Radio was certainly a constant presence for Israelis during the war, with 
regular programming suspended and all of Kol Yisrael’s channels broadcasting a single, 
rolling schedule of hourly news bulletins, battlefield reports and music.90 Under 
public pressure, programming for children was eventually reintroduced.91 On the 
other hand, one popular format was quite deliberately removed from the schedule. 
Call-in shows, where soldiers would often send recorded messages and record 
request were cancelled for fear that a now-dead soldier’s voice would be heard by 
grieving relations.92 The new schedule started at 8am on 5 June, and was marked 
with a change to the station’s standard call-sign. Instead of ‘From Jerusalem, this is 
Kol Yisrael’, wartime broadcasts began with ‘This is Kol Yisrael on the Hebrew 
                                            
 
88 "Israel Claims Jordan Station," New York Times 9 June 1967. 
89 van Dam, "Israeli Sectarian Propaganda During the October, 1973, War." 
90 Dan Caspi and Yehiel Limor, The in/Outsiders: The Mass Media in Israel (Cresskill, NJ: 
Hampton Press, 1999) 134. A foreign journalist later wrote ‘No audience survey is needed 
to determine Israel’s most popular radio program. It is the hourly news broadcast. Thirteen 
times a day, Israeli stop whatever else they are doing.’ A H Raskin, "Israel Tells the World: 
Keep Hands Off," New York Times 7 July 1969. 
91 Oren, Demon in the Box: Jews, Arabs, Politics and Culture in the Making of Israeli 
Television  118. 
92 Lossin, "War over the Ether [Hebrew],"   60. 
Chapter 2 
108 
 
broadcasting network’. The change was neither accidental, nor trivial. Since the main 
radio transmitter was sited in Jerusalem, and close to the Jordanian border, there 
were fears that it may fall victim to the fighting.93 In order to ensure that broadcasts 
would not be disrupted, plans were drawn up to use generator-driven relay stations 
and temporary studios if either of the main stations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv were 
damaged. Pre-recorded programmes of appropriately ‘national’ songs were ready for 
such an eventuality.  
The six days of war in June 1967 were days of glory for Kol Yisrael, which 
broadcast news, battlefront reports and commentary around the clock. At its end, 
Galili wrote an emotional letter of thanks to the workers of Kol Yisrael. ‘The people 
listened closely to the commentary, to peace breaking out from the fronts. Kol Yisrael 
strengthened and united us’.94 
 
Israel’s international image after the Six Day War: the ‘debacle’ 
A wave of warm friendship and understanding of Israel is washing over the 
world.95 
 
There was much for Israel to celebrate following the Six-Day War. The return to the 
Old City of Jerusalem and sites of religious significance were representative of a 
significant shift in Israeli cultural narrative from the siege mentality of 1948 to the 
embrace of Israeli heroic military might. For Israel’s western allies, the victory was a 
triumph over the Communist-supported Arab states. ‘They Did It!’ proclaimed The 
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Economist’s cover story.96 Ordinary people could also identify with Israel. In London, 
the Israeli Embassy received many thousands of letters of support, offers of financial 
and material aid, and applications to volunteer in hospitals, schools, kibbutzim and to 
join the military forces. On June 6, Mr J R Hebda wrote: 
All my thoughts are with the brave people of Israel, for whom I have the 
greatest possible respect and admiration. Being a Pole, now living in Britain, 
and having shared with my brothers, the Jews, the atrocities of the German 
occupation of Poland, I sympathise with your nation’s efforts to maintain its 
independence and freedom.97 
 
Israel’s occupation of Jordanian and Egyptian territories, and their large 
Palestinian populations, was initially seen as benign.98 Israel was a compelling subject 
for journalists, with ever larger numbers of foreign correspondents permanently 
stationed there. Between 1967 and 1970, the number of foreign journalists 
permanently based in Israel nearly trebled, from forty to over 100.99 But the 
adulation that had accompanied Israel’s military victory in June 1967 soon began to 
dissipate. Already on the fourth day of the war, Thursday 8 June 8, there were 
reports about Palestinian refugees who were unable to cross the Jordan River and 
find safety.100 In an attempt to make sense of the destruction of almost the entire 
Egyptian air force, whilst it was still on the ground, in the first hours of the war, 
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Radio Cairo accused Britain and the US of sending their air forces to assist Israel.101 
Nasser himself suggested that Israeli planes alone could not have attacked in such 
force, noting that ‘[Israel] was relying on something more than his normal strength.102 
The allegations were quickly dismissed by the New York Times’ editorial writers as 
‘fanciful invention ...spawned in the desperation of sweeping defeat [and] …military 
ineffectiveness’.103 However, officials in the British Foreign Office’s Information, 
News and Guidance Department noted their concerns that Nasser’s ‘big lie’ was 
accepted by even moderate Arab leaders, and that western governments would need 
to regain their support by ‘finding a face-saving formula’.104 The minutes went on to 
clarify the matter. ‘In effect this means that the United Kingdom must be seen to 
oblige the Israelis to accept less than they demand’.105 
At the international level, Israeli diplomatic efforts surrounding the UN 
Security Council resolution 242 made it clear that there was little support for Israel’s 
claim to hold on to the territories she had conquered during the war until an Arab 
partner was prepared to enter peace negotiations.106 The Soviet bloc, apart from 
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Romania, broke diplomatic relations with Israel.107 Newspaper articles appeared that 
described Israel as ‘giddy with victory’ and discussed the roots of militarism in Israeli 
society. 108 Unwelcome comparisons were drawn with rogue states such as South 
Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia, and with the domestic turmoil in the US in the era of 
Vietnam and the civil rights movement.109  
Internally, the debate over the fate of the occupied territories was beginning. 
An emerging peace movement derided Israeli society’s intoxication with her military 
power, decried the fact that the search for peace had turned to territorial ambition, 
and pointed out that Israeli control of the territories was at the expense of the 
Palestinians now under their control.110 The erosion of both international and 
domestic support for Israel, from the high-point of the summer of 1967, became a 
matter of concern for the Israeli government. 
 
Domestic criticism of government information policy 
Domestic concerns about the deterioration in Israel’s international image were 
reflected in the media, with articles questioning the government’s ability to effectively 
present its message.111 Even Davar, the ultra-loyal mouthpiece of Mapai, joined in the 
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chorus of disapproval.112 Six weeks after the end of the war, MK Binyamin Avniel 
(Gahal) told the Knesset that Israel had failed to influence international opinion and 
that following the war: 
There has been a drastic change for the worse in public opinion towards us… 
We were entirely unprepared for the information campaign, and we certainly 
didn’t approach it with anything like the application or readiness that 
accompanied the military campaign.113  
 
Avniel focussed his opprobrium on Yisrael Galili, and suggested ‘the minister 
lacks the necessary authority’ to face the challenges of Israel’s international image.114 
Further similar criticism was expressed in 1967 and early 1968, with numerous 
parliamentary questions about Israel’s communications policy, and her deteriorating 
image in the international media.115 Galili responded that Israel had made ‘enormous 
advances in international public opinion, and not just because of our information 
efforts, but because of the victories of the Israel Defence Forces and by virtue of the 
justice of our right to exist… Those responsible for government communications in 
the international arena are to be praised for their great achievements’.116 
Galili was not exhibiting false modesty. His ministerial responsibility extended 
only to the domestic arena – the Hasbara Centre, the Government Press Office and 
the Israel Broadcasting Authority. The job of cultivating Israel’s image on the 
international stage remained the remit of the Foreign Ministry, whilst all news 
relating to the IDF was the domain of its spokesperson’s unit, directly subordinate to 
the Director of Military Intelligence. However, due to this unnatural division of 
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responsibility, relations with foreign correspondents - perhaps the most significant 
factor in creating Israel’s national image in 1967 – did partly fall under Galili’s  
authority, through the Government Press Office. 
In fact, the experience of the international press during the war was mixed. 
Some correspondents echoed Israel’s own satisfaction with the efficiency with which 
the large number of correspondents was accommodated and their reports 
transmitted overseas.117 However, there was also criticism of the lack of 
coordination between the relevant Israeli agencies, the delays in Israeli response to 
Arab propaganda, and of Galili himself. One foreign journalist wrote ‘perhaps [the 
fault] lies in the Minister of Information, who doesn’t seem to possess the vaguest 
idea of public relations’.118 
Galili admitted that the experience of the war had highlighted some 
deficiencies. Addressing the Knesset in July, he told parliament ‘we must work 
according to a plan, making use of professionals and the knowledge already 
acquired’.119 He indicated he was focussing some attention on the issue, hinting that 
his approach was essentially organisational. ‘The government is aware of these 
problems. It also knows of the mistakes because of inadequate coordination between 
the various bodies dealing with this issue’. As a partial response, Galili announced the 
establishment of a committee of directors-general of the relevant government 
ministries to coordinate information efforts more fully, and a ministerial committee 
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to oversee information policy.120 He would not rule out the possibility of creating a 
Ministry of Information. 
Three factors, discussed in more detail below, lay behind the failure of those 
responsible for Israel’s international image in the wake of the 1967 war.  Firstly, the 
political leadership squabbled over the credit for the success of the war. Secondly, as 
negotiations started over the status of the territories Israel had captured, 
contradictory ministerial briefings eroded public confidence in the government. 
Finally, the distinction between domestic and foreign information efforts which had 
been blurred during the war, came back into focus. Together, they earned the 
unwelcome nicknames of ‘the debacle’ and ‘the war of the Jews’121 – the second a 
situation in the Israeli political lexicon indicating grave internal disagreements that 
pose an almost existential threat.122  
 
Who won the war? 
Immediately following the war, a bitter argument was played out in the Israeli press 
whether it was Levi Eshkol, who was Prime Minister and Minister of Defence until 
June 1 1967, or Dayan, who took the Defence portfolio on that date, who was 
primarily responsible for Israel’s dramatic victory. Meir had been the leading 
opponent of Dayan’s entry in to the government, and continued to argue that it had 
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been unnecessary.123 There were few people in public office that Meir disliked more 
than Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres. She was furious when she suspected that Ben-
Gurion was grooming one or the other as his successor, and perceived them as 
traitors when, in 1965, they joined Ben-Gurion in leaving Mapai and forming Rafi. 
When Eshkol died in early 1969, though suffering from cancer and more than once 
having announced her desire to retire, she agreed – reluctantly - to accept the 
nomination of the party and be appointed prime minister. It was too late to 
rehabilitate the reputation of Eshkol, but she was still able to prevent the popular Six 
Day War hero, Moshe Dayan, from getting the job.124 
The question had political ramifications, since Eshkol and Dayan belonged to 
different factions within the government coalition – Mapai and Rafi respectively. The 
debate also made the job of communicating Israel’s position to its domestic and 
international audiences considerably more difficult. The leaders of Mapai came to the 
defence of Eshkol, claiming that there had been no need to establish a national unity 
government, that Eshkol had prepared the country well for war, and that he could 
have continued to serve as Minister of Defence. Interviews with victorious generals, 
who said that they knew that Israel would easily win all along, were enthusiastically 
received.125 Much was made of the extensive planning for Operation Moked, the pre-
emptive air strikes on the Egyptian air force which effectively decided the war on its 
first morning. But many Israelis felt that if victory was so certain, their leaders could 
have done more to calm the public in the three-week ‘waiting period’ before the 
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war. The panic before the war, which appeared unnecessary after it, became a major 
factor in the lack of trust in the government. 
For international observers, revelations by Eshkol’s supporters that the military 
campaign had been some years in preparation stood in sharp distinction to Israel’s 
claims that she had unwillingly fought an essentially defensive war. Rather than a 
desperate attempt to fend off an existential threat, some questioned whether Israel 
had not, in fact, waited for an opportune moment to expand her territories at the 
expense of Jordan and Egypt – whose calls for the destruction of Israel and joint 
defence pact were forgotten. The glossy victory albums that were produced in great 
numbers immediately after the war also reinforced the image of Israel as a military 
power, and for some, as a militarist society.126Contradictory briefings 
Immediately following the war, the Israeli government adopted a set of conditions 
regarding its position in any negotiations, and made them public. Israel would not 
consider returning territories outside of a comprehensive peace deal; she was 
entitled to secure and agreed boundaries; she was entitled to internationally binding 
peace treaties; and Jerusalem would not be re-divided.127  
But there was a range of views within the cabinet, and ministers did not 
hesitate to make them public. Foreign Minister Abba Eban briefed journalists that 
Israel’s presence in the Sinai, West Bank and Golan Heights was temporary, pending 
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negotiations.128 Dayan told the BBC on June 12 that he was waiting for King Hussein 
to call, presumably with a peace offer.129 Menachem Begin, who had joined the 
government on 1 June, and his colleague from Gahal (Herut-Liberal Bloc), would not 
consider the return of any of the territories taken by Israel, even as part of a 
comprehensive peace deal.130 Labour Minister Yigal Allon, who headed the Ahdut 
Ha’Avoda (Unity of Labour) faction of the Labour Alignment, began to discuss his plan 
to retain only those territories necessary for Israeli security. Ministers from the left-
leaning Mapam faction hinted that they would support a unilateral withdrawal from 
almost all of the territories Israel had captured.131 The three ministers who 
represented the National Religious Party132 offered a different approach, suggesting 
that there was a distinction to be drawn between the territory captured from 
Jordan, which contained a number of religiously significant sites, and that captured 
from Egypt which was largely the Sinai desert.133 
Such public disagreement was noted with dismay in the Knesset. Yitzhak 
Levin (Agudat Yisrael) asked ‘does everyone really have to make statements – 
ministers and deputy ministers and party leaders – because they look to publicise 
their ideas? They make bombastic statements and never consider the fact that by 
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doing so they cause the state great damage’.134 International audiences may not have 
grasped the details of Israel’s parliamentary system which encouraged small factions 
to differentiate their positions both inside the political system and to domestic and 
international observers. 
The response was hardly better than the original problem. Stung by Eshkol’s 
criticism of some of his answers to journalists, Dayan decided to stop giving any 
interviews to the international press in September 1967.135 Menachem Begin, too, 
decided that he would not speak to foreign journalists whilst he was a minister in the 
national unity government.136 The decisions denied international audiences of both 
Israel’s most visible figure of the 1967 war, and of an alternative to the dominant 
Mapai analysis. 
 
 
 
Organisational challenges 
Immediately following the war, whilst hundreds of foreign correspondents were still 
in Israel, the reservists and volunteers who had supported the much-expanded work 
of the Government Press Office and the IDF Spokesperson’s unit began to leave. 
Although journalists still required assistance in covering the aftermath of the war, 
these units soon began to lack trained and experienced personnel.  
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When he took responsibility for information affairs, Galili had convened an 
‘information committee’ that met sporadically until the outbreak of war in June 
1967.137 The first meeting was attended by the Director-General of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, Yaakov Herzog, although much of the work was done by lower-
level officials. In early July 1967, the government empowered Galili to coordinate all 
government information efforts – both domestic and international.138 Speaking to the 
cabinet, Eshkol stressed that ‘there is a special importance to Israel’s information 
efforts at present because of the political challenges we are currently facing.’139 He 
also created a ministerial committee to deal with information issues, attended by 
Galili, Abba Eban, Menachem Begin, Yosef Burg, Mordechai Bentov, Moshe Dayan 
and Moshe Kol.140  
Attempts to centralise the coordination of information efforts, however, 
were again frustrated. Despite Galili’s newly-granted authority over foreign 
information efforts, the network of embassies and a number of information 
centres141 remained under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The division 
of responsibilities underscored the significant distinction between Galili’s 
organisational approach, and that of Eban, whose extensive diplomatic experience led 
him to conclude that the primary challenge was content. The debate between Galili 
and Eban regarding content and methods was to return in 1969 with the report of 
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the Peled Committee on Government Information, and in the early 1970s with 
discussions around the creation of a Ministry of Information. 
 
Conclusions 
The appointment of Yisrael Galili as minister with responsibility for government 
information efforts marked a welcome change to the years of deliberate neglect 
under Ben-Gurion. However, although the Eshkol government attempted to 
confront the problem, the minister appointed was badly-suited to the job. More 
importantly his mandate was badly-suited to the challenges of the issue. By only 
granting Galili authority over domestic information efforts, Eshkol established a false 
distinction that was to dog subsequent efforts to articulate cogent policy. This is 
particularly puzzling given the relatively low status of the Foreign Ministry, in whose 
hands foreign information efforts remained. 
Overly concerned with inter-factional party politics, Galili fought the wrong 
battle when war came in June 1967. Rather than embracing the opportunity to 
contribute to Israel’s foreign policy by engaging with the hundreds of foreign 
correspondents who flooded to Israel in the ‘waiting period’ before the war, and 
with those who stayed behind in a much enlarged press corps after it, Galili battled 
for Eshkol’s reputation in the domestic press. Given the considerable interest in the 
questions of inadvertency, miscalculation and misperception, it is tempting to 
speculate what the effect of a clearer presentation of Israel’s interests and intentions 
would have had in the critical ‘waiting period’ before the war. This missed 
opportunity, an additional aspect of Israel’s ineffective diplomatic signalling, is a new 
contribution to the study of the Six Day War. In any case, Galili’s work was largely 
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irrelevant. The hesitant Eshkol was no match for the dashing bravado of Dayan and 
Rabin, the popular heroes of the war for the watching world. It was they, not he, 
who featured on the front pages of Life and Time magazines.  
Whilst the gridlock of ‘activists’ and ‘diplomats’ contributed government 
information policy that was unsystematic, reactive and somewhat lacking in direction, 
the resulting ‘muddling through’ in wartime was a virtue. Policy choices were limited 
by availability – radio dominated because there was no television, for example - and 
incremental changes addressed immediate and concrete deficiencies, rather than 
abstract and theoretical problems. However, this approach was not appropriate for 
the post-war reality, with Israel under far more exacting scrutiny.  
Whilst ordinary Israelis were dismayed as international approval seeped away 
after the war, policy-makers were frustrated at the lack of accurate data to quantify 
and explain the erosion of support, particularly from the US and from Western 
Europe.142 Galili continued to ‘muddle through’, where the circumstances called for a 
comprehensive survey of the issue and evaluation of a wide range of policy options. 
The Eshkol government did, though, take action on two issues, both of which had 
been on the national agenda for some time – the introduction of television to Israel, 
and reform of the government’s structures and organisations that dealt with 
domestic and international information efforts. These issues will form the basis of the 
following two chapters.  
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Chapter 3  
Breach Birth: The Introduction of Television to Israel 
 
I’d like to see what Israeli culture – or any culture, for that matter – would be like 
without the all-intrusive proliferation of witless TV shows.1 
 
In May 1968, Israel celebrated the 20th anniversary of independence. The event was marked 
by a military parade through the streets of Jerusalem. Tens of thousands of Israeli soldiers 
marched along the route, showing off the weapons that won the war – and some of those 
captured from their defeated enemies.2 Unlike the previous year, there were no 
burdensome restrictions on the number or type of arms Israel could bring into the now-
united city. There was no passing of notes between VIPs with worrying news from the 
Egyptian front. This year, Israel was broadcasting a new political reality to the half-million 
citizens who lined the streets of the capital. There was another difference, too. Watching 
the parade from the tribune, minister without portfolio Yisrael Galili cradled a television 
monitor between his legs.3 This was the first televised event in Israel’s history. 
Preparations for the introduction of television began in 1965, but it was the 
perceived failure of Israel’s government information policy in the aftermath of the 1967 war 
– popularly referred to as the ‘debacle’ – that acted as the catalyst for the establishment of 
‘general’ television broadcasts in Israel.4 The issue had been debated in official circles and 
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had been on the public agenda since the early years of independence, but no consensus had 
emerged on the kind of television service most suitable for Israel.  
The Israeli media of the late 1960s conformed to a developmental model described 
by McQuail, in which nation-building is an overriding objective and collective ends, rather 
than individual freedoms, are emphasized. A certain level of journalistic freedom is 
subordinated in its service.5 This was certainly the case with Israeli media, which was, to a 
large extent, subject to party political control. The domestic media was extremely active, 
with daily and weekly newspapers – at least one each for the major political parties and 
some that claimed independence, and the radio stations Kol Yisrael (‘The Voice of Israel’) and 
Galei Zahal (IDF Radio).6 However, political control was pervasive, with the radio stations 
run from the Prime Minister’s Office and the IDF General Staff and newspaper editorials 
dictated, at times, from government ministries.7 The clearest example of political control 
was the ‘Editors’ Committee’, established before Israeli independence, where 
newspapermen and politicians agreed together what news Israelis could read.8 
Within this framework, Oren states, there were three possible ways in which Israel 
could have conceived of its television service: as an educational resource for a population 
still developing national values, as an advertisement for Israel to the wider world, and as a 
                                                                                                                                       
 
1966, and is still sometimes used to distinguish IBA Channel 1 television from its commercial 
competitors.  
5 Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction 4th ed. (London: Sage, 2000). 121.  
6 Dan Caspi and Yehiel Limor, eds., Mass Media in Israel [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Open University, 
1998), Raphael Mann and Tzipi Gonn-Gross, Galei Zahal - All the Time [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Ministry 
of Defense, 1991). 
7 Interview with Meron Medzini, 9.4.2006. 
8 Peri, Telepopulism: Media and Politics in Israel  76. Goren, Secrecy, Security and Press Freedom 
[Hebrew]  142. 
Chapter 3 
124 
 
propaganda tool to counter the often aggressively anti-Israel programming of Arab states.9 
While early discussions promoted television as an educational vehicle, the eventual outcome 
was closer to Ellul’s ‘propaganda of agitation’, which seeks rebellion or war, and nourishes 
revolutionary movements.10 The choice was a result of the Israeli government’s deep 
discomfort over the post-war criticism of its information policy, the influence of the political 
culture of hasbara, and the ‘activist’ predisposition of Galili, the minister responsible for 
information policy.  
This chapter will look at early discussions regarding the introduction of television to 
Israel, will examine how the outbreak of war in 1967 influenced the issue, and analyse the –
brief - post-war displacement of the developmental-educational model of television by what 
Galili described as ‘a kind of a weapon’.11 As opposed to the other episodes examined in this 
thesis, Galili’s intervention in the establishment of television was strategic and proactive, and 
thus free of the limitations that the political culture of hasbara, discussed in Chapter 1, might 
have imposed. Indeed, as a tool of propaganda rather than a tool of persuasion it is an 
exception to the model of hasbara this thesis has established. However, as a policy initiative 
aimed at improving Israel’s international standing and weakening its opponents’, it is 
consistent with the overall argument described above.  
 
Early discussions on introducing television  
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In the years immediately following independence, Israel received a number of inquiries 
regarding the establishment of television. In 1950, a group of investors from Canada and the 
UK proposed the establishment of a commercial television service in Israel.12 In June 1951, a 
group of Americans with ties to the television industry approached the Israeli Consulate in 
Los Angeles to obtain a license to begin television broadcasts. They noted that their group 
included Robert Sarnoff, the son of General David Sarnoff, the Chairman of the Board of the 
Radio Corporation of America (RCA).13 In July 1952, an American Jewish student sent a 
detailed technical proposal to the Ministry of Posts – apparently the most appropriate 
government body to deal with such a matter – noting that the $563,000 required to bring 
television to the people of the book could be raised from the Ford Foundation.14 He noted 
the educational and cultural possibilities that television could offer – Hebrew language for 
new immigrants, agricultural advances for farmers, and concerts and plays for residents of 
outlying settlements who could not reach the cities. 
In July 1952, David Sarnoff himself visited Ben-Gurion to discuss the issue. ‘Sarnoff – 
the electronics General - came to see me,’ wrote Ben-Gurion in his diary15. ‘He suggested 
television in Israel as a way of ‘ingathering the exiles’. I said that I doubted that our balance 
of payments would justify further unnecessary foreign currency expenditure.’16 Peri suggests 
that Ben-Gurion’s objection to television was informed both by his deep love of the written 
word, and by the experience of seeing his grandchildren utterly transfixed by the television 
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– to the point of ignoring him - when he visited them in London.17 According to Yitzhak 
Navon, his political secretary, the way that Ben-Gurion retold the episode confirmed that it 
had left a deep impression on him. ‘It was clear to me that the old man was saying in his 
downright way: that’s a mind-destroying device. It wastes time and addles the brain. We 
won’t have it in our country.’18 
But Zvi Gil, an enthusiastic supporter of Israel television and its first chronicler, 
quotes another of Navon’s anecdotes, indicating that Ben-Gurion could be persuaded of a 
different role for television. In 1960, during a visit to France, Navon urged him to watch a 
documentary, filmed using a microscopic camera, which showed the collective labour of life 
inside a beehive. Ben-Gurion was utterly transfixed. ‘How do they get inside the hive? Look 
at the queen! Quite remarkable – you can see everything that they are describing! I really 
never imagined that you could show bees in such an educational and eye-opening way. 
Wonderful, truly wonderful!’19 Other Israelis saw the benefits to be derived from television. 
Undeterred by Ben-Gurion’s rejection, David Sarnoff proposed a cooperative venture with 
the Israeli Ministry of Defence. Peres, newly installed as director-general, responded 
enthusiastically, and issued a set of guidelines to the ministry’s delegation to New York to 
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explore the issue.20 That suggestion was quickly shelved, the victim of Ben-Gurion’s moral 
and financial objections. However, the issue was regularly revisited.21  
In 1956, Teddy Kollek, director-general of Ben-Gurion’s office, appointed a 
government commission of enquiry to ‘research and investigate the possibility of establishing 
a television network in Israel’.22 Two previous committees had already recommended that 
Israel begin television broadcasts.23 Its proponents, too, argued that television would be a 
valuable educational tool, helping the large numbers of new immigrants to Israel acculturate 
and integrate, widening the use of the Hebrew language and familiarising citizens with 
political developments.24 
Katz notes that objections to television went much deeper than financial 
considerations.25 Having fought hard to establish Hebrew culture in Israel, the ideological 
elites were concerned that television would subvert this effort by introducing foreign 
influences into Israel.26 There was particular concern that television would bring American 
values to Israeli society.27 Religious circles were concerned about the secularising influence 
that television might bring, and political leaders were concerned that television would erode 
national solidarity and lead to social fragmentation. 
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International experts played a vital role in overcoming fears that television would be 
misused, and that it could have play a constructive role in nation-building. In June 1961, Dr 
H R Cassirer of UNESCO and T S Duckmanton of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
issued a report on the advisability of introducing television to Israel.28 They acknowledged 
Israeli reticence about introducing television, noting that ‘emphasis on [television's] 
constructive role seems especially called for in view of the potential harmful effects of 
television which preoccupy Israel public opinion’.29 They concluded that, despite the costs, it 
was in Israel’s interest to establish  
a publicly operated television service, financed out of non-commercial revenues, 
serving the entire territory of Israel with a limited number of programme hours 
whose objective is educational and cultural … and include in it a programme range 
from instruction to cultural enjoyment.30  
 
A report by the European Broadcasting Union suggested that the particular nature of 
Israeli society called for ‘a certain seriousness’ in programming, encouraging political 
engagement, rather than the more familiar model of television as diversion from reality.31  
However, so long as television remained under the direct control of the Prime Minister’s 
Office, the strongest objection to the introduction of television was that it could become 
                                            
 
28 H Cassirer and T S Duckmanton, Educational Television in Israel: Report of a UNESCO Mission, 
31 May-27 June 1961 (UNESCO, 1961). ISA/RG130/G/4604/1. Meir Avidor, Evaluation of the 
UNESCO Report into Educational Television, presented to the Minister of Education and Culture, 
1962; Report of the Council on Educational Television, 1962; Shmuel Bendor, Report of the 
Interministerial Commission of Enquiry into General Television Broadcasts, 1965. UNESCO (1961), 
the European Broadcasting Union (1965) and the Canadian Broadcasting Commission (1970) were 
each invited to consider the question of television broadcasts in Israel. See also Meir Avidor, 
Evaluation of the UNESCO Report into Educational Television, presented to the Minister of Education and 
Culture, 1962. 
29 Cassirer and Duckmanton, Educational Television in Israel: Report of a UNESCO Mission, 31 May-
27 June 1961 6. 
30 Cassirer and Duckmanton, Educational Television in Israel: Report of a UNESCO Mission, 31 May-
27 June 1961 10. 
31 Amit Schejter, "The Cultural Obligations of Broadcast Television in Israel," Gazette 56 (1996): 
185. 
Chapter 3 
129 
 
the mouthpiece of one party. This ran counter to the highly politicised but highly 
competitive ethos of the Israeli media. Eshkol, seeking to dismantle some aspects of Ben-
Gurion’s highly centralised administration, proposed that the state-owned media should be 
given its freedom. Despite its formal independence, the decisions around the establishment 
of Israeli television show that political influence was still considerable.  
 
Moving television out of the Prime Minister’s Office 
The 1965 Broadcasting Authority Law transferred authority for Kol Yisrael, Israel’s national 
radio network, from the Prime Minister’s Office to an autonomous Israel Broadcasting 
Authority (IBA) where it would be free from political control. The IBA’s new director was 
Hanoch Givton, who had formerly been Head of Radio at Kol Yisrael.32 Givton was keen to 
explore the possibilities of bringing television to Israel, and keener still that he be 
responsible for it. In July 1965, the cabinet decided, in principle, that the IBA should also 
create a television service and appointed a committee under Shmuel Bendor to examine the 
political, financial and cultural implications of the decision. The recommendations included 
the following:  
1. The Broadcasting Authority should be the guarantee to the level of the programs 
and their mamlachtiut33. 
2. The power of television will be of considerable magnitude in the advancement of a 
few mamlachti targets such as the ingathering of the exiles, population dispersal, the 
elimination of ignorance and the teaching of Hebrew. 
3. An Israeli television will reduce the destructive cultural and political influence of 
foreign television. The less educated people are, the more inclined they are to watch 
television and be affected by its content. Therefore, the most vulnerable population 
is also the one that watches the most television. 
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4. Television programs should be attractive and not frugal. This is to ensure that the 
audience will watch them instead of turning to foreign broadcasts. 
5. Television broadcasts must reach all areas of the country, especially remote areas. 
6. Israeli television, especially Arabic broadcasts, will serve as a useful tool of hasbara 
in neighbouring countries. 
7. The programs will be in one language. In certain programs in Hebrew, there will 
be Arabic translation. 
8. General television will begin by broadcasting 14 hours a week in Hebrew and 
about 3.5 hours in Arabic. It is preferable that broadcasts begin at the same time. In 
questions of quality versus quantity, quality should prevail. 
9. Israeli television programmes will not be broadcast in the Diaspora but they will 
be attainable through programme exchanges. 
10. The programs should be as Israeli as possible. This will also help create an 
industry of writing and producing television programmes. 
17. For the benefit of the young television service, it should develop and be 
strengthened without outside influences. The budgetary needs should be met by 
government rather than by commercials.34 
 
 
Whilst Bendor was aware of the hasbara potential of television, describing it as ‘a useful tool 
of hasbara’ and noting the importance of pulling Israeli viewers away from foreign television, 
the recommendation that programming should be overwhelmingly in Hebrew, and not in 
Arabic, indicated the acceptance of the ‘developmental’ model proposed by UNESCO and 
others.35 In January 1966, the first experimental broadcasts were enthusiastically received.36 
At the end of the month, the government approved a contract with the American company 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) to act as the IBA’s consultant.37 The cost of the 
contract - IL300,000 in 1966-67 – was considerable.38 
                                            
 
34 Shmuel Bendor, Report of the Interministerial Committee on General Television [Hebrew]. State 
of Israel, 1965). 
35 Interview with Elihu Katz, 19.7.2005. 
36 Maariv, 7 January 1966. 9; Haaretz, 4 January 1966. 5. The first broadcast lasted for around half an 
hour, ending with pictures of Israel’s US-supplied Hawk missile system to the rousing music of 
Tchaikovsky’s ‘1812’ Overture.  
37 Gil, A House of Precious Stones: Case History of Israeli Television [Hebrew]  36. 
38 Yisrael Galili to the Knesset, 21.12.1966, Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 47, col. 609.  
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Three months later, Prime Minister Eshkol inaugurated an educational television 
station, the gift of the French branch of the Rothschild family, which transmitted sporadic 
educational films to a few classrooms.39 Despite the support of foreign philanthropists, the 
television project was a heavy financial burden for Israel, which was experiencing a deep 
recession in 1966. That summer, the budget for establishing television broadcasts was cut by 
IL10m.40 The Finance Minister, Pinchas Sapir, was reluctant to commit further resources to 
television, particularly since he thought that there would be very little interest in it.  
However, Sapir was wrong. By 1967 30,000 Israelis owned television sets,41 and in 
the absence of local broadcasts, those television owners who did plug in their sets picked up 
black and white broadcasts from Cairo and Beirut.42 Public pressure for Israeli broadcasts 
propelled the government towards action, albeit cautious and in slow increments.43 
When Yisrael Galili agreed to take ministerial responsibility for information affairs, in 
October 1966, the IBA and the television project fell into his remit.44 He was conscious of 
the suspicions of political control over such a powerful new medium.45 Indeed, the question 
of independence was at the top of the agenda for a meeting of the inter-ministerial 
                                            
 
39 Haaretz, 25 March 1966. 8. 
40 Levi Eshkol to the Knesset, 12.6.1966, Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 46, col. 2123. 
41 Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Statistical Abstract of Israel’, vol. 20, 1969. 273; Peri, Telepopulism: 
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44 Shifris, "Yisrael Galili Ideology, Policy and Political Action, 1935-1967 [Hebrew]," 183. 
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government discussion on the introduction of television. He notes the views of Haim Moshe Shapira 
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committee on general television, which he chaired, of 23 April 1967.46 This issue was also 
picked up by the national press, which called for entirely new legislation, rather than the 
simple addition of television to the existing IBA Law, in order to prevent political influence 
extending to television.47  
Galili shared Eshkol’s caution with regard to the benefits of television. Progress was 
accordingly slow. Speaking to the Knesset in December 1966, he said that whilst it was ‘still 
too early to set an exact date’ for the launching of television in Israel, it was possible that 
broadcasts might begin by the end of 1968, if there were no unexpected delays.48 He did, 
however, appoint one of his protégés from the IDF to keep things ticking over.  
In February 1967, Galili appointed General Elad Peled, who was heading the IDF’s 
National Security College at the time, as his special assistant with responsibility for launching 
the television project.49 Peled had been a junior officer in the Palmach, and had come to 
attention for his part in organising the besieged Jewish population of the town of Tsfat, and, 
later in the summer of 1948, the military operation to capture it. When the Palmach was 
disbanded, Peled remained in the IDF, moving up the ranks. In 1965, on his appointment as 
commander of the National Security College, he joined the IDF General Staff, the first of his 
                                            
 
46 ISA/RG 124/G/6344/5. Galili asked that the committee discuss three matters – how to ensure that 
television would have a ‘national’, and not a party-political, nature; the issue of television during 
election campaigns; and television broadcasts on the Jewish Sabbath and religious holidays.  
47 ‘Sooner or Later on Television’, Haaretz, 7.4.1967. See also Amnon Rubenstein, ‘Television’s 
Coming’, Haaretz, 7.4.1967. Rubenstein called for the IBA’s Board of Governors to be ratified by the 
Knesset plenum, rather than the cabinet, and for the IBA’s budget to be an internal matter, rather 
than requiring the approval of the Knesset’s Finance Committee. Both of these recommendations 
were aimed at reducing possible political influence on the IBA. See also Yona Cohen, ‘The Campaign 
against Television’ HaTzofe, 7.4.67. 
48 Yisrael Galili to the Knesset, 21.12.1966, Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 47, col. 609. Galili returned to the 
Knesset two months later and repeated that progress was being made, but that it was still too early 
to predict exactly when television broadcasts would begin. Yisrael Galili to the Knesset, 15.2.1967, 
Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 48, col. 1313.  
49 YTA15/061/05/7. Peled to Galili, 2.2.1967; YTA/10/061/05/8. CV of Major-General Elad Peled.; 
Katz, "Television Comes to the People of the Book,"   251. 
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generation so to do.50 By his own admission, he was one of the few senior officers of his 
generation with ‘intellectual curiosity’, and regularly volunteered to stay behind at General 
Staff headquarters whilst his fellow generals rushed off to watch a football match.51 Peled 
was also politically neutral. As a member of the Palmach, he might have been expected to 
identify with Ahdut Ha’Avoda, like Allon and Galili, but in one of the myriad splits and 
fractures in the labour movement of the 1940s, Peled’s kvutza had sided with Ben-Gurion 
and Mapai.52 He, though, was never a party member.  
Galili and Peled agreed that the appointment would eventually be as Director-
General of the IBA, but that in the interim, Peled would work for Galili from the Prime 
Minister’s Office with responsibility for the television project.53 The appointment drew 
criticism of Peled, who as a soldier was considered temperamentally unsuited to the job, 
and of Galili who was accused – erroneously - of appointing one of his political allies from 
Ahdut Ha’Avoda.54 By having Peled work the Prime Minister’s Office, he was also criticised for 
reinforcing government control of the media.55 
The criticism of Peled’s appointment was, in fact, a serious misinterpretation of 
Galili’s approach to the television project. Firstly, Galili was indicating that although he was 
willing to advance preparations for the introduction of television, he would not do so 
without parliamentary approval. He proposed to present new legislation to widen the 
authority of the IBA, whose 1965 charter did not explicitly mention television, but talked 
only of broadcasting. While previous government decisions interpreted the charter as 
                                            
 
50 YTA/15/061/05/08. CV of Major-General Elad Peled. 
51 Interview with Elad Peled, 30.6.2008 
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including television when it began, Galili insisted on parliamentary approval to amend it56. At 
the same time, he was indicating that he wanted television and radio to be entirely 
independent and free of government control. In order to do so, he recognised that the IBA 
would need stronger leadership57. There was also a personal element to his decision. Peled’s 
military background was certainly an advantage, but Galili’s principal purpose was party-
political. Galili was bent on dismissing Hanoch Givton, who was closely associated with 
Rafi.58 Unhappily, Givton tendered his resignation, and after some discussion was offered the 
post of Ambassador to Lima. 59  
With Peled now in place, Galili brought the matter back to the government, which 
decided on 23 February 1967, following decisions of 18 July 1965 and 11 September 1966: 
 
To establish general television with national coverage and to expedite preparations 
to begin broadcasts.  
Television will not be used for the election campaign of 1969 
Television will operate within the framework of the Israel Broadcasting Authority 
The aforementioned decisions will be brought before the Knesset 
To request that Minister Y Galili and the Minister of Justice prepare an amendment 
to the Israel Broadcasting Authority law, as required by para. 4, and to bring it 
immediately to the Knesset.60 
 
In its editorial of 29 March 1967, Haaretz, itself associated with Rafi, warned of ‘the danger 
represented by the decision to place the issue of government communications in the hands 
of Minister Y Galili, who intends to take control of the entire broadcasting system, radio 
and television. We must oppose this trend’. The newspaper also urged its readers to ‘block 
                                            
 
56 Yisrael Galili to the Knesset, 21.12.1966, Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 47, col. 609. Galili referred to a 
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60 YTA/15/061/05/3. 
Chapter 3 
135 
 
the plans to turn [television] into a tool of influence for one party alone’.61 The Six-Day War 
was to provide Galili with the opportunity to divert television away from its lofty goals of 
education and enlightenment and to use it for the political ends he had sensibly objected to 
before it.  
 
Emergency domestic television broadcasts in the ‘waiting period’ 
Towards the end of April 1967, the General Security Services, Israel’s internal security 
agency, convened a discussion to discuss the impact of television on national security62. The 
main conclusion was that broadcasts from neighbouring Arab states, particularly Egypt, were 
highly influential for Israeli Moslem Arabs, although the Christians preferred the more 
moderate broadcasts from Lebanon. The GSS assessed that the broadcasts strengthened 
both the sense of Palestinian identity amongst Israeli Arabs, and their desire to eradicate the 
State of Israel. The report noted that there were 1305 television sets in Arab towns, of 
which around half were to be found in largely Christian Nazareth, and another 750 sets in 
‘mixed’ towns63. In total, there were around 30,000 televisions in Israel at the time, of which 
22,000 were registered with the Israel Broadcasting Authority64.  
There were thirty-two television stations operating in the Middle East – in Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Cyprus, amongst others - and another twenty-eight were 
planned. Many of these stations, particularly those from Egypt and Lebanon, were picked up 
                                            
 
61 Haaretz, 29.3.1967. Haaretz was strongly supportive of Ben-Gurion’s Rafi party, and critical of 
Labour. In conversation with Shimon Peres, a protégé of Ben-Gurion and one of his allies in the 
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62 ISA/RG 124/G/4886/9. ‘Security implications of television’, 21.4.1967.  
63 ISA/RG 124/G/4886/9. ‘Security implications of television’, 21.4.1967. p. 5. 
64 Response to a parliamentary question by Y Tamir, 29.3.1967. Divrei HaKnesset vol. 48, col. 1877. 
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in Israel. The GSS thought that an Israeli television transmitter would be able to block these 
broadcasts, even if only partially. An Israeli transmitter would be able to reach Gaza, some 
of Sinai, the Hebron area and a large part of the ‘triangle’ of Arab towns in the Galilee. 
Broadcasting deep into the Arab states was not considered technically possible, although a 
transmitter placed on Mount Meron in the Galilee – which would cost $1million - would be 
able to reach around 800,000 Lebanese and 1,500,000 Syrians65.  
With the full support of Yisrael Galili, whose predisposition to view the world 
through the prism of Israeli national security was well-known, the government decided to 
press ahead with emergency television broadcasts, even if they were highly improvised.66 In 
the same week, he had received the first of a set of public opinion surveys from the Israel 
Institute of Applied Social Research and the Institute of Communications at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. Galili was much impressed by the researchers, the US-born 
Professors Louis Guttman and Elihu Katz, and remained in close contact with them. 
Moshe Hovav, a Kol Yisrael employee who had taken a three-month course in television 
production in Scotland was asked to head the emergency television team. Hovav had heard 
from Arab participants on the television course that Israeli radio was picked up in 
neighbouring states, and was considered to be a highly reliable source of news. He reported 
that the Arab journalists had begged him to press for Israeli television. ‘Start soon, and start 
well, because we are waiting for Israeli television back home. If you start well, you’ll 
convince the Arab viewer immediately. How? Broadcast good entertainment. Not the cheap 
stuff.’67 
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The emergency broadcasts were planned to be transmitted from the Educational 
Television studios in Ramat Aviv, by government order. Since the Educational Television 
initiative was a private project by the Rothschild Foundation, the only way the government 
could gain access to the studio was by an emergency edict. As war approached, the 
government did indeed make a formal step to take control of the Ramat Aviv facility.68 On 4 
June, the day before the war broke out, the IBA Board discussed the plans for emergency 
television broadcasts, and authorised an initial grant of IL10,000 for the project, on the 
understanding that most of the expenditure would not be covered by the IBA’s regular 
budget. The emergency television project was considered a government project, and the 
IBA board discussed the possibility of establishing an inter-ministerial board of management, 
which would include the IDF and the information services, as well as the IBA. They even 
suggested a formulation for the title of the broadcasts: ‘Israel Broadcasting Authority, 
Emergency Broadcasts Unit, in cooperation with the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit’.69 
The thing was almost ready. We had a daily schedule of three and a half hours, 
comprising news with films and slides, foreign reports, filmed interviews, arts shows, 
feature films and so on. We had done all the coordination. The IDF Spokesperson’s 
unit had even organised a Piper light aircraft to pick up the films from cameramen on 
all the fronts every day. But the war was too quick. When we were three or four 
days away from starting, we were told to stop. And that’s how it ended.70 
 
Hovav was disappointed but not beaten. He wrote to Hanoch Givton, the IBA’s 
acting Director-General, and stressed the need for Arab-language broadcasts. He was aware 
of the difficulties, including the lack of trained television personnel who spoke Arabic, but 
noted that ‘it should still be possible to plan general television broadcasts in Arabic, which 
                                            
 
68 A Bar-Kedma, ‘Why Did Israel Hesitate to ‘Shoot’ the Television Weapon?’, Yediot Ahronot, 
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would include news in Arabic, documentaries (from those broadcast in Hebrew) with 
dubbing or subtitles in Arabic, interviews in Arabic and discussions with commentators in 
Arabic.’71 He found a powerful ally in the minister, Yisrael Galili. 
On the offensive: government information policy in the wake of the Six-Day 
War 
The last week has brought a totally new reality. Amongst the Jewish population, 
morale remained firm, and does not need any new emergency treatment at this 
point. On the other hand, the Arab population of the state has grown to around a 
million. The danger to morale – Arab in particular, but also Jewish – of television 
from Arab states may not be serious at this point, but we must look to the future’.72  
 
Immediately following the end of the war, the Chairman of the IBA Board wrote to Galili, 
urging him to divert efforts for establishing domestic television. ‘We must ensure that we 
give the Arab population now under our control appropriate, comprehensive and detailed 
hasbara, using all media possible – including television.’73 Galili needed little convincing of the 
value of using radio and television as a tool of government policy. ‘It’s a kind of weapon,’ he 
explained to his cabinet colleague, Minister of Finance Pinchas Sapir.74 Galili’s weapon was to 
be used in the war against what he saw as an unchecked stream of Arab propaganda75.  
Galili then convened the Ministerial Committee on Television and spoke in the same 
terms76. He reported on the preparations made by the IBA for emergency domestic 
broadcasts before the war, but noted that the circumstances were now entirely changed. 
Galili explained the need for shifting the focus of television. On one hand, it would help 
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74 ISA/RG 124/G/4604/1. Yisrael Galili to Pinchas Sapir, 31.10.1967. 
75 Yisrael Galili to the Knesset, 15.2.1967, Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 48, col. 1309; 29.3.1967, Divrei 
HaKnesset, vol. 48, col. 1877.  Katz, "Television Comes to the People of the Book." p. 245.  
76 ISA/RG 124/G/4886/9. Minutes of the Ministerial Committee on General Television.  
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explain Israel’s position to the Palestinians. It would also serve to block the transmissions of 
less positive broadcasts from the surrounding Arab states. The Committee voted 
unanimously in favour of his proposal and authorised Galili to ‘examine the possibility of 
establishing broadcasts to the [Palestinian] Arab population. 77‘ 
Following discussions in September, the cabinet instructed Galili to bring the matter 
before the Knesset for approval and to make the necessary legislative amendments to the 
IBA Law78. In November 1967, Galili announced to the Knesset that the time had come for 
Israel to begin television broadcasts, and to use them as a propaganda tool79, just as the 
Arab states had done before the war80. ‘The anti-Israeli element in television broadcasting in 
the Arab countries has been strong for some years, and even more so after the Six-Day 
War.’81 Others, too, were convinced that it could be a useful tool for the government.  
Television, argued one politician, would ‘show the Arab population on our borders 
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…everything that is good, beautiful and noble in the state of Israel.’82The Knesset approved 
a budget of £IL8.5m for the establishment of an emergency television service.83  
Galili suggested that the government install televisions in coffee-shops, social clubs 
and schools to ‘reach different publics, and influence previously conceived, anti-Israel 
opinions’.84 The service would broadcast four hours a day – three in Arabic and one in 
Hebrew.85 This was a significant reversal of the Bendor recommendations of 1966, which 
envisaged 14 hours of Hebrew and only 2½ hours of Arabic programming each day. Galili 
did not ignore the ‘developmental’ model of television.  In the same debate, Galili described 
television as a tool that would ‘unite the people in a country of immigrants, raise standards 
of culture and education, combat ignorance, encourage reading, allow those living in remote 
communities to benefit from the treasures of art and culture’.86 He had maintained contact 
with Professors Guttman and Katz, and had commissioned opinion surveys before, during 
and after the war87. When they presented the surveys to him in August 1967, he received 
the results with some dismay, noting that whilst most Israelis supported the retention of the 
recently-captured Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, and some wanted to 
hold onto Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, when faced with a map, very few could accurately 
identify these areas. The solution, suggested Elihu Katz, lay in starting television broadcasts. 
‘If there were television in Israel, and if the weather forecast was broadcast with a map as a 
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background, many more Israelis would be able to identify the occupied territories on the 
map.’88 
In earlier discussions, Galili had noted the contribution that the establishment of 
television could play to establishing Israel’s electronics industry.89 There was also popular 
pressure to bring television to domestic audiences. Haaretz called for the ‘triumph of 
common sense’ - Israeli television for Israelis, not for Arabs.90 Speaking later, he clarified his 
position. ‘I saw television as having the potential to do some good, in engendering 
responsible Zionist consciousness and love of the land, but not for preaching or 
indoctrination … I saw television’s role as making people’s leisure time more pleasant, and 
bringing culture to the people.’91 
 
From General Peled to Professor Katz 
In fact, the eventual direction taken by Israel television was influenced as much by 
personality as by policy. Galili’s first choice to lead the project, Major-General Elad Peled, 
returned to the IDF in May 1967, and had commanded operations with great success, 
capturing the Golan Heights from Syria. When the war ended, he asked Galili to allow him 
to stay on in the IDF, and to be released from his job with the television92, a decision which 
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saddened his colleagues and angered Galili.93 In an uncharacteristic show of emotion, Galili 
told Peled he felt betrayed.94 But Peled had begun to sense that he and Galili did not agree 
on the principle of the independence of television and radio from political influence. ‘I see 
the independence of the Broadcasting Authority as a cornerstone of democratic life in 
Israel’, wrote Peled. ‘I am not sure we share a common assessment of the coming 
developments, and so I doubt my ability to manage the broadcasting service by the 
principles of non-dependence.’95 Peled may also have been influenced by concerns that 
debates over the use of television would place him in an uncomfortable position in the 
possible clash between Minister of Labour Yigal Allon (Ahdut Ha’Avoda) and Minister of 
Defence Moshe Dayan (Rafi), with both of whom he had close personal relations96.  
In his place, Galili turned to Shmuel Almog of Kol Yisrael to head the expanded IBA. 
Despite Almog’s known opposition to Jewish settlement of the West Bank and Gaza, which 
was strongly supported by Galili, he was seen as reliable and loyal97. His appointment was 
approved by the cabinet at the beginning of November98. Galili then asked Elihu Katz, whose 
enthusiasm for television was already apparent, to replace Peled in establishing television as 
head of the ‘television task force’. 
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Oren suggests that Galili was determined to appoint a ‘trouble-free and popular 
successor, an authority who would appear above political motivation and would bring 
unquestioned expertise to the post’.99 He was also motivated by the desire to prevent 
Hanoch Givton from once again staking a claim on the television project100. Katz certainly 
had expertise in communications, but he also made no efforts to hide his scepticism 
regarding Galili’s proposal to use television as a short-term propaganda tool, aimed primarily 
at Palestinian Arabs.  
Katz did not believe that television could be used to reduce tensions between Israel 
and the Arab population under its control. ‘In choosing me, the government could not have 
found a more sceptical person as far as belief in the short-term mass media effects are 
concerned. I did not think that television could by itself cause the Arabs to like Israelis, and I 
said so.’101 Rather, he saw a role for television in reinforcing the substance of government 
policy – which could either be one of reconciliation or of ongoing conflict. He was 
particularly interested in television as a vehicle for broadening Israel’s image abroad from 
one where political and military interests dominated to finding areas of mutual interest with 
its Arab neighbours.  
In order to explore the alternatives to Galili’s views regarding broadcasting policy for 
Israel Television, Katz convened a round-table discussion in September 1967, to which he 
                                            
 
99 Oren, Demon in the Box: Jews, Arabs, Politics and Culture in the Making of Israeli Television  127. 
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invited officials, academics and practitioners in the field of government communications.102 A 
compromise was reached in which emergency broadcasts to the Arab population would 
precede the introduction of Hebrew-language and imported programming, but that the 
schedule would become bilingual as soon as was possible.103 Galili’s national-security 
dominated television service would come first, but was to eventually give way to a 
domestically-targeted vehicle for education and culture.  
 
‘Finally, something to watch!’104 
With news that Jordan was about to inaugurate television broadcasts in early 1968, Katz’s 
television team weighed the possibility of a debut broadcast for Israel’s Independence Day 
on 2 May.105 The first anniversary of the victory would be an appropriate opportunity to 
unveil the new television service. Time was short, with the decision to broadcast in early 
May taken only nine weeks beforehand.106 Perhaps more significant was the lack of 
experienced staff, insufficient budgets, and no equipment. A team was hastily assembled 
from Israelis who had experience of television, many of whom were living abroad, and from 
diaspora Jews who were willing to bring their skills to the new service. It was a matter of 
debate what would happen first: whether the Israelis would learn how to use the 
equipment, or the foreigners learn how to speak Hebrew.107 The budgetary requirements 
were also a heavy burden for the accounting department of the Prime Minister’s Office, 
                                            
 
102 YTA/15/057/04/1. Round-table discussion on ‘Hasbara tools in operation’. 
103 Katz, "Television Comes to the People of the Book,"   254. 
104 Gideon Reicher, ‘Finally Something to Watch’, Yediot Ahronot, 5.5.1968. Reicher’s ‘The Small 
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which was nominally responsible for the task force, resulting in delayed payments to 
suppliers and staff.  
There was also a serious shortage of broadcast equipment, which according to a 
contract with the American RCA firm would only arrive in the summer of 1968. Following a 
tip-off from CBS’s office in London in March 1968, Uzi Peled, Katz’s deputy, was despatched 
to purchase a mobile broadcast unit that was up for sale. Peled recounts that he was 
unexpectedly met with great ceremony by a senior British military officer when he landed in 
London. Several hours later, it transpired that he was not General Elad Peled, one of the 
heroes of the Six-Day War, who had also led Israel’s television efforts before the war.108 
The mobile unit was purchased with great haste, and at rather greater cost than intended, 
from under the noses of a Jordanian team who had intended on buying the same truck for 
their new television service.109 With only three weeks to prepare for the broadcast, there 
was little time for training. Louis Lentin, an experienced television producer from Ireland, 
and recently arrived in Israel, was appointed as producer. The CBS instructors manned the 
cameras. Chaim Yavin, Elihu Katz’s assistant and later Israel’s ‘Mr. Television’, acted as the 
anchor.  
The sense of enthusiasm, Peled later admitted, was bravado in the face of real 
ignorance of the realities of television production.110 There was no back-up equipment to 
cover breakdowns; if broadcasts stopped, there was no slide to notify viewers what was 
happening. Yet it caught the popular mood, with the public racing to buy one of the sixty 
models of television sets available for purchase.111 More than 42,000 sets were sold between 
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February and April. Yisrael Galili watched the parade live from the government tribune; but 
he also had a portable battery-operated monitor installed discreetly between his legs that he 
watched.112  
The broadcast was watched by nearly 60 percent of the population and over 80 
percent rated it as highly successful.113 However, there was no time for complacency. The 
next day, newly-qualified television critics wondered why there were no pictures of the 
soldiers marching along the route, and why Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan was not more 
prominent in the broadcast.114 The explanation for the second complaint was more prosaic 
than political; Louis Lentin, the Irish-born producer of the broadcast, was still unfamiliar 
with the faces of Israel’s politicians and was unaware of Dayan’s significance to Israeli 
viewers.115 Elihu Katz later described the broadcast as a ‘media event’, which was both 
collectively experienced and remembered.116 
Galili’s chief of staff, Sini Azaryahu, told Sapir that interest in television would be 
infectious – ‘like keeping up with the Joneses’, and he was right.117  Writing a little over a 
year after the beginning of broadcasts, the British press attaché in Tel Aviv reported to 
London that ‘General Television has already affected Israel’s cinemas to the extent that 
there is now no problem in obtaining a seat on the days that TV is on the air.’118 And Israelis 
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were not content to watch television in black-and-white, despite Eshkol’s pleading that there 
was no need for expensive colour TV, and the best efforts of the government to stave off 
this symbol of Americanisation. Within ten years, 80 percent of households watched 
television in colour, a far quicker rate of penetration even than in the United States. 119 
One of the commentary team on the day of the parade, Ram Evron, was stationed on top of 
the Notre Dame convent, overlooking the route of the parade as it passed the walls of the 
Old City of Jerusalem. He remarked that where machineguns had been deployed a year ago, 
now television cameras stood.120 ‘The IDF’s Independence Day parade marched through the 
streets of reunified Jerusalem,’ wrote Haaretz in retrospect, ‘through Channel 8 on the 
coast and Channel 10 in the Gulf, and continued to march, unimpeded, across screens in 
Jewish and Arab homes alike. Thus another fact was established, and it too has a meaning 
more political than technical: Israel has gained sound and light and the new medium will be, 
from now on, a regular weapon of propaganda.’121  
 
Conclusions 
The television service that went live in 1968, after many years of discussion and delay, was 
sharply different to the one envisaged only a year earlier. The thinking that influenced the 
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change, largely that of Galili, was strategic and proactive, and had the explicit and rational 
aim of influencing international public opinion – of neighbouring Arab states, at least - 
regarding Israel. It was based in comprehensive analysis of the issue, with professional advice 
sought on the various different options. Despite the unsuccessful scramble to start 
emergency broadcasts during the war, and the successful scramble to launch television in 
May 1968, this was not another example of ‘muddling through’ the policy decisions.  
However, neither was it the kind of policy designed to engage audiences in ongoing 
dialogue with the aim of persuading by enlarging or changing perceptions, as discussed in the 
Introduction. Galili thought that Israeli television would be a valuable post-war propaganda 
tool, which is also at variance with the definition of hasbara outlined above. In short, and 
perhaps paradoxically given his own views on the wider issue, Galili’s approach to 
establishing television in Israel does not conform to this thesis’ definition of hasbara.  
Three comments are necessary to clarify this. Firstly, and in the face of much 
misdirected criticism, Galili appointed an army officer, General Elad Peled, to advance the 
‘educational’ model of television. When Peled returned to the IDF, it was an academic, 
Professor Elihu Katz, who unwillingly implemented a more ‘offensive’ model after the war. 
Galili directed policy, they implemented it. Secondly, the television service of May 1968 
existed for a short time in a micro-environment of post-war Israel. Under the direction of 
Elihu Katz, it soon returned to the ‘developmental’ model recommended by international 
experts earlier in the decade, focussing on broadcasts in Hebrew as a cultural and 
educational vehicle for Israeli society, rather than on propaganda broadcasts in Arabic for 
Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese audiences. Finally, Galili’s policy was all the more effective 
because of the absence of those characteristics of hasbara.  
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Peled’s absence was brief; he was recalled by Galili in 1969 to undertake a 
comprehensive review of government communications policy, which forms the subject of 
the next chapter.
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Chapter 4 
The Peled Commission on Government Information, 1969 
 
 
‘Hasbara is a kind of diplomatic ‘artillery’, whose job it is to create a more 
comfortable climate of international public opinion for direct diplomatic efforts’.1 
 
 
Immediately after the end of the Six Day War, minister without portfolio Yisrael Galili 
acknowledged that there was room for an overhaul of the government’s information 
infrastructure. Speaking to the Knesset in July, he acknowledged ‘the government is aware of 
the problems. It also knows the mistakes that were made because of inadequate 
coordination between the different bodies dealing with the issue’.2 His advisers also 
indicated to him that his own mandate of responsibility for government information efforts 
was insufficient for the challenges ahead. Writing to him in July 1967, the head of the 
Information Service in the Prime Minister’s Office, Yosef Nevo, pointed out the painful fact 
that, ‘the main effort after the battle ended has moved to engaging international audiences, 
…and the minister responsible has absolutely no authority even though he is the recipient 
of all claims and complaints’.3 
However, it took over a year for Galili to develop a practical approach the problem 
of Israel’s perceived failures in the information field. In the interim, the extra resources that 
had been available during the war dried up, as did the willingness to coordinate information 
work. A Ministerial Hasbara Committee was established within a month of the war ending.4 
However, the committee was convened only a handful of times. In its absence, the various 
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2 Yisrael Galili to the Knesset, 19.7.1967. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 49, col. 2662. 
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directors-general of the relevant ministries and their subordinates ‘muddled through’ the 
policy questions in weekly meetings.5 
Galili himself spent much of the immediate post-war period concentrating on issues 
far closer to his heart, and consistent with his ‘activist’ outlook. Ahdut Ha’Avoda, his political 
party, had never accepted the principle of partitioning the land between Jews and Arabs. 
When the Twentieth Zionist Congress debated the Peel Commission’s proposal for 
partition in the summer of 1937, Yitzhak Tabenkin, the leader and ideologue of the Kibbutz 
HaMeuchad movement, rejected any compromise on the issue. ‘His outlook was voluntarist, 
pioneering and devoid of any hesitation regarding the Jewish people’s right to Palestine as its 
historic homeland.’6 Thirty years later, his godson and political disciple, Galili, was the most 
vocal advocate for Jewish settlement in the areas conquered by Israel during the 1967 war – 
particularly in the West Bank, with its considerable historical and national resonance for the 
Jewish people.  
So it was only in March 1969 that Galili announced to the Knesset, newly under the 
premiership of Golda Meir, that the Ministerial Hasbara Committee had appointed a 
commission of enquiry to investigate the coordination of government information efforts.7 
                                            
 
5 ISA RG124/4878/4. See also Medzini, Changes in Israeli Foreign Communications since the Six Day 
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The commission was to be headed by Elad Peled, who had retired from the IDF in the 
summer of 1968. When it was published, later in 1969, its report was the most 
comprehensive survey of the problems of articulating clear hasbara policy and its 
recommendations the first serious attempt to create an organisational framework that could 
advance Israel’s national interests through the use of public diplomacy.  
The Peled report was also to bring the ‘activist’ and the ‘diplomat’ schools of 
government information policy, championed by Galili and Eban respectively, into brief, direct 
confrontation. The quiet shelving of the report is the clearest example of the failure of Israel 
to articulate hasbara policy in this period of intense yet inconclusive policy-making this thesis 
seeks to investigate. 
The background to the commission 
‘The whole world is against us –  
It’s an old song 
That our fathers taught us 
To sing and dance 
 
It’s a song we learnt  
From our aged parents 
And we’ll sing it too 
And after us, our sons 
And our grandchildren’s grandchildren will sing 
Here in Eretz Yisrael 
And anyone who is against us 
Can go to hell’8 
 
The roots of the Peled Committee were to be found in the immediate aftermath of 
the war. Eshkol’s perceived lack of decisive leadership, popularly characterised by his 
‘stuttering’ radio address of May 28 1967, had contributed to a wave of existential panic 
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amongst Israelis that Israel would be annihilated. Although the results of the war 
dramatically disproved these concerns, Eshkol was a broken man. Galili’s decision to 
commission an inquiry into the perceived failures of government information policy was one 
outcome of a wider campaign to try and rehabilitate Eshkol, whose reputation had been 
grievously harmed in the three-week ‘waiting period’ of May 1967.  
After the euphoria of victory subsided, Israelis were left to deal with both the 
problems they had faced before, including an economy in marked depression, and some new 
ones. In Sinai, Egypt continued to engage IDF forces in a war of attrition. In the West Bank, 
the government seemed indecisive over claims to settle Judea and Samaria. International and 
domestic support began to dwindle. They began to notice a decline in the country’s 
international image. The lightning victory, which saw Israel take the West Bank from Jordan, 
the Sinai desert from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria, also resulted in Israel 
controlling the affairs of a million Palestinians. Although Israel enjoyed some benefits that 
came with its display of military proficiency, namely ‘the appreciation (diluted with jealousy) 
of the military resourcefulness we have developed’, Israel’s new image as a military power 
was an uncomfortable new ‘frame’.9   
The theme was taken up in the Israeli media: ‘Israel’s loss of popularity – and about 
that, there’s no disagreement – is caused by time and place. No-one likes a military 
conqueror; we are seen as the strong, the militarist; we are powerful, talented, developed, 
ruling over the weak with our superiority’.10 The international press also noted the change, 
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the New York Times describing Israel as a ‘tough victor’ with an ‘image problem’.11 Another 
article asked ‘has this people, so full of idealism and accomplishment, become a captive of 
the same self-righteousness that afflicted its oppressors through 4,000 years of struggle?’12 
Public concern about Israel’s failing international legitimacy was accompanied by a loss of 
faith in the government’s ability to handle the issue. New tools shed light on public opinion. 
In the first set of major, national opinion polls commissioned in Israel, in June 1967, 62 
percent of Israelis felt that the government was doing all it could in the field of government 
information. By April 1968, that number had plummeted to 27 percent.13 One particular 
focus of concern was the success of the Arab states in this field: ‘Our embassies are unable 
to compete with those of the Arab states, who have 14 representatives in almost every 
country’.14 
  Eshkol’s closest advisers and confidants, particularly Galili and Finance Minister 
Pinchas Sapir, were determined to rescue Eshkol’s reputation, urging him to appear more in 
public. But he hesitated on making policy decisions after the war, and was battling – in 
private – with ill health.15  Following a heart attack in late 1968 that the government 
reported as a bad case of bronchitis, Eshkol was frequently bed-ridden, with oxygen tanks 
delivered secretly to his residence.16 His heirs presumptive squabbled over the succession.17  
                                            
 
11 James Feron, "Israel Has the Image Problem of a Tough Victor," New York Times 20 July 1969. 
12 Raskin, "Israel Tells the World: Keep Hands Off." 
13 "Information, Please," The Jerusalem Post 8 December 1969: 4. 
14 Yosef Lamm, "Needed: A Ministry of Information [Hebrew]," Haaretz 5 December 1969. 
15 On June 19, the cabinet agreed it was willing to return Gaza and the Golan Heights to Egypt and 
Syria respectively, in return for a peace treaty. Eshkol was undecided about the fate of the West 
Bank, and explored both the ‘Jordanian’ and the ‘Palestinian’ options.  
16Goldstein, Eshkol: Biography [Hebrew]  600. Elinor Burkett, Golda (New York: Harper, 2008) 230. 
17 Peter Y Medding, Mapai in Israel: Political Organisation and Government in a New Society 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1972) Ch. 12. 
Chapter 4 
155 
 
Defence Minister Moshe Dayan argued for economic integration of the West Bank and 
Jordan with Israel, with an active settlement policy. On the other hand, Deputy Prime 
Minister Yigal Allon limited Israel’s interest in the ‘territories’ to security needs and 
advocated withdrawal from all but essential areas. However, the rivalry ran deeper, with 
both inter-factional political differences and decades of personal animus. Dayan had been a 
protégé of Ben-Gurion since before independence, and followed him into the breakaway 
Rafi party in 1965. Allon, along with Galili, was a member of Ahdut Ha’Avoda. He had been 
stung when he was passed over by Ben-Gurion for IDF high command in 1950 because of 
his political allegiance.  In 1967, he had hoped to be appointed defence minister. However, 
under intense pressure from Dayan’s supporters within Mapai and the new partners to the 
coalition, Gahal and the National Religious Party – which he later referred to as a ‘putsch’ - 
Eshkol had appointed Dayan instead.18  
Finance Minister Pinchas Sapir, who also served as Secretary-General of the newly-
formed Labour Party, worked to protect it from disintegrating back into its constituent 
parts if one of them succeeded.19 Meir, who had retired from public life and as Secretary-
General of Mapai in the summer of 1968 after the successful agreement to form the Labour 
Party, was called back to head the party and prevent a divisive leadership battle between 
Dayan and Allon.20 Despite protestations to the contrary, and her own ill health, her 
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appetite for politics had not waned, although she initially agreed to head the party only until 
the elections, later in the year.21 
In early February 1969, Levi Eshkol gave an interview to Michael Elkins and Arnaud 
de Borchgrave of Newsweek. He suggested that Israel maintain control only of those areas of 
the West Bank with security value – primarily the north-south ridge of the Samarian and 
Judean hills and the Jordan Valley, and leave the settled areas.22 The policy, the work of Yigal 
Allon, was deeply divisive. On one hand, Foreign Minister Eban was opposed to the 
annexation of any territory outside of an internationally-backed agreement. On the other, 
the plan drew threats of resignation from Menachem Begin, leader of the right-wing Gahal 
party and a minster in the national unity government, if any land was evacuated. By the time 
it was published, the interview had unwittingly turned into his last political testament. 
During the interview, he complained of stomach pains, cut the meeting short, and vomited 
in his office. He returned to the Prime Minister’s residence, and an hour later suffered 
another heart attack. He remained at home, muttering about his successor in juicy Yiddish: 
‘Die Klafte setz dort und wachtet’ (‘that bitch is sitting there, waiting’).23 He died on 26 
February , early in the morning.  
Thus, when the Peled Commission was announced in March 1969, Galili’s principal 
goal - to rehabilitate Eshkol – was no longer relevant. Peled actually delivered his report to 
Meir, whose greater consciousness of the importance of Israel’s international image was 
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overridden by a deep and persistent suspicion of the press and a predilection for secrecy.24 
She was also ‘inclined by temperament to resist external pressures on Israel rather than 
plan a positive long-range foreign policy’.25  
 
The Peled Commission’s recommendations – towards an Information Authority 
The commission, which was formally appointed by the Civil Service Commission at the 
request of the Ministerial Committee on Information, was asked ‘to examine Israel’s 
domestic and international communications efforts, the means and the methods used in the 
field of government communications, the delineation of authority between the various 
ministries and coordination between them on matters of domestic and international 
communications.’26 
Galili turned to General Elad Peled to head the commission. As one of the heroes of 
the 1967 IDF General Staff, the stuff of instant legend, Peled was a visible public figure with 
an impeccable reputation.27 He had returned to the IDF in May 1967 to take part in the war, 
following his brief spell at the head of the television task force. He commanded his forces 
with distinction, firstly on the Jordanian front in the area of Jenin and Nablus and then on 
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the southern sector of the Golan Heights, against Syria. Following his retirement, he had 
offers to head a major supermarket chain, the Industrial Development Bank, and to become 
Director-General of the Israel Electric Corporation. But Peled was not interested in 
sinecures. He remarked that he had never visited a supermarket in his life, only went into 
banks to pick up cheque-books, and soon realised that his prospects as Incoming CEO of 
the electric company were limited.28  
Peled wanted to continue to make a significant contribution to the state, but without 
becoming embroiled in political infighting. He had fought with the Palmach before the 
creation of the state, but took the unusual position of associating politically with Ben-Gurion 
and Mapai, rather than its natural leadership of Tabenkin and Ahdut Ha’Avoda. He had little 
time for the toxic relations between factions and splinters of the Israeli left, and never 
formally joined Mapai. His distaste for political infighting had been a significant factor in his 
resignation as head of the television task force in the spring of 1967, a decision which had 
infuriated Galili, the minister responsible.  
With degrees in Economics and Philosophy, and a graduate of the École supérieure 
de guerre, Peled had a reputation as an intellectual, which set him apart from most of his 
colleagues. Few of his fellow commanders shared his understanding of the military tradition 
of antiquity. They were unmoved when Peled reminded them that victorious Roman 
generals had a slave whisper sic gloria transit mundi or memento te mortalem esse to remind 
them of the vicissitudes of fortune.29  
                                            
 
28 Interview with Elad Peled, 30.6.2008. Peled was appointed to the Electric Corporation by Finance 
Minister Pinchas Sapir as Deputy and Incoming CEO in late 1969. However, it became clear that the 
appointment was intended as nothing more than a warning signal to the incumbent, whose political 
independence troubled Sapir.  
29 Golan, The Commanders, Victors of 1967: 25 Profiles of Israel's Senior Officers [Hebrew]  112. 
Interview with Elad Peled, 30.6.2008. Peled remarked that the IDF of the time had ‘no culture of 
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Government information policy was a suitably weighty task to attract the attention 
of Peled although he had very little previous knowledge of the issue. He found the work 
extremely interesting, but admitted that he simply applied common sense to a well-known 
problem, and produced an appropriately straightforward solution.30 There was a high level 
of public interest in the issue following the 1967 war and an opening gap between Israel’s 
self-perception and the way it seemed to be viewed by international observers. This gap was 
being observed by more and more foreign press, whose numbers had risen from around 
forty before the war to a permanent press corps of over one hundred in the years following 
it.31 Government information efforts also carried a significant budget – from IL3,000,000 in 
1968-69, rising to IL5,400,000 in 1969-70 and IL7,000,000 in 1970-71.32  
Despite his somewhat worrying political independence, and his disappointment over 
Peled’s resignation from the television task force, Galili was confident that his former 
Palmach comrade would adopt an appropriately ‘activist’ line. Eshkol, too, who approved the 
appointment, was aware that it would bring disagreements with Eban out into the open, but 
gave his blessing. Galili did not attempt to direct Peled in any way, or to interfere with his 
work. He may have been busy with the more pressing issue of settlement; he may have been 
                                                                                                                                       
 
learning’, and that there was little intellectual curiosity. The exceptions on the General Staff were 
Mati Peled (Air Force), Aharon Yariv (Intelligence) and Uzi Narkis (Central Command). 
30 Interview with Elad Peled, 30.6.2008.  
31 Interview with Meron Medzini, 9.4.2006. Medzini headed the Government Press Office in 
Jerusalem, and was also spokesman for prime minister Eshkol during the war.  
32 ISA RG124/4847/5. According to Danny Rosolio’s oral evidence to the committee, the budget 
required for all information efforts was closer to IL20,000,000. IL3,000,000 is approximately 
equivalent to $75m at current prices.ISA RG124/4847/5. 
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somewhat blinded by the glare of glory emanating from a victorious member of the 
legendary 1967 General Staff.33 
The three additional members of the commission were selected by Galili and his aide 
‘Sini’ Azaryahu and brought both professional and political breadth to its work. Benjamin 
Eliav (Lubetkin), who had started his political career as Jabotinsky’s personal secretary, was 
the deputy chairman of the Board of Governors of the IBA and editor of HaDor, a Mapai 
daily newspaper. David Shaham was a writer and commentator and was associated with the 
left-leaning HaShomer HaTzair. He had recently opened one of the first public relations 
offices in Israel. Yitzhak Taub, secretary and spokesman of the Bank of Israel, organised that 
the Bank would host the meetings of the commission. A fourth member, Professor Levontin 
of the Hebrew University law faculty, resigned from the commission soon after its 
formation. 
As secretary to the commission, Peled approached Nahum Blass, with whom he had 
studied economics at the Hebrew University between 1964 and 1966. Blass agreed to 
return from studies at Rutgers University in the United States in order to work for Peled. 
He was 27 at the time, and was proud to be working on an issue which was at the centre of 
public discourse. He saw the work as a huge opportunity.34 
The commission met 19 times, and in two sub-committees a further 10 times. In 
total, they took evidence from 52 witnesses, including ministers, senior officials, Israeli 
journalists and foreign correspondents, IDF officers, officials from the World Zionist 
                                            
 
33 Interview with Elad Peled, 30.6.2008. Sini Azaryahu, Galili’s chief of staff, concurred that Galili had 
a weakness for the 1967 General Staff, many of whom were his protégés from the 1948-era Hagana 
and Palmach. Interview with Arnan ‘Sini’ Azaryahu, 19.6.05 
34 Interview with Nahum Blass, 3.8.2008.  
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Organisation, private individuals and representatives of Jewish organisations from Israel and 
overseas.35 In some cases, oral evidence was supplemented by written submissions.36 
Several clear themes emerged quickly from the evidence, which were reinforced in 
subsequent sessions. Firstly, Israel was suffering from an image problem which had taken it 
‘…from the image of a few pioneers draining the swamps, paving roads and establishing 
settlements, …creating an egalitarian society, via the image of underground fighters 
opposing a foreign invader and, during the War of Independence, the new Jewish warrior’.37 
Secondly, too large a number of bodies dealt with government communications, either 
directly or in passing. Finally, there was unsatisfactory coordination between these bodies. 
This was particularly evident in the distinction drawn between communicating with foreign 
and domestic audiences. 
Peled came to his initial conclusions early in the process: so long as there was 
division between the various agencies, there could be no single policy.38 He also identified 
the major obstacle: whilst the only sensible way for government information policy to be 
made was by the prime minister, or his closest advisers, the foreign ministry would bitterly 
oppose the loss of authority.  Peled wrote his report alone. He sketched out the main 
structure of the report on a single 5’ x 8’ index card – introduction, main findings, 
recommendations, and appendices. Then, for each section, he detailed the points he wanted 
to make, attributing each point to evidence that he had heard in the evidence sessions. The 
secretary to the commission, Nahum Blass, prepared more index cards with the main points 
of the relevant testimony that the commission had heard. Amongst his papers were various 
                                            
 
35 YTA/15/53/5/8. Peled Report, Appendix B. The full list of interviews is in Appendix I, below.  
36 ISA/RG124/4847/5. See, for example, the written submission from Yehuda Ben-David, 27.8.1969. 
37 ISA/RG124/4847/5. Submission from the Government Press Office to the Peled Commission, June 
1969. 
38 Interview with Elad Peled, 21.11.2005. 
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notes, apparently scribbled down as the thoughts came to him: can you sell castor oil to 
children as if it were Pepsi-Cola?, he wondered; what is the difference between image, self-
image and self-persuasion?39 And then he sat and wrote it, longhand. The other members of 
the commission were asked to make comments, but the draft was approved without 
dissent.  
On 8 July 8, 1969, Galili returned to the Knesset to report on the progress of the 
Peled Commission, whose work was not yet complete.  
 
The experiences of the Six Day War, and mainly a look toward the future, have led 
me to the conclusion that Israel’s government information system is unsuitable, both 
in structure and in scope of activity, and that there are too many sources of 
authority. We suffer from a lack of centralised work from a single authorised body.40  
 
He went on to announce reforms that would remove the distinction between 
internal and domestic information efforts, and that such an effort would require financial 
resources ‘quite different from those with which we are familiar’.41 Some interpreted Galili’s 
speech as a call for the establishment of a separate ministry of information, and that he was 
responding to criticism of his effectiveness.42 Perhaps in response to this, he returned to the 
Knesset for an important point of clarification: ‘Members of Knesset, I wish to remind you 
that the Knesset and the government never decided to establish a Ministry of Information 
that deals with activities within Israel, in the Jewish world and the world at large, 
domestically and internationally’.43 Neither Galili nor Peled believed that government 
information efforts could, or should, be the work of a government ministry.  
                                            
 
39 Handwritten note, undated. Private papers of Elad Peled.  
40 Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 55, cols. 3457-3458. 
41 Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 55, cols. 3457-3458. 
42 James Feron, "Israeli Official Seeks Stronger Information Arm," New York Times 14 July 1969. 
43 Galili to the Knesset, 19.7.1969. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 49, col. 2661.  
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In November, the commission issued its final report. Writing to the Ministerial 
Committee on Information that ordered the inquiry, Elad Peled indicated the five major 
findings of the report: 
 
The commission took a view that the accusation of absolute ‘failures of information 
policy’ levelled against the Israeli information apparatus is fundamentally over-stated. 
It is a combination of criticism of policy or lack or policy, together with an objective 
difficulty in explaining to the world certain Israeli interests. In the body of the report, 
we have tried to elaborate on some of the difficulties this presents.  
 
The commission came to understand that a special ministry for government 
information exists today only in totalitarian regimes, and is a byword for 
‘propaganda’ in those countries. As a democracy, the State of Israel would find it 
difficult to adopt such a model. 
 
The commission found it appropriate to recommend the establishment of an 
Information Authority, within the Prime Minister’s Office. Its responsibilities would 
be the dissemination of government information for international and domestic 
audiences, whilst implementation would be in the hands of different bodies.  
 
We found that, despite the considerable efforts in improving the apparatus of 
government information work and its activities, both in the Foreign Ministry and the 
Information Service of the Prime Minister’s Office, there are still defects of 
organisation, working practice and methods of information dissemination. We have 
presented our principal findings in this regard and have recommended organisational 
and operational changes.  
 
We take the view that the upswing in overseas information efforts requires larger 
budgets, appropriate recruitment of professional staff and some disconnection from 
the limitations of the government pay scale in order to do so.44 
 
The most significant operational recommendation was the third: to combine all 
information activities under a single body, the ‘Information Authority’, which would be a 
branch of the Prime Minister’s Office. The commission thought it preferable that the agency 
be headed by an official who held ministerial rank but would not be counted as a 
government minister, who would participate in cabinet meetings and would bear 
                                            
 
44 ISA/RG124/4847/5. Peled to the Ministerial Information Committee, 25.11.1969.  
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responsibility for it to the government and the Knesset. However, the commission 
deliberately and explicitly refrained from recommending the establishment of a new 
government department, and the appointment of a minister of information, ‘for fear that it 
would be described as a ministry of ‘national propaganda’, typical of totalitarian regimes, an 
observation echoed by Binyamin Avniel (Gahal) in the Knesset earlier in the year.45 ‘If the 
minister responsible for information has authority only over domestic matters, there’s no 
need for such a minister. This is a democratic and free country, and in such a place we have 
no need for foreign propaganda’.46 The press also had concerns that: ‘using modern high 
pressure methods to sell Israel is alien and distasteful to the disciples of A.D. Gordon who 
built this country long before television was invented’.47 Alongside the warning that a 
Ministry of Information might carry totalitarian overtones, it described the Military Censor 
as anachronistic, and the IDF Spokesman’s announcements as dry and monotonal.48  
On the first issue, the body of the report described the unreasonable expectations 
that Israelis had that more effective government communications could soften public 
attitudes to unpalatable policies:  
 
Since the Six Day War a growing gap has emerged between the image we have of 
ourselves, and our image in the eyes of international public opinion. The root of this 
gap is changing international attitudes towards Israel, and the excessive expectations 
of Israelis regarding our ability to influence international opinion. The gap results in 
an uncomfortable feeling for the Israeli public and an impression of ‘information 
failure’. The commission considers expectations that hasbara can operate outside of 
given policy to be unreasonable.49 
 
                                            
 
45 YTA/15/53/5/8. Peled Report, p. 6.  
46 Binyamin Avniel to the Knesset, 19.7.1967, Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 49, col. 2660 
47 Philip Gillon, "The Tarnished Image," The Jerusalem Post December 12 1969. 
48 "Recommendations to Fix Hasbara [Hebrew]," Haaretz 7 December 1969. 
49 YTA/15/53/5/8. Peled Report, p. 4. 
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In contradistinction, the report described the achievements of Arab propaganda in 
creating an image of a romantic, heroic Arab freedom-fighter in the mould of Viking 
warriors or Che Guevara-style guerrilla fighters. This image was underpinned by Arab claims 
that Israel was an outpost of western imperialism, and that the Arab-Israeli conflict was part 
of the wider struggle against imperialism. This found particular resonance in intellectual and 
left-wing circles in the west, and in the developing world. Arab propaganda also stressed 
Israel as a conqueror, dispossessing Arabs from their homeland.  
And, in reference to the fifth and final finding, the commission heard evidence that 
the Arab propaganda campaign had a declared budget of over $50 million in 1969, primarily 
from Arab oil companies.  
 
We must assume that the intentions behind the commission’s recommendations 
were to ensure that whoever is sent on hasbara missions abroad will be 
professionals, and not people who are dealing with our representation on the UN 
Social Committee today, with consular matters in South Africa tomorrow, and with 
press relations in Scandinavia the day after.50 
 
In the body of the report, Peled worked on the assumption that the most important 
work was to be done in the international sphere. Thus, he concluded, there was no sensible 
distinction to be drawn between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ information. In fact, he simply 
ignored the issue of how the government should communicate with domestic audiences as 
unimportant. The report estimated that 80 percent of the material written on Israel in 
Western Europe originated from the foreign correspondents stationed in Israel, in whom 
Israel should invest most of its effort. It was crucial to build relations with the several 
hundred permanent correspondents, not the thousands of visiting journalists.  
                                            
 
50 "G Meir Hands Domestic and International Hasbara to Galili [Hebrew]," Haaretz 9 December 
1969. 
Chapter 4 
166 
 
The commission worked on the assumption that Israel’s government 
communications strategy – hasbara – was a mechanism intended to ‘sell’ Israeli foreign and 
security policy. Thus, they reported, there must be a direct relationship between the policy 
itself, and the strategy adopted for ensuring its acceptance in international public opinion. 
The strategy needed to: 
Disseminate information on the policy 
Ensure support for the policy in two ways: 
Advocating the justness of Israel’s policy 
Advocating that the policy serves the interest of the ‘other’51 
 
On the issue of organisational structure, the report made the following assumptions: 
The State of Israel is a democratic regime 
One of the characteristics of a democratic state is the absence of ‘national guidance’ 
from a government ministry created for this purpose 
The state of war that Israel finds it itself in requires a system that is efficient, quick 
and coordinated 
The staff of the government communications system must be mostly professional 
There is no distinction between hasbara in Israel and hasbara overseas 
All hasbara activities overseas must be under the authority of the heads of the 
delegations, and guided by the central hasbara body in Israel 
There must be an ongoing assessment of Israel’s international image, undertaken by a 
central body which will be responsible for bringing this assessment to the notice of 
the Prime Minister and the government.52 
 
But, the number of bodies dealing with the issue of hasbara led the commission to conclude 
that there was unnecessary duplication of effort, as well as a lack of coordination in both 
planning and implementation of policy. This was one of the principal reasons for the failings 
it found in Israel’s government communications effort, and the reason for the proposed 
reorganisation of the entire system under a single, new, information authority.  
                                            
 
51 YTA/15/53/5/8. Peled Report, p. 10. 
52 YTA/15/53/5/8. Peled Report, p. 39. 
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 Since the report dealt exclusively with international information efforts, it envisaged 
most of the work would be done overseas. Larger Israeli embassies were to have an 
information attaché, who would represent the new Information Authority, but would work 
under the ambassador. This mode of working was already familiar to military and defence 
attachés that represented the IDF and the Ministry of Defence abroad. The new information 
attaches were to be drawn from professionals in the field of mass communications, and on 
short-term contracts, unlike career diplomats. Peled also recommended that they not be 
paid according to the civil service pay-scale, which could not compete with private-sector 
salaries. In a similar vein, Peled concluded that the best way to influence the growing 
criticism of Israel that was emanating from the European ‘new left’ was through supporting 
local pro-Israel students, not by sending Israeli speakers on lecture tours.  
Finally, the commission noted that there was no mechanism to ensure that policy 
presentation was automatically part of the policy-making process, and that in consequence 
such considerations, in fact, rarely formed part of the process. Thus, Peled recommended 
the creation of a body which would bring information and analysis of Israel’s image in 
international public opinion to the attention of the Prime Minister and the government on 
an ongoing basis. This body would also present these issues when policy was being formed, 
ensuring that it was an integral part of the policy making process.  
Although the report is only forty pages long, it was the most comprehensive survey 
of the issue ever undertaken by the State of Israel to that point, and its findings accurately 
diagnosed the problem and prescribed the solution. Yet, its careful analysis was quickly 
boiled down to a single headline recommendation to create a new body. Elad Peled was 
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frustrated that the politicians, and later the public, were only interested in structures and 
reorganisations which were only a minor part of his analysis.53  
 
Eban’s counter-attack and the shelving of the Peled Commission report 
‘[Eban] should reconcile himself to the assumption that an efficient information 
system cannot make a distinction between domestic and international activities’54 
 
 
Peled was well aware that his decision to concentrate solely on foreign government 
information issues, in clear contradiction of his mandate, would bring him into conflict with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But he also knew that the ministry had only a limited 
influence. Both Ben-Gurion and Eshkol had given the generals, who shared and indeed 
implemented their ‘activist’ outlook, far more say than the ‘diplomats’ on the shaping of 
national policy. Moshe Sharett, in his time, had offered a real alternative to Ben-Gurion’s 
‘activism’ in the early years of the state, but Israel’s foreign policy orientation was firmly 
‘activist’. 
The Foreign Minister, South African-born and British-educated Abba Eban, was the 
archetypal Israeli ‘diplomat’, and quite different from Peled’s generation of ‘activist’ native-
born soldier-leaders. Eban was one of Israel’s best-known figures overseas, both amongst 
Jewish communities and on the international stage. He was certainly one of its most 
important advocates, representing Israel as Ambassador to both the United States and to 
the United Nations. Henry Kissinger recalled: 
 
                                            
 
53 Interview with Elad Peled, 30.6.2008. 
54 "G Meir Hands Domestic and International Hasbara to Galili [Hebrew]." 
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I have never encountered anyone who matched his command of the English language. 
Sentences poured forth in mellifluous constructions complicated enough to test the 
listener’s intelligence and simultaneously leave him transfixed by the speaker's 
virtuosity.55 
 
During his tenure at the UN, it was said that he spoke finer English than the British 
ambassador, and more correct Farsi than the Persians. But, as an Israeli commentator noted 
witheringly, Yiddish was not one of the six languages he spoke.56 His international standing 
was not replicated at home. When his Israeli compatriots said that he was ‘made from 
different material’, they were in earnest.57 He had not served in the IDF, nor had had he 
served his apprenticeship in a political party. His rich Hebrew was unintelligible to their 
simple ears.58 They joked that he was like an ambassador from a foreign, but friendly 
country. His air of self-importance was at odds with the more earthy political culture of the 
times. His foreignness remained an obstacle to his full integration into the fabric of Israeli 
politics, giving him the persona of a diplomatic ‘technician’, rather than a fully-fledged 
politician. 59 Eban was aware of how he was perceived. ‘I am not from Meskha, nor from 
Nahalal, nor from eastern Europe’, he once remarked.60 
                                            
 
55 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979) 358-9. 
56 Yoel Marcus, "There's Been a Change in Abba Eban [Hebrew]," Haaretz 9 December 1969. 
57 Interview with Elad Peled, 30.6.2008. 
58 Eban won a scholarship to Queens’ College Cambridge, and achieved the rare distinction of a 
triple first in Classics and Oriental Languages, winning prizes in Hebrew, Syriac and Arabic during his 
studies. He later remarked that his studies made it impossible ‘to adopt the routine Zionist 
stereotype that regarded the Arab nation with intellectual condescension.’  
59 Marcus, "There's Been a Change in Abba Eban [Hebrew]." 
60 Interview with Eytan Bentsur, 19.7.2010. Meskha is the name of the Arab village on whose land 
Kfar Tavor, an Israeli village in the Galilee and home to the Kadoorie Agricultural School where 
Yitzhak Rabin and Yigal Allon studied, was founded; Nahalal is the archetypal moshav - a collective 
settlement with less centralisation than the Kibbutz – and the birthplace of Moshe Dayan; eastern 
Europe was the typical birthplace of Eban’s generation of Israeli leaders. Bentsur, his closest personal 
adviser, also recalled that Eban deliberately simplified his Hebrew when addressing Israeli audiences.  
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But the Abba Eban of 1969 was not the same as he had been when he came back to 
Israel a decade previously. When he was appointed foreign minister, in place of Meir, in 
1966, he was only the third person to fill that role. His predecessors, Moshe Sharett and 
Meir, had worked for prime ministers who also held the defence portfolio.61 After the Six-
Day War, with a defence minister his contemporary and of equal rank, Eban set out to 
establish the Foreign Ministry’s authority over foreign policy issues, and to reach a final 
status settlement with the Arab states. More assertive now, he clashed publicly with Dayan, 
opposed Allon’s plan for annexing parts of the West Bank on the basis of security needs, 
and tried to clip the wings of his Ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin. ‘It may 
be,’ Haaretz speculated,’ that [Eban] feels that the race for the party leadership is open and 
he does not want to absent himself from it. It may be that reaching the age of sixty has given 
him new urges. It may also be that, in the absence of a clear direction from the government 
regarding our political-security future, it is worthwhile him taking a gamble on his own line 
which, although it is not popular at present, may be more acceptable later on when our 
security situation worsens’.62 
Eban was aware that Peled’s recommendations were a serious challenge to his 
authority in the sphere of international government communications. He had faced repeated 
parliamentary questioning on the government’s policy regarding its information efforts.63 In 
January 1969, Yitzhak Raphael (National Religious Party) asked about the organisation and 
budgets available for Israeli information policy. Eban’s response typified the attitude of the 
                                            
 
61 The sole exception was the brief tenure of Pinchas Lavon as defence minister in 1954-55, which 
ended with the failure of Operation Susannah, a ‘black flag’ operation, in Cairo. The ‘unfortunate 
business’ cast a shadow over Israeli politics and Israeli foreign relations for decades after, and did not 
endear the Mapai leadership to the idea of entrusting the defence establishment to anyone but the 
prime minister.  
62 Marcus, "There's Been a Change in Abba Eban [Hebrew]." 
63 Abba Eban to the Knesset, 4.6.1968, Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 52, cols, 2131-2; 12.8.1968, col. 3204. 
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Foreign Ministry and of the diplomatic corps to the sustained criticism of their work. ‘The 
issue of content is more important than the issue of methods,’ he said.64 He announced that 
he would invite public relations professionals to join a ‘brains trust’ on government 
information issues that the Foreign Ministry had established.  
In the meantime, Israel went to the polls on 28 October, 1969. Under Meir, the new 
Alignment of Labour and Mapam party retained its dominant position, with 56 of the 120 
Knesset seats. With the War of Attrition dragging on, Meir wanted to continue the 
government of national unity that had been formed immediately before the Six Day War 
with Menachem Begin’s Gahal party. This was the first time that a left-right coalition had 
been negotiated at the beginning of a parliament, and the negotiations were lengthy and 
fractious. Although not natural coalition partners, the arrangement would survive until the 
summer of 1970, when Begin withdrew his party over the initial adoption of the Rogers Plan 
and, by implication, UN Security Council Resolution 242, which implied Israeli willingness 
for territorial compromise in the pursuit of peace with the Palestinians.  
By October 1969, Peled’s work was done. He sent the manuscript of the report to 
the printers, along with a covering letter dated 25 November, addressed to the Ministerial 
Committee on Information. In the covering letter, he noted: 
We have concentrated on matters relating to foreign and defence affairs and have 
knowingly ignored domestic hasbara, and not because we are dismissive of these 
issues which undoubtedly require attention in a different framework.65 
 
With the report already in print, Abba Eban summoned the members of the Peled 
Commission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He presented them with his counter-blast: a 
                                            
 
64 Abba Eban to the Knesset, 6.1.1969, Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 53, cols. 999-1006. 
65 YTA/15/53/5/8. Cover letter to the Peled Commission report, dated 25.11.1969.  
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detailed work-plan, written by the recently-appointed head of the ministry’s information 
department, Alouph Hareven. Hareven, a former IDF intelligence officer, had recently left 
the Mossad, where he had specialised in psychological warfare. According to his successor, 
‘he was the closest Israel had to an expert in information affairs’. 66 He was also able to work 
collaboratively with other official bodies, which was a deficiency of the foreign ministry’s 
somewhat insular staff. 
Eban told the Peled Commission members that he ‘rejected the current division of 
effort in foreign information affairs’.67 He envisaged a new public diplomacy division within 
the Foreign Ministry that would bring together existing units, such as the ministry 
spokesman and the Protocol Department, and add new units for producing audio-visual and 
printed material. In the hurry to offer an alternative to Peled’s proposal, Eban acknowledged 
had no budget to implement such changes, and that he would need to seek significant 
increases in his budget to absorb the cost.68 
Undeterred by Eban’s attempt to neutralise his report, Peled reconvened the 
members of the commission to discuss Eban’s proposal and found that ‘most of the 
recommendations were incorporated [in the Peled report], albeit in a different 
organisational framework. He wrote a second cover letter, explaining the situation, and sent 
the report to the Ministerial Committee on Information. The Peled Commission formally 
presented its findings to the government at the end of November 1969, even though there 
was, in effect, no government to receive it. Within a few days, the main points were leaked 
                                            
 
66 Interview with Moshe Yegar, 3.1.2012. 
67 YTA/15/53/5/8. Second cover letter to the Peled Commission report, dated 26.11.1969. 
68 "Leak of Peled Report Discussed by G Meir and Foreign Minister [Hebrew]," Haaretz 7 December 
1969. See also, Jerusalem Post, 8.12.1969 
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to the Israeli press, where it was generally well-received.69 The Haaretz leader writer 
described the report as ‘reasonable and logical’, although acknowledged the 
recommendation to create an information authority independent of the foreign ministry 
would be an obstacle to the report’s implementation. The Jerusalem Post went further, 
noting that ‘a ministry carries more weight than an authority’, and urging the prime minister 
to establish a body that would talk on all issues, including defence. The cabinet was less 
easily convinced, though, with most opposed.70 
The timing was uncomfortable for Meir, who was under increasing pressure on the 
political front.  The negotiations on the composition of her new government were dragging. 
She had already sought an extension on the deadline for swearing in the government, which 
was to expire on 11 December. She had threatened to resign at least once, and was in open 
conflict with deputy prime minister Allon, who was unhappy with the offer of the education 
portfolio for himself. Amongst other demands, the main opposition party Gahal was pressing 
for the creation of a Ministry of Information in the new government, and Begin wanted the 
job for himself.71 At this point, Galili was also disposed to accept the position, had it been 
offered.72 But Abba Eban, her foreign minister and an important ally, was bitterly opposed to 
the proposal.  
                                            
 
69 "Leak of Peled Report Discussed by G Meir and Foreign Minister [Hebrew]." See also Feron, 
"Israeli Official Seeks Stronger Information Arm." 
70 Dan Margalit, "Most Ministers Do Not Support the Recommendations of the Peled Commission 
[Hebrew]," Haaretz 8 December 1969. 
71 Haaretz, 3.2.1970, Yediot Ahronot, 20.2.1970. 
72 Interview with Meron Medzini, 9.4.2006. Medzini was the son of Regina Hamburger Medzini, 
Meir’s childhood friend from Milwaukee and had a close personal as well as professional relationship 
with her. Arnon Azaryahu, Galili’s closest adviser, concurred that Galili was well-disposed to the 
offer of heading the Information Agency, or a ministry. According to Amos Shifris, Galili’s 
biographer, Galili was hesitant because the appointment would lead to ongoing friction with Eban.  
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On 8 December , she met Eban at the airport at Lod to discuss the matter with him. 
He told her the Foreign Ministry was ‘in uproar’ at the proposal to create a national 
information authority that would take over ‘one of the most important parts of the work of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs …and empty the foreign ministry of one of its principal 
responsibilities’.73 She then went to visit Yisrael Galili at Asaf Harofe Medical Centre, where 
he was recovering from a serious car accident.  
These two meetings produced a dramatic shift in Meir’s thinking. Although Peled had 
called for a non-ministerial information authority, explaining his reasons for avoiding 
recommending the establishment of a separate ministry, Meir now changed tack. At a 
meeting of the Labour Party’s Central Committee that evening, Meir announced: 
 
I have come to the conclusion that the government should include a Ministry of 
Information, a ministry that will include all branches, foreign and domestic. This 
includes radio, television and everything it entails, including the [Government] Press 
Office. There are quite a few bodies that deal with information in this administration 
and, to say the least, this division has not brought great joy to the government.74 
 
She also announced that she intended on appointing Galili minister, and that she 
envisaged ‘far more than just organisational changes’ to the current system.75 ‘We can’t say 
that we are doing everything possible, and at the same time say nothing can be done,’ she 
told the Central Committee.76 However, she reported that Galili had told her that he was in 
no position to accept a ministerial appointment whilst he was recovering, and that he had 
agreed only to be appointed minister without portfolio until his health was better. Perhaps 
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with Eban’s entreaties earlier in the day in mind, she told the meeting that the changes 
would still need further consideration, and that ‘the problems are many, and they can only 
be solved when we sit down together’.77 This would have to wait until Galili was back on his 
feet.78 
The new proposal for a separate Ministry of Information was overtaken almost 
immediately by a far greater challenge. The next day, 9 December, at a speech to an adult 
education conference in Washington D.C., US Secretary of State William Rogers announced 
the results of Four-Power talks on an agreed interpretation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 242. To Meir’s horror, the Americans envisaged no more than ‘insubstantial 
alterations required for mutual security’ to the borders of 6 June, 1967. 79 In other words, 
Israel would face demands for full withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza in the pursuit 
of peace. Meir was seriously shaken, but firm in her resolve: the Rogers Plan met with 
‘immediate and categorical Israeli opposition’.80 She had agreed to lead the party to the 
elections when she took over from Eshkol in March, and grew in confidence during 1969. 
But the exhausting coalition negotiations with Gahal and the failure of the United States to 
stand by Israel, as they had failed in the Suez campaign and in the lead-up to the Six-Day 
War, made her question if she wanted to continue as prime minister.81 
Now, more than ever, Meir needed the unalloyed support of her foreign minister. 
She certainly had no-one else to appoint in place of Abba Eban, who was aware of her 
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predicament. He later, rather witheringly, described her premiership as ‘primarily an 
exercise in crisis management’.82 She met him the next day, 10 December, on his way to the 
airport to fly to Washington and assess the damage for himself. Meir did not formally drop 
the proposed idea of a Ministry of Information, or the other recommendations of the Peled 
Commission. Indeed, she appeared on television that weekend, and again pledged to create 
a ministry.83 The new ministry was reported in the international press as late as 14 
December.84 But when the government was sworn in on 15 December, both Galili and 
Begin retained their position as ministers without portfolio, along with a new entrant to the 
government, Shimon Peres. There was to be no information minister and no Ministry of 
Information, at least for the time being. Indeed, the report of the Peled Commission itself 
was to be sacrificed in favour of Eban’s loyalty. 
The report was only debated in the Knesset several weeks later. Answering 
questions in February 1970, and with barely disguised irritation, Foreign Minister Abba Eban 
noted that the document was an internal report for the Ministerial Information Commission 
that was published unlawfully.85 ‘It may well be that the report was approved by the three or 
four people who were active in the commission, but that fact does not give it any special 
status; it is a legitimate issue for discussion, like any other document on this issue’.86 
Speaking in the Knesset a few weeks later, Prime Minister Meir said simply, ‘responsibility 
for hasbara overseas is currently in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.87 
                                            
 
82 Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography  597. 
83 Gillon, "The Tarnished Image." 
84 James Feron, "Information Post Is Added by Israel," New York Times 14 December 1969. 
85 Eban to the Knesset, 4.2.70. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 56, col. 707. He was responding to questions 
from Yosef Tamir (Gahal) tabled on 28.12.1969. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Golda Meir to the Knesset, 24.2.1970. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 56, col. 919.  
Chapter 4 
177 
 
That was indeed the case, but Yisrael Galili’s office was still working on proposals to 
establish an information ministry that would bring both domestic and foreign efforts 
together. In January 1970, Galili received a one-page proposal for a Ministry of 
Information.88 Two weeks later, he sent a more detailed plan, with budgets and a list of 
‘problems to investigate’.89 Curiously, the list did not consider coordination with the foreign 
ministry a problem of any serious magnitude. Meir herself had not yet finally given up on the 
idea of creating an information ministry. She produced a document, dated 8 February, as the 
basis for discussion between Eban and Galili. The proposal, entitled ‘The Ministry of 
Information’ details the areas of responsibility of the new ministry, both for domestic and 
foreign information policy, which she proposed would be operational as early as 1 April, 
1970.90 In the sensitive area of relations between the new ministry and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the draft clearly laid out the division of labour: 
 
10. Policy direction regarding the operation of diplomatic missions will be given, of 
course, as previously, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Positions regarding political 
matters will be decided by the government. The Ministry of Information, in 
coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will work to convey them using the 
tools and processes of hasbara. The Ministry of Information, in coordination with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will, from time to time, select political issues to which it 
deems appropriate to pay attention, with regards to timing and/or locale.  
11. In order to carry out the work of hasbara, the Israeli Foreign Service will act as 
one, and there will be no separate foreign service for hasbara matters. Responsibility 
for hasbara activity in each diplomatic mission will be given to the head of mission, as 
accepted practice with regard to any type of Israeli activity…. 
 
The proposal was not quashed immediately. Nearly a month later, in early March, 
the prime minister sent the proposal to Yisrael Galili, who was still toying with the idea of 
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taking the position of minister. However, the proposal failed. On 31 March 1970, Meir 
announced that there was no intention of creating a separate Ministry of Information.91 Two 
weeks later, on 15 April 1970, deputy prime minister Allon repeated the announcement, 
stressing that there were no plans to create a ministry.92 
Between these two announcements, on 1 April 1970, government information 
services were reorganised, with much of the responsibility now dispersed between the 
Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Education and Science and the Prime Minister’s Office.93 As 
required, Prime Minister Meir reported on these changes to the Knesset a week later:  
 
Having read the [Peled] report, I thought it would be appropriate to establish a 
separate Ministry of Information, headed by a minister. Since then, there have been 
clarifications to the issue, and last week, I brought to the government my proposals 
for a re-allocation of the various information bodies.94 
 
The Hasbara Centre, film service and publicity departments were now to fall under 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Culture, as was the Israeli Broadcasting 
Authority. The Hasbara Centre, which dealt with foreign students in Israel, Israeli students 
travelling abroad and voluntary organisations, was transferred to the Foreign Ministry. And, 
to the discomfort of its employees, the main work of the Government Press Office, dealing 
with foreign correspondents in Israel, both permanent and temporary, was also taken over 
by the Foreign Ministry. The GPO, whose rump fell once again under the authority of the 
Prime Minister’s Office, was reduced to providing technical assistance, translation and 
issuing press cards to domestic and foreign journalists. It also remained the main channel for 
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forwarding urgent news updates to both domestic and foreign journalists, primarily from the 
Government Secretariat and the IDF Spokesperson’s unit.  
Meir’s announcement was followed by a Knesset debate. Shlomo Lorincz (Agudat 
Yisrael) criticised the decision, on the basis that it gave additional responsibilities to Deputy 
Prime Minister and Education and Culture Minister Yigal Allon, who was already holding two 
full-time positions. He noted that Allon himself had asked that higher education be 
separated under its own ministry. Speaking for the opposition, Yoram Aridor (Gahal) used 
the debate to criticise the failures of previous Israeli governments to adequately articulate 
their positions: ‘The issue of foreign hasbara in Israel, as it has been dealt with until now, has 
not helped improve the international image of the State of Israel’.95 
Three months after the report was delivered, Elad Peled was interviewed in 
Lamerchav. He noted that the report was not in the public domain, that despite the fact the 
report bore his name he had no ownership over it and that he was not at liberty to discuss 
its findings. He also remarked that ‘the Prime Minister herself said that she thought one 
thing and then did something else, for different reasons. Who am I to say different?’96 
 
Conclusions 
The Peled Commission was commissioned primarily as a political act. In the aftermath of the 
Six Day War, Levi Eshkol’s bruised reputation needed burnishing, and the perceived failure 
of the government to explain its positions to international audiences was an issue of 
concern for many Israelis. Galili, as minister responsible for commissioning the report, 
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understood that Israelis wanted to feel that their concerns were being dealt with. He may 
also have been motivated by wanting to divert attention away from his personal priority of 
encouraging Jewish settlement of the West Bank. Eshkol’s death in early 1969, before his 
reputation was salvaged, was out of Galili’s control. However, and perhaps unwittingly, his 
choice to appoint Elad Peled to head the commission produced a report that, for two 
reasons, could actually have made a difference. 
Firstly, Peled was the antithesis of the political appointee. He had shown a stubborn 
unwillingness to allow political considerations to interfere with professional matters from 
his youth. Galili had already clashed with him over the decision to abandon the television 
project after the Six-Day War. Peled’s lack of interest in comfortable jobs after he finally 
retired from the IDF in 1968 was yet another indication. Secondly, Peled was intellectually 
curious, well-educated and extremely thorough. He produced a report that was clear, 
simple and precise and which accurately described the problems of government 
communications policy and offered the most straightforward remedy to duplication of effort 
and unclear authority: bringing the issue under unitary control. The antithesis of Lindblom’s 
model of ‘muddling through’, he eschewed successive limited comparisons in favour of a 
comprehensive review of possible policy directions. It remains the single most important 
consideration of the issues undertaken by any Israeli government. However, it is largely 
unknown. 
Peled’s lack of political patronage was the ultimate undoing of the report. When 
faced with the opposition of a foreign minister who was both professionally opposed to his 
ministry losing an important part of its work and personally determined to take a more 
assertive role in order to stake his claim to party leadership, the Peled Commission met its 
match in Abba Eban. Meir, installed as party leader and prime minister in order to prevent a 
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damaging leadership contest between Allon and Dayan, was inclined to adopt the report. 
But, with Galili absent and facing a far greater threat from the United States in the form of 
the Rogers Plan, Meir decided that the issue of government information policy was simply 
not important enough to squabble over. The question of whether or not to create a 
Ministry of Information, and the wider challenge of ending the ‘muddle’ over government 
communications was to resurface in 1974, after the Yom Kippur War. 
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Chapter 5 
The Ministry of Information on Hold, 1970-1974 
 
‘There is an artificial distinction between information for the local public and 
information directed to the foreign media’1 
 
Shelving  Elad Peled’s central recommendation to create a Ministry of Information, Israel in 
the early 1970s again moved away from formalising government policy on communications 
and closer to a now characteristic ‘muddling through’ of limited policy options. Yisrael Galili 
was re-appointed minister without portfolio in Golda Meir’s new government, without 
responsibility for domestic and foreign information affairs, but retaining both interest in and 
influence on the issue.2 At the same time, the economic situation in the early 1970s evoked 
strong objections from the Ministry of Finance regarding new policy initiatives.3 However, 
under Abba Eban, the Foreign Ministry began a process of comprehensive re-evaluation of 
Israel’s foreign information efforts, largely directed under the able leadership of Alouph 
Hareven. 
 The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 ripped Israel apart, calling into question the 
most basic tenets of Israeli political and social life. Although the failures of Israel’s press 
policy were only one element of a far wider failure, they were a target for public disquiet, 
pushing the government to take action. Two reports – by Nachman Karni and by Shlomo 
                                            
 
1 Hareven to Divon, ‘The Hasbara work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Some Suggestions for 
Reorganisation’, 20.5.1970. Private papers of Alouph Hareven. 
2 Interview with Yossi Sarid, 29.7.2010. Sarid was approached by Galili in the summer of 1970 to 
take up a new position of government spokesman. However, both Galili and Meir refused to allow 
the spokesman to attend cabinet.  Sarid rejected the offer, asking Galili ‘what use is there for a 
spokesman who wasn’t in the meeting he is briefing about’? 
3 Yegar, History of the Israeli Foreign Information System [Hebrew]  86. 
Chapter 5 
183 
 
Gazit - added impetus to Meir’s surprising decision to implement the Peled Report’s main 
recommendation, the centralisation of information policy under a single authority. However, 
she now pressed for the creation of a Ministry of Information, contrary to Peled’s findings.  
This is the clearest example of the problem of the political culture of hasbara. Meir’s 
decision to establish a Ministry of Information was taken at a moment of personal and 
national weakness. Far removed from the detailed, patient and insightful work of Peled and 
of Hareven, both of whom had begun to articulate a far more sophisticated approach to 
advancing Israel’s national interests by attention to its international image, it was a reactive, 
defensive and apologetic response, triggered by an unprecedented national trauma. As the 
final chapter will examine, it was quickly revealed as mistaken. This chapter, then, deals with 
the impact of the Yom Kippur War on the unsuccessful, decade-long attempt to clarify an 
Israeli approach to cultivating and maintaining a positive national image on the international 
stage.  
 
The Foreign Ministry in the driving seat 
Foreign Minister Abba Eban was the most frequent and vocal opponent of proposals to 
establish an information ministry. He stated a number of times that if such a move was 
undertaken, he would feel obliged to resign, since it would result in a significant loss of 
authority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, much of whose diplomatic activity in small and 
medium-sized countries was in the field of public information. In fact, Eban had proposed 
that the Foreign Ministry should increase its authority in this area by taking responsibility for 
foreign correspondents stationed in Israel. Now, having rebuffed the Peled Report in late 
1969, and seen Yisrael Galili return his ministerial mandate for domestic and international 
information efforts, Abba Eban was now in a position to take a lead.  
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However, the Foreign Ministry was limited in its ability to affect policy. With security 
concerns often dominating the Israeli national agenda, the voice of the ‘activists’ was very 
often stronger than that of the ‘diplomats’. According to Brecher, the security establishment 
‘persistently ridiculed’ the Foreign Ministry  
and its alleged soft line and concern for ‘the Goyim’: in their preoccupation with 
foreign reaction, was the charge, they did not contribute to Israel’s crucial foreign 
policy objective - security.... To the Army the [MFA] was saturated with ‘Sharettism’, 
the policy of caution and exaggerated concern with ‘the external factor’.4 
 
Moreover, Eban was sceptical about the very idea of policy planning, preferring that 
his ministry should improvise in the face of uncertain developments. ‘All that a planning 
department in a foreign ministry can do is to analyze the various possibilities of evolution’, 
he said.5 Israel’s international image in the early 1970s was, in any case, precarious.  
Unsurprisingly, the progress made by Eban in securing international support was only 
incremental.   
In the reorganisation of April 1970, he had increased the authority of his Ministry in 
two important areas. Firstly, the Foreign Ministry assumed responsibility for permanent and 
visiting foreign journalists, a job previously handled by the Government Press Office. Since 
1967, the number of permanently-stationed foreign correspondents in Israel had more than 
doubled.6 Secondly, the Foreign Ministry took responsibility for the Hasbara Centre, which 
had been established in 1968 and was aimed at engaging foreign students and voluntary 
organisations in Israel, as well as Israeli students overseas.  
A year earlier, Eban had thrown down the gauntlet, warning those who criticised the 
government’s performance in the field of hasbara: ‘From now on, anyone who writes an 
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article on the government information ‘debacle’ is likely to find himself invited to join the 
brains trust and asked to apply himself to finding some answers’.7 In April 1970, he launched 
the first incarnation of the ‘brains trust’, a public committee of forty experts in mass 
communications and public relations, Knesset members, academics and journalists, whose 
brief was to advise the minister on the information services that the Ministry provided. 
However, it met only a handful of times before it fizzled out.8 A smaller, more junior, group 
met until mid-1971 under the leadership of the highly-experienced Aviad (Adi) Yaffe. 
Speaking to the Knesset, Eban reported that the committee had avoided discussions on day-
to-day issues, and had focussed instead on advising the minister on the fundamental issues, 
such as ‘a) the Zionist vision and our historical rights; b) Israel and peace; c) Soviet 
involvement and the risk of war; d) The refugee problem; e) Arab terrorism; f) Palestinian 
self-determination’.9 He also reported that the committee had advised him on the principles, 
content, methods and techniques of Israeli public diplomacy, particularly with regards long-
term planning and prioritising.  
Eban’s enthusiasm for dealing with the issue was felt most strongly inside his 
ministry. Whilst far more comfortable with matters of content than of organisational, Eban 
was ‘innovative, and even revolutionary’ in restructuring the ministry.10 He brought together 
the departments that dealt with press, hasbara, cultural and scientific affairs and official 
visitors into a new information division, headed by a deputy director-general – firstly Eliashiv 
Ben-Horin, and from 1970, Shmuel Divon. The key position was head of the ministry’s 
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hasbara department. But with no real authority to create and deliver policy, it had suffered 
from a high turn-over of officials.  Within a three-year period, the job had been filled by 
Netanel Lorch, Yohanan Cohen and Yeshayahu Anug, cramping long-term planning.  
Eban now brought in an outsider to fill the role. Hareven had served for many years in IDF 
military intelligence, but had moved to the Mossad after the Six-Day War, where he had 
pioneered the field of psychological warfare.11 Given the sense of inferiority that many 
diplomats already felt in relation to their colleagues from the security establishment, 
bringing in an ‘original, fresh-thinking’ outsider was a risky move.12 Hareven never felt fully 
accepted by the diplomats, and indeed stayed for only four years.13  However, the 
appointment paid dividends, with ‘muddling through’ replaced – at least temporarily – with 
structured policy planning.   
Hareven focussed first on the work of the foreign ministry in the field of 
international public diplomacy. In a memo dated 20 May 1970, he outlined his suggestions to 
his immediate superior, Divon, for an initial re-think of the work of the ministry.14 The new 
approach, he argued, was necessary because of three current problems: Israel’s poor 
international standing, the lack of clear organisational structure to deal with it, and the low 
domestic image of Israel’s public diplomacy efforts. He suggested a trial six-month period in 
which the foreign ministry would pose three questions - ‘1) Who are we?, 2) Who are our 
neighbours and what are their intentions?, and 3) What are our intentions regarding our 
neighbours?’ Hareven categorised his target audiences, prioritising government and political 
parties, then media and then universities. Jewish communities, trades unions and churches 
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were considered less important. He also identified the United States as the key geographical 
target, with Western Europe and Japan following.  
This initial paper outlined the principles which he believed underlie successful 
hasbara: 
Quality and content: The world is full of hasbara material, ours and theirs, which 
because of its mediocrity has no consumers. We must establish a strict rule that our 
hasbara material must be interesting – that is to say that its recipient must be 
sufficiently interested to study it. Our material (in whatever form it takes) must, 
therefore, be better than anything else comparable. It must be unusual in format, and 
where possible in content. Material that does not meet these criteria should be 
examined for effectiveness. 
Impact of dissemination: Even if we have interesting, unusual material which is better 
than that of others – our success will still be dependent on its dissemination. Our 
material must get to every individual in the audiences we have determined as 
important. This means creating distribution lists of hundreds of thousands of people 
and addresses who we want to receive our information. In the Mossad, such lists 
have begun to be uploaded on computers, and it is suggested that this be adopted.  
Hasbara is a mutual process: Traditional hasbara is a one-way street of sending 
material indiscriminately. A process that aims to be verifiable must attempt to be 
mutual. That is to say, it must try and arouse responses, in the form of dialogue, 
from its recipients. In this way, public diplomacy is humanised and there is ongoing 
human contact between the ‘explainers’ and their audiences.  
We must ‘freshen up’ the lexicon of hasbara: The lexicon we use is that of the 
establishment, outdated and focused almost entirely on terms related to conflict. 
Too often, we use terms of moral condemnation. Too often, we appeal to 
‘international public opinion’, which exists neither in theory nor in practice.  
The lexicon of hasbara needs updating and focussing on practical and realistic terms. 
For example, if an airliner is attacked by terrorists, we should reduce to a minimum 
the expressions of moral outrage (because the entire free world already shares 
them). On the other hand, we should describe clearly what we intend to do. Human 
society seeks practical information more than it does moral commentary.  
The lexicon of hasbara needs widening to include terms outside of conflict, in an 
attempt to create the consciousness that ‘there is another way’. We should describe 
the alternatives to war, stressing alternative uses for the tremendous resources 
which are currently wasted on war.15 
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Hareven’s work took the ministry in new directions. For the first time, the 
embassies and consulates were asked to give their feedback on the hasbara department’s 
work, in order to assess its usefulness. Budgets were increased, doubling in 1971 alone. This 
allowed longer-term planning, with a rolling three-year work-plan.16 In 1973, the foreign 
ministry conducted opinion polling amongst foreign audiences for the first time, with 
students in France, Sweden and Japan asked their views on Israel. However, this was an 
exception, since Hareven believed that public opinion had been essentially static since early 
1968, with ‘around 35 percent supportive of Israel, around 5 percent supportive of the 
Arabs and around 60 percent indifferent or undecided’, and he believed it would remain 
so.17 He also noted how expensive such polling was.18 Hareven stressed the distinction 
between proactive and reactive efforts, and urged diplomats to channel their efforts into 
areas where Israel’s international image could be improved by fuller discussion, and to avoid 
engaging in unproductive debate.19  
Other departments in the foreign ministry were also involved in the work. The 
official visits department welcomed hundreds of official visitors each year. The public affairs 
department sent diplomats recently returned from foreign postings to speak to students, 
schoolchildren, soldiers and factory workers. 
However, Hareven was not convinced that the Foreign Ministry was the best vehicle 
for this work. In August 1970, he presented a more detailed plan to Yisrael Galili, who 
remained a key figure in the debate about hasbara policy, outlining the rationale and a 
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possible structure for a Ministry of Information.20 The principal argument for such a body, 
he argued, was that the current mechanisms for distributing information about Israel were 
deficient. When several ministries explained complex issues each from their own standpoint, 
the message was disjointed and often conflicting. This was the case regarding the 1967 war, 
where the Ministry of Defence and the IDF presented the military analysis, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs talked about the political aspects of the conflict, and the Ministry of Finance 
dealt with financial and economic affairs. But the critical issues facing the State were wider 
than a single ministry’s purview; Israel needed a central body that would strike the correct 
balance between them, that would collate all information and that would consider the needs 
of the recipients rather than the distributors.21  
The failures of the current system were clear. Firstly, too much attention was being 
paid to the Arab-Israel conflict. Although he was in no doubt that the conflict was the most 
significant important challenge facing the nation, he questioned whether it was healthy that 
‘civilian’ issues were being pushed to one side. After all, he wrote to Galili, ‘the unique 
nature of the State of Israel is not only her ability to manage armed conflict’.22 Secondly, he 
noted that Israel was yet to take advantage of the advances in communications technology 
that would allow a more nuanced and flexible approach to different sectors in Israeli society, 
and to international audiences. Such developments might also allow government to develop 
a genuine and ongoing dialogue with its citizens and international observers.  
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The solution was a Ministry of Information that would both coordinate the existing 
information activities within the other ministries, and would also coordinate and provide 
professional support – such as the commissioning of opinion polls –  on those issues that 
were wider than a single ministry’s responsibility. In addition, the Ministry of Information 
would have representatives in Israel’s embassies around the world, although he reassured 
his diplomatic colleagues that:  
Hasbara must not become a routine, bureaucratic process. So the Ministry of 
Information must have as small a permanent staff of its own as is possible and use as 
many professionals as possible – either from government ministries or from 
outside.23 
 
Not all the changes were successful, or popular. On 1 June 1970, Abba Eban was 
called to defend his ‘brains trust’, from charges that it was a party-political rubber stamp. 
When the names of the committee were announced, it appeared that all its members were 
associated with the Labour Alignment. Speaking in the Knesset, he answered a question 
from Yosef Tamir (Gahal) on the issue, and said 
 
I appointed the members of the advisory committee without any regard for their 
party affiliation, to allow me to benefit from their views, their experience and their 
expertise in the different areas that comprise the problems of hasbara we are facing. 
One particular criterion was my personal relationship with these people.  I aimed at 
finding a broad spectrum of knowledge and specialisation, not a broad spectrum of 
party political affiliation.24 
 
In 1972, the State Comptroller issued a report which dealt with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affair’s work in the field of hasbara. The report, which dealt with inspections carried 
out in early 1971, found some technical discrepancies in the work of the hasbara and 
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cultural and scientific affairs departments.25 However, the overall assessment was that the 
changes introduced by Hareven were positive. The Government Press Office, whose work 
had been dramatically cut with the transfer of responsibility for foreign journalists to the 
foreign ministry, unsurprisingly found fault with the changes. In a report on the issue written 
in 1972, the director of the Jerusalem office of the GPO wrote: 
 
The current system is unsatisfactory, and does not answer existing requirements. In 
this field, there has been no progress since the Six-Day War. In fact, despite the 
achievements there has been deterioration, and instead of working to coordinate 
efforts, there has been diffusion of effort.26 
 
In June 1973, Dan Pattir, who had served as press secretary to Yitzhak Rabin during 
his tenure as Ambassador to Washington, summarised the findings of a working group on 
government communications which reported to the Foreign Ministry.27 It deliberately 
adopted a new term, midu’a, for government information in place of the ubiquitous term 
hasbara.28 The report found that an ‘information system that is efficient in organisation and 
activity is a requirement of the highest order’. It recommended a system with four elements: 
 
A central information ministry/authority 
Heading the ministry will be a minister/director who will be a member of the 
government or a permanent participant in its meetings, and party to its discussions 
and decisions 
The government spokesman will be the minister heading the central information 
ministry (or the head of the central information authority), or his appointee 
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The central information ministry/authority will comprise the domestic information 
directorate, the foreign information directorate, the government spokesman and the 
Government Press Office and will coordinate hasbara policy and activity between 
government ministries and other bodies.29  
 
Between April 1970 and October 1973, Abba Eban had begun a period of serious 
assessment of Israel’s government communication policy. Whilst Hareven’s work had shed 
some light on the issue of content, Eban had failed to tackle the question of organisation and 
inter-ministerial coordination.  In fact, his starting point of protecting his own ministry’s 
work by blocking the creation of a separate ministry maintained the key organisational 
deficiency: the distinction between domestic and international information efforts. Although 
this problem was subsumed by others during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the 
question of authority for hasbara did not disappear.  
 
Government communications and the Yom Kippur War 
‘The Yom Kippur War, which broke out in October 1973, re-opened the flood of 
criticism about ‘foreign information failures’ and showed that the changes made by 
the Foreign Ministry had been insufficient’.30  
 
Whatever the changes to the structure and strategy of Israeli government communications 
between 1970 and 1973, they proved lacking during the Yom Kippur War. In the absence of 
clear objectives and coordination between the branches of government, Israel ‘muddled 
through’, with limited success. The IDF Spokesman, who naturally came to the forefront 
during war, bore the brunt of the failure. 
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Israelis were not expecting war in 1973. The victory of 1967 had planted a 
misconception that Israeli military strength would deter any Arab attacks, and that – in the 
unlikely event that it did come - the next war would be like the last. Israel was dismayed to 
find out that 1973 was not remotely like 1967. Returning to Israel in early March 1973 from 
his term as Ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin found Israel ‘almost smug …as 
befits a country far removed from the possibility of war’.31 Foreign Minister Abba Eban 
described it as ‘a climate of exuberant self-confidence that began to border on fantasy’.32  
Speaking at Haifa University in March 1973, he warned of an obsession with the country’s 
physical borders, and a disregard for its moral and political frontiers.  
The surprise attack, launched simultaneously by Egypt and Syria on Saturday 6 
October was thus a profound shock to officials and the general public, who had dismissed 
the military build-up on the southern and northern fronts as yet more bluster by Anwar 
Sadat and Hafez Assad. The day before the war broke out, defence minister Moshe Dayan 
briefed Israeli military correspondents that the considerable build-up of Egyptian forces 
along the Suez Canal – the border between Israel and Egypt since 1967 - was merely a 
posture. President Sadat had first pledged to attack Israel in September 1970, following the 
end of the War of Attrition. He repeated it at the end of 1970, declaring that by the end of 
1971 he would regain the lost Sinai. Then he said the ‘year of decision’ would be by the end 
of 1972, but that deadline had long since passed without incident. ‘Sadat swore by the 
Prophet Mohammed, but was in no hurry to keep his vow. Repetition only reduced his 
credibility both in Israel and in the rest of the world.’33 Egypt had mobilised and then pulled 
                                            
 
31 Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs  184. 
32 Shlaim, "Interview with Abba Eban, 11 March 1976," 158. 
33 Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake: Yom Kippur, 1973 (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 
1974) 34. 
Chapter 5 
194 
 
back its forces three times in recent months, leaving Sadat ‘a laughing stock in his own 
country’.34  
On the evening of 5 October, Israel received credible information that the attack 
would come the next evening.35 On the morning of 6 October, IDF Chief of Staff David 
‘Dado’ Elazar asked Meir to approve calling up 200,000 reservists. Dayan, who had trouble 
grasping that war was imminent, urged a limited call-up of 20-30,000. The attack came in the 
early afternoon, with Syria and Egypt launching a simultaneous attack on Israel. 
Dayan remained up-beat, for the time being. At 4pm, he briefed Israeli journalists to 
expect the real fighting to begin when the reservists arrived at the front the next day, when 
‘we will turn the area in to a gigantic cemetery’.36 At a large press conference that evening, 
he declared ‘the IDF will smite the Egyptians in Sinai hip and thigh. The war will end in a few 
days, with our victory’. Although he didn’t mention the Syrian front in that press briefing, he 
did so in an interview on Kol Yisrael: 
 
On the Golan Heights, it is possible that here or there a few Syrian tanks have 
broken through our lines, and they may have taken, in one way or another, control 
of one or more of our posts – that is, conquered our positions – but [they have] 
not, not made any significant progress.37 
 
Meir broadcast a similarly optimistic message to the Israel people – although she 
subsequently gave only one interview to the press, and Dayan instructed the IDF 
Spokesman, Colonel Pinchas Lahav, to reassure the military correspondents that all was 
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well.38 The ‘absurdly optimistic statements’ in the first days of war created an entirely false 
expectation of another quick Israeli victory which was soon proven wrong.39  
In reality, Israel suffered an enormous blow on the Sinai front, and its defensive 
positions on the Golan Heights were overrun. Israel counter-attacked – unsuccessfully at 
first – after three days, but it took until the beginning of the second week of the war for 
Israel to fully absorb the blow and successfully push back Syrian and Egyptian forces. Israel 
had also lost the information initiative. Soon after the attack, Damascus and Cairo radios 
announced that Israel had attacked their forces. The first statement from the IDF 
Spokesman was short and factual. Zeev Schiff, military correspondent of Haaretz, noted ‘The 
dry statement doesn’t promise victories, but many Israelis are unimpressed by a later 
statement that a general blackout has been imposed; everyone expects an easy victory’.40 
 
Dealing with the press 
In the initial scramble of getting troops to the fronts, arrangements for journalists were by 
no means the most pressing issue. Some local journalists, Israelis and permanent foreign 
correspondents, did get to the front on the second day.41 However, their initial reports gave 
a deceptively optimistic account of the war. Three factors influenced this. Firstly, the 
optimism of Meir and Dayan, itself a product of the sense of Israeli invincibility that dated 
from 1967, was a powerful ‘frame’ through which they saw the early days of war. This 
framing was reinforced by the IDF Spokesman and his unit, the sole source of official 
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announcements. Secondly, the Israeli correspondents were, for the most part, reporting 
from a war-zone from the first time. Almost all of them had seen action in 1967 as 
combatants, but they had not yet adopted a ‘proper distance’ between themselves and the 
war.42  Thirdly, their field of view was limited, and the technology for getting news from the 
front back to the newsrooms was patchy. They extrapolated the view from a particular 
sector to the whole front. This was often incorrect. The initial reports were, consequently, 
rosier than the reality.  
Early on 7 October, Israel Radio’s Amos Ettinger reported, ‘This morning will have 
some surprises for the Egyptians, as absorption turns to containment, if not more’. Three 
hours later, Michael Karpin of IDF Radio reported from the divisional commander’s 
command post at Refidim, forty kilometres behind the front line, that ‘Egyptian forces have 
not crossed the waterline, more or less, and in places where they managed to set up 
bridgeheads, our forces have repelled them on all fronts’.43 He also had a bullish interview 
with divisional commander, General Avraham ‘Bren’ Adan who announced he was about to 
launch an Israeli counter-attack against Egyptian forces.44  
Karpin admits that in the scramble to get to the front, he had failed to make the 
mental switch from combatant, as he had been in 1967, to journalist.45 He managed to 
transmit his interview with Adan to the Tel Aviv studios of IDF Radio, using the general’s 
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communications net. However, minutes later, rather than launching a counter-attack, Adan 
came under missile fire himself. The general beat a hasty retreat, leaving Karpin alone in the 
field. His status as a journalist began to be clearer.46 
At the front, the reality was quite different. The counter-attack along the Suez Canal 
failed, with Israeli tanks coming under fire from Soviet-supplied Sagger anti-tank missiles, 
which IDF Intelligence had not known about. Israel Radio’s Yirmiyahu Yovel was incensed by 
what he heard on the radio, and tried to get a more accurate picture of the fighting to the 
newsroom in Tel Aviv. 
 
I picked up the field telephone, and said – a bit angrily, I admit – ‘we’ve just heard on 
the radio that our forces are containing the Egyptian army in the Canal Zone. Your 
correspondent wants to contradict the report. This is not like previous wars. This is 
a different war. This war is harder, will last longer, with more casualties. We’ll win in 
the end, for sure, but it will take far longer. We must not think of this war in terms 
of the Six-Day War. This is a different war’. That whole section was censored. Not 
one word was broadcast.47 
 
At the same time, official Egyptian spokespeople were reporting their successes with 
a good deal of embellishment, and ‘adding these claims up, one would have to suppose that 
the entire Israeli armour, and three-quarters of her air force, were totally destroyed in the 
first week of the war’, wrote the pro-Israeli British journalist Terence Prittie.48 Arab states, 
particularly Egypt and Syria, as well as the Palestinians, had begun to broadcast in Hebrew in 
the early 1970s. By the summer of 1973, Cairo Radio had 12 hours of broadcasts aimed at 
Israel, in Hebrew, English and French, ‘a low-key, if sometimes awkward, attempt to 
persuade instead of conquer’.49  For its part, Israeli radio broadcasts were ‘designed to show 
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that Israel has eyes and ears in major Arab capitals,’ including once broadcasting the answers 
to Egyptian school examinations the evening before the tests were to be given.50 
Perhaps the most important element of the ‘very marked improvement’ in Arab 
information efforts during the war was the pictures of the hundreds of Israeli prisoners of 
war captured in the first two days.51 These were given to international news services, via 
whom they made their way to Israeli television for the evening news on Sunday night. They 
made extremely gloomy viewing, as well as contributing to a ‘sudden drop’ of credibility in 
the IDF’s own accounts of the war.52  
Dayan’s elation turned to desperation during the course of 7 October. Addressing 
the cabinet, he proposed a retreat from most of the Sinai. At 3pm, he briefed Meir in more 
detail, urging her to retreat from the Golan Heights, as well as conceding the Suez Canal to 
the Egyptians.  An hour later, he briefed Israeli newspaper editors and political 
commentators, now telling them the truth.53 The Bar-Lev defensive line had fallen and the 
counter-attack had failed in the south, and the Hermon listening post had fallen to the 
Syrians in the north, putting the major cities of Israel under threat. He continued with a 
startling assessment: ‘we are standing before the destruction of the Third Commonwealth’, 
evoking the biblical destruction of the first and second Jewish Temples and the consequent 
loss of national independence.  
That evening, Meir called for Elazar to brief her. Although the situation was grim, the 
chief of staff reported, it was too early to order a retreat. Earlier, Elazar had given a press 
conference, in which he responded to a question about the predicted length of the war, 
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telling journalists ‘I expect only one thing: that we will continue to attack, continue to beat, 
and that we will break their bones. I don’t yet want to commit to how long it will take.’54 
Torn between Dayan’s cataclysmic gloom and Elazar’s bullish assessment, the prime minister 
later said that, if Dayan had been right, that evening she would have considered suicide.55 
 The next morning, she was in decisive mood. She ordered a counterattack on both 
the Sinai and Golan fronts, appealed to the United States to begin an emergency airlift of 
supplies and ordered Israel onto nuclear alert, arming Jericho missiles and F-4 fighter 
planes.56 The unpopular and ineffective southern front commander, Shmuel ‘Gorodish’ 
Gonen, was effectively replaced with former chief of staff Chaim Bar-Lev who was sent to 
oversee affairs as the personal representative of Elazar.  
Dayan’s pessimism was compounded when the counter-attack of 8 October did not 
yield immediate results. The following day, he briefed newspaper editors, telling them ‘it’s 
become clear to the whole world that we are no stronger than the Egyptians’.  Gershom 
Schocken, the editor of Haaretz, said ‘if you say what you have told us on television this 
evening, it will be cataclysmic for Israelis, for Jews and for the Arab world’.57  At the urging 
of Maariv editor-in-chief Arye Dissentchik, Meir ordered Dayan to cancel his scheduled 
television broadcast that evening.58 In his place General Aharon Yariv appeared. According 
to the military correspondent of Haaretz, Yariv’s account of the fighting was honest, 
sensitive and balanced. ‘Let’s not delude ourselves with rapid and elegant conquests. The 
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war is likely to go on, but let’s not think in terms of danger to the population of Israel’, he 
was quoted as saying.59 Foreign press reports were similar:  
 
Generally speaking I would say that we have now reached a certain phase in the war 
in which it is permitted to say that we have been able to redress the situation, but 
there is still a way ahead of us which will not be easy, for which we’ll have to do a lot 
of fighting, in which our nerves will be probed and tested, in which there might be 
difficult situations, but during which I think we are permitted not to fail in our 
confidence as far as Israel’s people and its defence forces are concerned.60 
 
This was the first time the Israeli public were given a frank evaluation of the war – 
‘neither a continuation of the Six Day War, nor a blitzkrieg’.61 After the ‘breakbones’ speech 
given by Elazar the previous evening, some Israelis were confused about what to believe. 
More, though, understood that they had been deceived until this point.62 
Dayan now asked Yariv to take over press matters on a more permanent basis. Yariv 
had served as the head of military intelligence until his retirement from the IDF in 1972, and 
was serving as Meir’s adviser on counter-terrorism.63 Meir also invited General Chaim 
Herzog, the ‘national soother’ of the 1967 war, to resume his military analysis on Israel 
Radio. Fearing that matters were slipping out of his control, IDF Spokesman Colonel Pinchas 
Lahav fought to get a grip on the issue.64 Starting from 9 October, the ‘hasbara forum’ met 
every day of the war with representatives from the IBA and the Hasbara Centre, professors, 
psychologists and sociologists, although without a representative from the Foreign Ministry. 
Their first meeting, though, compounded the credibility deficit. The forum decided to allow 
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only ‘gradual and considered reporting of the difficulties we are experiencing in battle, and 
alongside that the obvious fact that in such a situation there is loss of morale and of life’.65 
This was a mistake; the Israeli and international press were already reporting the losses of 
the first days and Yariv’s more accurate broadcast had improved, rather than damaged 
morale. It was nothing new, though. Already in 1969, during the Israel-Egyptian War of 
Attrition, Lahav had faced accusations of delaying reports that Israeli soldiers had been killed 
in order not to depress Israelis on Independence Day. That time, Minister Yisrael Galili had 
made it clear that he would not tolerate such behaviour: 
 
Interviewer: Mr Galili, you are the minister with responsibility for government 
communications in Israel. Can you assure the people of Israel that also very 
unpleasant, depressing news will be reported, even if it could damage morale? Isn’t 
that preferable to hiding things and damaging credibility? 
 
Galili: I can say that the government must report the whole truth to the people, and 
for two reasons: firstly, because we believe the Israeli people values truth and does 
not want to be misled by fantasy and deception, and that people are strong enough 
to face up to the truth, even when it is told plainly.66 
 
Although he remained in position in 1973, Lahav’s already tattered reputation did 
not survive the war.67 Dayan had already started to blame IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar for 
failing to predict the start of war, and for his failure to immediately reverse the losses. 
Lahav, Elazar’s protégé, was an easy target for Dayan’s fury.68  Dayan brought in his own 
man, Brigadier General Aharon Avnon, to supervise Lahav’s work. Neither played any 
meaningful role during the remaining weeks of the war.  
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By the end of the first week of war, intelligence head General Eli Zeira was 
exhausted. Yariv, his immediate predecessor, was now asked to ‘shadow’ Zeira and share 
some of the burden, and so, on 13 October, General Shlomo Gazit was handed the task of 
running hasbara efforts. As Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories since 
late 1968, Gazit was responsible for the security, political and economic affairs of Gaza and 
the West Bank. In this position, he had briefed the domestic and international press 
frequently, and was experienced and confident. Unlike any other of his colleagues in the IDF 
General Staff, he was also relatively unburdened during the war. His policy was to ensure 
‘business as usual’ in the West Bank whilst the war was fought on the Syrian and Egyptian 
borders.69 
Gazit took control quickly: ‘I was, in effect, the minister of information, without a 
formal appointment. I coordinated the work of the ministries of foreign affairs, education, 
interior and so on. Under those circumstances it was understandable, natural and 
required’.70 Those circumstances included a prime minister who, for fear of being asked 
about why Israel was so ill-prepared for war, gave only one televised briefing during the war 
– and that ‘not a good performance’ – and a foreign minister who was out of the country 
for most of the war.71 Gazit’s improvised position, therefore, carried enormous and ill-
defined responsibilities. It was typical of Israel’s ‘muddling through’ of communications 
policy.  
Gazit exercised his authority with immediate effect. On 16 October the Knesset was 
scheduled to debate the progress of the war, the first time it had done so. The Speaker of 
the Knesset, Yisrael Yeshayahu, requested that the debate be broadcast live. Gazit felt 
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differently. ‘There was no way of censoring mid-broadcast, and we could not risk an 
incautious slip of the tongue by one of the Members of Knesset’. He had another 
consideration: ‘In the midst of battle, with the whole nation anxiously following every report 
from the front, it was not possible to stop for eight or more hours in order to broadcast 
the ‘dramatic’ speeches of 120 Members of Knesset’.72 Only the prime minister’s speech was 
to be carried live, and that only after it had been cleared by the military censor.  
His instruction ruffled political feathers. The leader of the opposition Herut party, 
Menachem Begin, was furious that his speech would not be carried live. Speaking to Chaim 
Landau (Herut), Gazit offered the same terms to Begin as to the prime minister – any speech 
passed by the censor could be broadcast. ‘I’d offer the same deal even to Meir Vilner,’ he 
told Landau.73 Now incensed that Gazit had compared him to Vilner, Begin complained to 
Dayan and to the chair of the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, Chaim 
Zadok (Alignment). ‘For a week or even more – at the height of battle – there was nothing 
more important to deal with than Menachem Begin’s bruised honour’.74 Gazit apologised, 
but his grip on policy was firm. Begin’s speech was not broadcast live.  
Gazit spent his time between the ‘pit’, the IDF’s underground command 
headquarters in Tel Aviv, and at the Beit Sokolow press centre across the road. His rank 
gave him access to the most up-to-date information about the progress of the war, without 
disturbing the minister. He was also able to talk directly to the prime minister, or to 
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communicate with her via Yisrael Galili, who had returned to his favoured position of 
eminence grise. Equipped with the best information possible, he organised twice-daily 
briefings, in Hebrew and in English, as well as personally briefing the more important 
journalists.75 He also took control of the hasbara forum, which he considered a useful 
mechanism for sharing information and agreeing on messages and how they would be 
delivered.76  
Despite Gazit’s grip on the situation, Israel was still struggling to cope with an influx 
of hundreds of foreign journalists. Held up for the first 48 hours because Israel’s only 
international airport was closed, they were reliant on Israeli reports, which gave their 
coverage the same false impression of Israeli military fortunes.77 With the airport opened, 
they flooded in from 8 October.78 By the end of the first week of fighting, over 500 
journalists – reporters and their crews – had arrived. By the end of the war, there were 
nearly 900, as well as the permanent foreign press corps of around 400. This ‘vast regiment’ 
of visiting journalists was battle-experienced, and senior in their organisations.79 Some of 
them had satellite telephones, which, despite the patchy quality, offered the advantage of 
broadcasting live, or filing copy immediately. The new technology was a source of envy for 
some Israeli correspondents. However, the foreign correspondents’ tendency to stay well 
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behind the front lines and to embellish their reporting with fanciful, colourful details was 
not.80  
The visiting journalists were not impressed with the facilities made available to them 
by Israeli officials. Max Hastings, reporting for the London Evening Standard, later recalled 
‘there was no point in harassing the Israeli press department for assistance – none would be 
forthcoming’.81 They complained that, unlike in 1967, they did not have free access to the 
battle-zone, and had to be escorted by IDF liaison officers from the Spokesman’s unit.82 The 
IDF tours of the front were only a partial answer, although more than half went on one. 
Getting to the front required air transport, which was in short supply. ‘We had to be 
arbitrary in allocating places and that led to quite a few complaints, usually from reporters 
representing small and medium organs, as well as from representatives of small Jewish 
newspapers’.83  
Some did make their own way to the Syrian and Egyptian fronts and file their 
reports. One, Nick Tomalin of the Sunday Times, was killed on the Golan front, on such a 
trip.84 The unmediated access to soldiers on the front that the IDF wanted to prevent, 
ironically generated some highly favourable coverage: 
 
Until this war, I have never much liked Israel. But to see this society gathered in 
arms to save itself has been impossibly emotive. Down in Sinai under the stars, we 
sat and talked for hours to sentries who are agricultural engineers, tank commanders 
who are university dons, students who drove amphibious assault craft in the 
                                            
 
80 Interview with Michael Karpin, 1.3.2012. 
81 A junior reporter at the time, Hastings had missed reporting the Six-Day War. His seniority was 
decisive in getting him to Israel for the Yom Kippur War. Max Hastings, Going to the Wars (London: 
Macmillan, 2000) 141. 
82 Yegar, History of the Israeli Foreign Information System [Hebrew]  90. 
83 Interview with Meron Medzini, 30.12.2011 
84 One other journalist, Raphael Unger of Israel Radio, was killed during the war, on the Egyptian 
front. He was travelling with one of the armoured division commanders, General Albert Mendler, 
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murderous first crossing of the canal. Israel at war is a family at war, perhaps the 
most highly motivated family in history. Even in Syria, I have seen Israelis treat 
prisoners with nothing worse than amused pity, embarrassed by a terrified Arab 
grovelling for mercy to which he is quite unaccustomed, and does not expect. This is 
why it has felt so shameful to be a Western European in Israel; because we have 
been watching the Israelis displaying all the qualities for which we look in our 
civilization – military genius not least – while on the other side stood an enemy of 
whom there could be no doubt that, armed with an atomic weapon, he would hurl it 
like a hysterical child. …I shall never go on holiday to Israel because the waiters are 
rude, the food is terrible, the architecture drab. But these last three weeks, I am 
proud to have shared the Israelis’ camp fires in Sinai. For the only time in my life 
anywhere in the world, I wish that I had been carrying a rifle beside them.85 
 
Only 35 percent of foreign journalists were satisfied with the information they 
received from the Israeli authorities, citing justified censorship and a need to preserve 
domestic morale as reasons for withholding information. However, unlike their Israeli 
counterparts, few of them directly blamed the inefficiency of the system or cumbersome 
bureaucracy.86 They objected to Israeli military censorship, with 68 percent complaining that 
it interfered with their work ‘all the time’ or ‘some of the time’, and 41 percent said that it 
distorted their work all or some of the time. However, 74 percent of visiting journalists and 
100 percent of the resident foreign correspondents said that, if they were Israeli, they 
would justify censorship under the same circumstances.87 
Yet, even if they were unsatisfied, the reporters obtained a good deal of information 
from official sources. Around 80 percent of resident reporters and 60 percent of visiting 
reporters had off-record conversations with military and political leaders, and around the 
same numbers went on organised battlefront trips. Around half of the journalists had special 
trips arranged for them individually. They also tended to mark the official sources, such as 
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the IDF Spokesman’s unit, the Government Press Office and official press briefings as both 
helpful and credible. 88 
After the second, permanent ceasefire on 25 October, the foreign press dispersed 
quickly. Those who remained made their dissatisfaction felt. On November 5, the Foreign 
Press Association, representing journalists permanently stationed in Israel, submitted a 
memo to the IDF Spokesman, Colonel Pinchas Lahav, complaining that he and his unit had 
not been truthful in their statements during the war. 89 He responded that he had always 
told the truth, but admitted that he had not always told all the truth. He also noted that 
‘boastful remarks’ by public figures and senior officers in the first days of the war had 
compromised his credibility.90 Lahav was dismissed early in 1974, as was Avnon who had 
been brought in by Dayan to supervise him.91 The IDF unit he had headed underwent a 
thorough re-organisation, also in early 1974, formally changing its name from the IDF 
hasbara department to the IDF Spokesman’s Unit.92 
The failure of the IDF Spokesperson’s unit to adequately prepare for handling the 
foreign and domestic press during conflict led to the establishment of two internal inquiries, 
headed by General Shlomo Gazit and by Colonel Nachman Karni. They were important 
steps in the creation of a Ministry of Information early in 1974.  
 
Towards a ministry: Nachman Karni and Shlomo Gazit report 
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‘In this war, the IDF became the chief source of government communication, 
perhaps the sole source, whereas in a proper system of government the army should 
only be one part of the system’.93 
 
 
The Yom Kippur war was a profound shock to the Israeli political and military 
establishment, whose eventual consequences were to be found in the political upheaval of 
1977.94 Journalists were bruised, ‘admitting that their silence also contributed to the 
catastrophe’.95 Writing in Davar, Daniel Bloch hinted at the depth of the crisis of press-
politics relations:  
I don’t accept the idea that the role of the press is to keep up morale. Its major role 
is to deliver accurate information, expose the truth, criticize and sound warnings. 
The role of the press today is to make every effort to open additional paths to 
independent sources of information, so that we will not be dependent on one source 
that is not prepared to reveal everything.96 
 
Within weeks, Meir bowed to popular pressure and ordered the establishment of a 
State Commission of Enquiry, headed by Supreme Court President Shimon Agranat. Even 
before that, IDF Spokesman Pinchas Lahav appointed Colonel Nachman Karni to report to 
him on his unit’s performance during the war.97 Karni had served as IDF Spokesperson in 
the early 1950s, and served in a variety of roles in the intelligence and foreign liaison 
spheres. He had retired in 1968, but remained in close contact with his peers, many of 
whom were in senior political or military positions by 1973.  
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The panel also included Dr. Yirmiyahu Yovel, David Pedhatzur and Moshe Shalit. 
Yovel taught philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, but had also been a military 
commentator for Israel Radio during the war.  It was he who had protested at his 
colleagues’ inaccurate reporting of the first days of the war. Pedhatzur was a leading 
journalist, and had been the editor of Lamerchav, the daily newspaper of Ahdut Ha’Avoda, 
until 1971. When Lamerchav folded, it merged with the Mapai paper, Davar, where he 
became deputy editor. Shalit, a lawyer with close connections to the Labour movement, 
served as secretary to the panel. Despite their clear political affiliations, the report did not 
avoid the political aspects of the issue. 
On the face of it, the Karni report was a minor detail. It was commissioned as an 
internal report for a discredited IDF Spokesman on the performance of his unit during the 
war. Lahav knew that he would face questions about his and the unit’s deficiencies, and he 
hoped an independent assessment would shield him from further criticism.98 The report was 
not made public, and, given the enormity of national soul-searching after the war, left very 
few traces in political debate.  
Yet, the report is far more important than that. Largely by default, the IDF took 
responsibility for national information efforts, firstly through the IDF Spokesman and then 
through Generals Yariv and Gazit. Conscious of this, Karni effectively ignored the rather 
limited mandate he received from Lahav and presented a comprehensive critique of Israeli 
government communications. Its recommendations far exceeded the narrow focus it was 
intended to examine.  
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There was also a personal element to their work. The members of the panel felt the 
war was ‘an offence to the profession’ to which they all belonged, in one way or another.99 
Within a few weeks of the end of the war, he was able to call an impressive list of witnesses 
to give evidence, as well as make use of relevant academic research to produce a report 
which, although not widely-read, represents an immediate, first-hand account of what went 
wrong. 
Between late November and late December 1973, the panel met 10 times to hear 
evidence from 32 witnesses.100 They heard from Israeli and foreign journalists, from officers 
within the IDF Spokesman’s unit, as well as from Lahav himself, twice. General Shlomo 
Gazit, who played a key role in creating order from the chaotic first days, gave his account 
of the war to Karni, as did Alouph Hareven of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The report 
makes dismal reading, with four major themes emerging from the evidence. 
Firstly, the unit was not prepared for war. There had been training for the unit’s 
reservists in 1971, but not all of them came forward when the war started. Other 
reservists, without training, did appear and asked to serve101 Career officers, whose 
peacetime jobs became less relevant during war, ‘volunteered’ where they felt there was a 
need.102 There was no system for collating information on the hundreds of foreign 
correspondents, which could have helped ensure they received appropriate treatment, or 
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for monitoring their output.103 Karni’s report noted that such improvisation was a missed 
opportunity: 
‘Information services during wartime are no less important than the work of other 
staff units. Indeed, information is one of the areas with the highest levels of marginal 
benefit since significant military and political advantage can be derived from relatively 
small investment’.104 
 
 
The panel also heard that there was a lack of clear policy, at least until Gazit took 
charge. One senior officer told the panel: ‘There was no ‘guiding hand’, and I did not – nor, I 
think did the IDF Spokesman – have anyone to tell me what our policy was’.105 Only at the 
end of the third day of fighting, 8 October, did the unit’s officers get an accurate picture of 
the war. That evening, Col Aryeh Tichon briefed the unit that the situation on the fronts 
was ‘not as rosy’ as they had been led to believe. ‘That was the point,’ one officer told the 
panel, ‘at which we began to restrain ourselves [my emphasis]’106 
Karni also noted that the unit failed to adequately integrate reports from 
correspondents in the field into a comprehensive picture of the progress of the war. Such 
reports are inevitably narrow in scope and, in the first days of the war, were misleadingly 
optimistic.  ‘Some of these optimistic reports were sent, as if they were news [my emphasis], 
to the newspapers and in one paper an optimistic field report became headline news’.107 This 
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also resulted in misleading Spokesman’s announcements, particularly during the first days of 
fighting, which were consequently less credible when the true picture emerged.  
However, Karni’s most significant contribution was to point out that the IDF was not only 
responsible for communicating the military aspects of the war to domestic and international 
audiences.  ‘During the Yom Kippur War, the State of Israel did not have hasbara as such, 
rather improvisation of a coordinating mechanism between the various bodies headed by a 
senior military officer’.108 This task was ‘totally disproportionate, and beyond what it could 
manage on its own’. His recommendation was to appoint an information minister: 
 
‘The IDF cannot successfully carry out its duty in the sphere of hasbara unless all 
government communication agencies are under the supervision and direction of a 
single authority, preferably with ministerial rank’.109 
 
 
The question of how Israel handled information efforts during the war reached the 
Knesset on 25 December 1973. Shmuel Tamir (Free Centre) called for a debate on the 
‘shocking deficiencies, so destructive on the international stage, in Washington, the United 
States, Japan, Europe, the free world’.110 He noted that ‘only two or three people’ in the 
Israeli embassy in Washington D.C. dealt with information efforts, and called for a significant 
increase to this work. He also criticised the work of the IDF Spokesman during the war, 
who he said proved incapable of dealing with the influx of foreign press and was primarily 
responsible for the decline in Israel’s international credibility.  
In response, Foreign Minister Eban noted the considerable disadvantages Israel faced 
in the field of international public opinion in the face of a well-funded campaign from Arab 
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states. Whilst agreeing with Tamir that the war had exposed deficiencies in both 
organisation and content, he was upbeat about Israel’s current standing, noting the opinion 
poll research commissioned by Hareven earlier in 1973 which showed strong support for 
Israel in Britain, France, Sweden and Japan, whereas support for Arabs was very low.111 In 
the United States, 6 percent of those polled indicated support for the Arabs, whilst 54 
percent indicated support for Israel. ‘Where is the great achievement of the oil money and 
the millions of dollars?’ he asked. ‘I do not believe any other country in the world has 
succeeded so fully in achieving influence’.112  
This speech to the Knesset also contained his fullest public exposition of his 
underlying view on the issue, that the root cause of concerns about Israel’s international 
image was to be found government policy itself and not than in the professionalism of 
Israel’s diplomats:  
 
‘Once again, I feel a sense of intellectual frustration when the issue of how the 
government communicates is taken out of the context of the political reality. 
Because what really affects our image at the end of the day is not the skill of the 
policy advocate. It’s not the salesman, nor the wrapper, but the goods themselves 
that matter. …Israel’s image is not a product solely of the words its diplomats use; it 
is a product of entirety of Israel’s reality as seen from the outside. Her positions, 
style, atmosphere, the way her society conducts itself, her approach to peace, her 
relations with neighbouring countries, her position on universal human values, her 
view of her own and the world’s culture and heritage – all these are taken into 
account. And the advocate for Israel is not alone in his task. There are positive 
influences and, to my regret, negative influences. …I simply want to prove that not 
only we, not only policy advocates and government ministers and official 
representatives formulate our image and how we look’.113 
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The debate also included the familiar concerns that a lack of sufficient coordination 
was responsible for the perceived failures. Nissim Eliad (Independent Liberals), whilst 
praising the ‘fine work done by the Israeli information system in its overseas work’, asked 
‘whether the current division of responsibility was sustainable, and whether it might not be 
preferable to concentrate efforts under a single body’.114 Shlomo Lorincz (Agudat Yisrael) 
returned to another well-worn theme, that Israel was ‘a nation that dwells alone’, before 
the call for a full debate on the issue was voted down.115 
In early 1974, Gazit was asked to summarise his findings on the issue of hasbara 
during the Yom Kippur War. His principal finding, which he had shared with the Karni 
Committee in late 1973, was that the apparatus of government communications suffered 
from a lack of coordination, and that the various bodies should be combined, either in the 
Prime Minister’s Office or under a special ministry of hasbara. The report recommended: 
 
To establish a central focus for coordination of hasbara within the IDF 
To establish a central hasbara body at the national level 
To prevent the phenomenon of un-coordinated announcements by the authorised 
bodies 
To efficiently and quickly create coordination between the IDF Spokesman’s Unit, 
the Government Press Office and the Israel Broadcasting Authority.116 
 
When he wrote the report, Gazit had effectively replaced Zeira as Director of 
Military Intelligence. With his focus on rebuilding the shattered intelligence branch, he had 
little time for information affairs.117 Fifteen years later, in a subsequent report, he noted that 
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the 1974 report ‘was not dealt with properly, and we recommend that it be presented again 
for discussion’. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
On the day before the outbreak of war in October 1973, Alouph Hareven of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs drafted a detailed memorandum for Professor Yigael Yadin on international 
perceptions of Israel. In it, he described the changes in international perceptions of Israel 
since 1967, from ‘underdog’ to regional power, from pioneering to economic success and 
from ‘a state that gives and takes, to a state that primarily takes’.118 Because of the war, 
Hareven did not send his memorandum until two months later. In his cover letter, he noted 
a rise in international support for Israel following the war, explained by Israel’s return to 
‘underdog’ status, although not to the levels immediately following 1967. With regard to 
Israel’s military image, Hareven suggested that the IDF had been perceived as a ‘people’s 
army’ during the war, in place of more negative, militaristic, images that had been prevalent 
before the war. In short, he concluded, ‘the war improved our hasbara position in the 
countries of the free world and created a contradiction – in Europe – between public 
opinion which is supportive of Israel and the views of governments, which are more 
hesitant’.119 What he failed to note was that war exposed the Foreign Ministry, which had 
                                            
 
118 ‘Israel in the Eyes of the World (written in the day before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur 
War)’, n.d. Private Papers of Alouph Hareven. 
119 Alouph Hareven to Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7.12.1973. Private Papers of 
Alouph Hareven. 
Chapter 5 
216 
 
argued so forcefully for control of this sphere, as a bystander. Israel’s international image 
was determined by external events, rather than cogent policy planning.  
Having successfully prevented the establishment of a separate Ministry of 
Information, it fell to the foreign ministry under Abba Eban to assess the root causes of 
Israel’s international standing, and to formulate appropriate policy. Given the restricted 
policy-making power of the ministry, and the outbreak of war in October 1973, it should be 
no surprise that they met more success in the first task than the second.  
The ministry did have some success in creating a more coherent structure for 
communicating Israel’s positions to international audiences, in secondary settings. Ahead of 
the Geneva talks that followed the war, Hareven produced a detailed plan for the 
organisation and content of Israel’s spokespeople.120 He also provided a detailed briefing 
booklet for the team of spokespeople who attended the peace conference, held on 19 and 
20 December 1973, tasked with engaging diplomats and journalists.121 The operation was 
considered ‘a great success’, at least by one of its participants.122 The indefatigable Hareven 
also defended the ministry’s work to domestic audiences, and urged them to join in Israel’s 
information efforts overseas: ‘Every Israeli, at home or overseas, can take part in the 
hasbara fight’.123 
Yet, the failures of the Israeli government communications mechanism during the 
Yom Kippur War were clear, and the two inquiries that followed provided sufficient 
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ammunition for Prime Minister Meir to revisit her earlier decision not to create a separate 
Ministry of Information.  She did so, somewhat surprisingly, as Israel agonised over its 
responses to the wider failures of the Yom Kippur War, and as her own political career 
drew to an end. 
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Chapter 6 
The Rise and Fall of the Ministry of Information, 1974-1975 
 
‘What is the information minister supposed to do?’1 
 
 
On 1 December 1973, David-Ben Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, died. This was 
more than the passing of a leader; it was the end of a political era. As Israel struggled 
to comprehend the enormity of the 1973 war, Golda Meir found herself the last of 
the ‘founders’ generation’. Although she narrowly won the elections held after the 
war, she would soon hand over power to a new generation who came of age with 
Israel’s independence in 1948. With that handover of power came a greater 
understanding of the importance of political communications, if not the ability to 
create meaningful policy.  
General elections were held on 31 December 1973. Whilst there was no 
great enthusiasm for Labour, whose party list was substantively the same as that for 
the 1969 elections, Israelis did want to see the prisoners of war returned home and 
progress in the internationally-sponsored talks with Syria and Egypt. The Likud’s 
opposition to the post-war Geneva peace conference, brokered by Henry Kissinger, 
was thus a lifeline for Labour.2 Although the Geneva talks had failed to produce any 
progress towards peace agreements by election day, the Labour party successfully 
campaigned that the team that had begun the talks would have to continue them.  
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The new government, led briefly by Meir and then – after her resignation 
following the Agranat Commission’s interim report into the 1973 war – by Yitzhak 
Rabin, included a Minister of Information for the first time. After nearly a decade of 
reports and recommendations to bring Israeli government communications under 
ministerial authority, it was now that the decision was finally taken. Yet, the ministry 
was a short-lived failure of ‘muddling through’. This chapter will argue that the 
decision to establish the ministry was a knee-jerk reaction to Israel’s wider post-war 
problems, with no attempt to address the underlying dilemmas that the same reports 
had identified. The gridlock of ‘activists’ and ‘diplomats’ then again limited policy 
options, producing a dilemma for Rabin, which was resolved largely by reference to 
personal, rather than policy, considerations. With no great surprise, and even less 
regret, two ministers and ten months later the Ministry of Information was 
dismantled. It disappeared without a trace. With regard to government information 
policy, Israel of 1975 was very much like Israel of 1966.   
 
Establishing the Ministry, March-June 1974 
An unlikely birth 
The establishment of a new ministry in early 1974 was, on the face of it, unlikely. 
Indeed, the timing was highly unpromising for creating a new ministry, with the 
consequent demands on legislative, budgetary and political agendas. Previous 
proposals to establish a Ministry of Information had fallen in the past because of the 
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strenuous objections of the foreign ministry.3 Abba Eban’s position was no different 
now. And yet, the ministry was created.  
In the months immediately following the Yom Kippur War, Meir had very 
little time or enthusiasm for internal party politics. She was preoccupied with the 
substantial challenges of negotiating ceasefires with Syria and Egypt, negotiating a 
$2.2bn package of emergency aid from the US government to prop up Israel’s 
precarious financial situation, and – closer to home - with growing public protests at 
her government’s conduct of the war. 
She had returned to public life unwillingly in 1969 on the death of Levi Eshkol, 
and although her appetite for political leadership had returned during her 
premiership, the failure to predict the Yom Kippur war was a massive blow to her 
confidence. Although Israel had reversed the early losses of the war, the substantial 
loss of life was a heavy burden. The catalyst for the post-war protests was Motti 
Ashkenazi, an IDF captain whose one-man protest tent outside the prime minister’s 
office sparked a wave of public demands for political change. Outside Meir’s office 
protesters blamed her daily for failing to predict the war and for the death of 2,500 
Israelis, and called for her and her government to resign.4  
 
The [protest] movement reminded the leadership that there was an urgent 
need to take drastic steps to change the government and the way it worked, 
but Golda was neither mentally nor physically capable of doing it. She was too 
busy with negotiations with the United States, and indirectly with Egypt, with 
the prisoners of war in Syria and soldiers who were missing in action, and 
with relations with America5 
                                            
 
3 See, above, the Peled Commission’s proposals (1969), the recommendations of Pattir 
(1973), of Colonel Nachman Karni (1974) and General Shlomo Gazit (1974).  
4 Motti Ashkenazi, "The Tasks of the Non-Conformist Movement," Haaretz June 7 1974.  
5 Meron Medzini, Golda Meir and the Vision of Israel: A Political Biography [Hebrew], 2nd 
ed. (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, Sifrei Hemed, 2008) 590-91. 
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She dealt with internal party issues only when absolutely necessary. Despite 
the lack of popular support for the party’s ‘old guard’ leadership – Meir, Dayan, 
Sapir, Eban, Galili and Allon – she had refused to allow internal elections to compose 
a new party list for the elections. Some new names did join the list, including former 
generals Yitzhak Rabin and Aharon Yariv, and she hoped this would satisfy the 
electorate and quieten concerns from within the party.6 After the elections, in which 
Labour held on to power with a reduced majority, she took part in the coalition 
negotiations, although teasing together a parliamentary majority was a higher priority 
than re-allocating responsibility for government communications policy.7  
Meir was emotionally and physically exhausted. Speaking to the Labour Party 
Central Committee in December 1973, she admitted ‘I will never be the same 
person I was before the Yom Kippur War’, and continued  
 
I have been roundly criticised for appearing on television – as much as I have 
been on television since the war – since it doesn’t help public morale that I 
look so sad. At my age, should I start using cosmetics? I would do it if I 
thought it would help. But I’m a realist about these things, and I can’t put on a 
mask. I am sad. Sad like everyone else, and something else: the fact that I am 
prime minister.8 
 
 
                                            
 
6 Rabin was appointed Minister of Labour and Yariv as Minister of Transportation. General 
Haim Bar-Lev, who was not an MK, was appointed Minister of Trade and Industry. 
7 The new Knesset had 51 members from the Alignment (Labour and Mapam), five fewer 
than previously. The newly-established Likud party, comprising Gahal, the Liberal Party and 
the Free Centre Party, took 39 seats. 
8 Meir to the Labour Party Central Committee, 5.12.1973. See also: Shlomo Nakdimon, Low 
Probability: A Narrative of the Dramatic Story Preceding the Yom Kippur War and of the 
Fateful Events Which Followed [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot - Revivim, 1982) 260-61. 
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The focus of the protests was Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, who faced 
both public and internal political opposition. Yaakov Shimshon Shapira, the justice 
minister, had called for his resignation as early as October 1973 and resigned from 
the government when Meir stood by Dayan.9 Even when Dayan offered to step 
down, Meir supported him. She was determined that ‘the street will not dictate 
political moves to me’, and clung to the political system, even though it was deeply 
discredited.10 Dayan also had the support of his junior colleague from Rafi, Minister 
of Communications Shimon Peres.11  
However, it appeared to be a losing battle. When even senior IDF officers 
began to criticise him, Dayan decided that he could no longer remain in office.12 Meir 
was distraught, and during the cabinet meeting of 24 February, she sent Peres a note 
pleading with him to stay. ‘Shimon, to my great regret Moshe already considers 
himself out of office. I am in such despair there are no words for it’.13 Dayan made 
his decision public at a rally of Rafi supporters in Jerusalem two days later. 
‘Somewhere along the way we reached the point where a responsible man cannot go 
on being Minister of Defence,’ he told his supporters.14 
                                            
 
9 Ben-Porat, Dialogues [Hebrew]  179-82. 
10 Medzini, Golda Meir and the Vision of Israel: A Political Biography [Hebrew]  590. 
11 Matti Golan, Shimon Peres: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982) 141. 
12 The turning point may have been an angry remark by Colonel Gideon Mahnaimi at a 
meeting between Meir, Dayan and the IDF senior command staff on February 12. ‘We were 
taught in the Palmach and in the IDF that someone is always responsible. The Minister of 
Defence is responsible for the IDF, so he is also responsible for what happened. He should 
understand this and go,’ he said. Although Dayan was not in the room at that moment, the 
remarks were reported to him. Nakdimon, Low Probability: A Narrative of the Dramatic 
Story Preceding the Yom Kippur War and of the Fateful Events Which Followed [Hebrew]  
274. 
13 Golan, Shimon Peres: A Biography  142. 
14 Golan, Shimon Peres: A Biography  141. 
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Reluctantly, Meir drew up a new government without Dayan and presented it 
to the Labour Party’s Knesset faction on 3 March.15 Three ministries were reserved 
for Rafi, should they choose to join the government, including a new Ministry of 
Information.16 This was the first time the new ministry appears in the records, but its 
proposed creation was far from the most important issue of that stormy faction 
meeting; it was overshadowed by Meir’s surprise resignation. Able only to establish a 
minority government of 58, she announced that she would go to the president that 
evening and ‘return the mandate’. She demanded that the party now find an 
alternative candidate for prime minister.17 She was serious about her intention to 
quit, but immense pressure from many of her cabinet colleagues convinced to 
remain, at least for the time being. Dayan’s resignation, too, was averted. He was 
aware that his bluff could well be called, and his place at the Ministry of Defence 
taken by Yitzhak Rabin, who was unsullied by the Yom Kippur War. Dayan found his 
way back on 5 March, the day he was supposed to leave the defence ministry. A 
meeting of the Labour Party Central Committee that day, where he was dismayed by 
the lack of support from the grass-roots of the party, may have been the final 
straw.18 Dayan’s own memoirs indicated he was motivated to reverse his decision 
when the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee received reports of a 
                                            
 
15 Medzini, Golda Meir and the Vision of Israel: A Political Biography [Hebrew]  603. 
16 David Landau, "Premier Meir Unable to Form Government; Due to Return Mandate to 
Katzir," JTA 4 March 1974. 
17 With 120 seats in the Knesset, a government needs at least 61 votes to ensure it can pass 
legislation. Meir’s proposed coalition comprised only the Alignment (Labour and Mapam, 51 
seats), and the Independent Liberals (4 seats). She could also count on the support of two 
Arab satellite parties (3 seats) which later merged into Labour. The National Religious Party 
(10 seats) was calling for a national unity government, which Meir strongly resisted, and so 
remained out of the coalition at this point.  
18 Interview with Meron Medzini, 30.12.2011. 
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Syrian troop build-up on the border.19 Yet according to Abba Eban, the information 
appeared to be no more serious than previous such reports, and that ‘no more than 
a dozen Israelis could be found who took the Syrian threat seriously’.20 When the 
new government was presented to the Knesset on 10 March, Dayan retained the 
defence portfolio, and Peres was confirmed as Minister of Information, whose 
ministry would ‘coordinate hasbara activity in Israel and abroad …in close contact 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs …[whilst] those working on hasbara in overseas 
delegations will continue to be under the authority of the Foreign Minister and his 
ministry’.21  
Three factors combined to outweigh those that might have prevented the 
establishment of the new ministry. Firstly, Meir sincerely believed that special efforts 
ought to be made at this point to improve Israel’s international standing. She had 
seen the faltering and ineffective performance during and after the war, and the 
limiting of Israel’s room for manoeuvre in the internationally-sponsored talks with 
Egypt and Syria. The Karni and Gazit reports had highlighted the consequences of a 
lack of centralised authority, particularly during conflict. She therefore decided to 
implement the Peled Commission recommendations that she had so enthusiastically 
endorsed in 1969, and appoint a full-time minister.  
                                            
 
19 Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Eidanim, 1976) 734-35. See also: 
David Landau, "Syrian Arms Build-up Reason for Dayan’s, Peres’ Decision to Serve in 
Cabinet," JTA 1974. 
20 The perceived emergency was also enough to persuade the National Religious Party to 
join the government coalition, giving it a parliamentary majority. Eban, Abba Eban: An 
Autobiography  564. 
21 ‘Presentation of the Government to the Cabinet – Remarks by the Prime Minister’, 
10.3.1974. ISA/RG 44/G/5269/3. 
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Secondly, political and personal considerations played a role. Peres was aware 
that Meir’s tenure as prime minister would be short-lived, and that her government 
would end with the report of the Agranat Commission. He wished to position 
himself for the inevitable shake-up in the party. Although he had developed his 
political standing during his short term at the Ministry of Posts, changing the name to 
the more modern-sounding Ministry of Communications, he now sought a better 
platform from which he could emerge from the shadows of Dayan and from the 
narrow confines of the Rafi faction.22 It may not have been an immediate prospect, 
but he was already thinking ahead to a run at the leadership of the party. For her 
part, Meir was desperate for Dayan, and by extension Peres, to join her government. 
Although she strongly disliked and mistrusted Peres, particularly his incessant self-
promotion, she was in no position to oppose him.23 She wanted to establish the 
ministry, and her dislike of Peres was not strong enough to block it.24  
Finally, whilst Meir’s opinion of Eban as a diplomat and orator was very high, 
it was almost non-existent as a policy maker. Throughout her premiership, she 
maintained direct contact with Yitzhak Rabin in Washington, whilst ‘Eban’s political 
role was of a most limited nature’.25 Eban was asked to remain in the US throughout 
most of the Yom Kippur War and the Foreign Ministry played no appreciable role 
during the war itself. The crucial relationship with US Secretary of State Henry 
                                            
 
22 Interview with Dan Pattir, 3.8.2010. 
23 Interview with Yossi Sarid, 29.7.2010. Peres had assiduously built relations with the 
domestic press since the late 1940s, on transactional rather than ideological grounds. By the 
mid-1970s he had a powerful set of allies including Shabtai Tevet (Haaretz), Yoel Marcus and 
Hagai Eshed (Davar) and Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, Dov Yudkovsky and Mira Auerbach (Yediot 
Ahronot) known as ‘Peres United’ for their support of him. See: Yair Sheleg, "United Peres 
[Hebrew]," The Seventh Eye 3.May (1996). 
24 Interview with Meron Medzini, 30.12.2011. 
25 Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs  190. 
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Kissinger during the war was maintained by Simcha Dinitz, Meir’s former chief of 
staff and Rabin’s successor as Ambassador to the US. She was not alone in taking a 
dim view of Eban’s failure to create an effective system to ensure international 
support for Israel, having strenuously opposed the establishment of a separate 
ministry in 1969.26 This deficiency was made plain during and after the Yom Kippur 
War, and Meir now saw no reason to oppose the creation of a separate Ministry of 
Information any further.27 
Formalising the creation of the Ministry of Information 
The new Minister of Information started work immediately, tackling the most 
obvious – and difficult to resolve – problems. There was little public questioning of 
his suitability for the job, even by the Likud opposition. ‘There is no doubt that Mr 
Peres is one of the most suitable people in the country for the hasbara job,’ Shmuel 
Tamir (Likud) told the Knesset.28 Presenting the new ministry to parliament, Peres 
admitted he was somewhat overwhelmed by the ‘the public expectations of the 
Ministry of Information. I saw that one public opinion poll showed that 85 percent of 
the population support such a ministry and have high hopes of it’.29 Peres 
acknowledged the challenge of operating both domestically and internationally, and 
the concerns regarding duplication of work between the Foreign Ministry and his 
ministry, but made it plain he intended on doing both: 
 
                                            
 
26 ‘Until this very day, there has been no overseas Hasbara. This is one of the clearest, far-
reaching failures of the government of Israel.’ Moshe Nissim (Likud) to the Knesset, 
10.3.1974. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 69, cols. 974-1054. 
27 Interview with Eytan Bentsur, 19.7.2010. 
28 Shmuel Tamir (Likud) to the Knesset, 10.3.1974. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 69, cols. 974-1054. 
29 Shimon Peres to the Knesset, 10.3.1974. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 69, cols. 974-1054.  
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The Ministry of Information has a dual role, as other speakers have already 
said: one inwards and one outwards. …If the domestic task of the Ministry of 
Information is to help journalists do their job – the free press in Israel – its 
job overseas is to help Israel’s voice be heard. …It is not the intention of the 
Ministry of Information to break the ‘chain of command’ or disrupt the 
foreign ministry’s administration …but in the field of overseas hasbara, 
relations with the foreign press, hasbara intended to explain Israel’s position 
overseas, this will be done by a single authority, and that is the ministry. …I 
believe the role of the Ministry of Information is not administrative 
coordination, but ‘to administer’ [said, apparently in English], in other words 
to oversee as far as possible the presentation of Israel overseas.30 
 
 
His reassurances were not universally accepted. Zalman Shoval (Likud) told 
the Knesset ‘I find it hard to free myself of the feeling that the compromise reached 
between the Foreign Ministry and the Information Ministry will not benefit the issue, 
and the division of responsibility has as much to do with ego and power as with 
professional considerations’.31 From the Labour benches, Yossi Sarid – a former 
prime minister’s spokesman, fully aware of the challenges of the issue - warned 
‘hasbara does not replace policy, and cannot take its place. Only when they are 
combined is there a chance of success. More than that: hasbara cannot cover up for 
an absence of clear policy, and can’t bridge the gaps and contradictions in statements 
and declarations’.32 
Within a week of taking office, Peres received a memorandum from Alouph 
Hareven of the Foreign Ministry entitled ‘Basic Problems of Hasbara’.33 Scarcely 
hiding his enthusiasm for a new ministry, even though he worked for its rival, 
Hareven noted that ‘for each of the problems [outlined in the memorandum] the 
                                            
 
30 Shimon Peres to the Knesset, 10.3.1974. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 69, cols. 974-1054. 
31 Zalman Shoval to the Knesset, 10.3.1974. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 69, cols. 974-1054. 
32 Yosef Sarid to the Knesset, 10.3.1974. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 69, cols. 974-1054. 
33 ‘Basic Problems of Hasbara’, 17.3.1974. Personal papers of Alouph Hareven. 
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establishment of the Ministry of Information is a blessing’.34 This document was to be 
the blueprint for the new ministry’s work. His analysis was clear and precise, and 
included the following observations: 
The key domestic problem – credibility of leadership 
...The successes, and the failures, of hasbara are primarily a result of what 
[the prime minister, the defence minister and the foreign minister] said and 
say, and their credibility. 
 
Hasbara in parallel with policy-making 
There is currently no standard process by which national policy-making is 
accompanied by considerations of the hasbara connected to that decision. 
Frequently, hasbara is decided upon only after a policy is decided – because 
those with responsibility for hasbara knew nothing of the decisions.  
There must be a system by which the minister of information considers the 
implications, in the field of hasbara, of any government decision.35 
 
According to Hareven, there was difficulty in recruiting appropriate people 
for this kind of work. ‘It’s a ‘mongrel job’’, he explained, ‘since it isn’t a profession in 
its own right, rather a tool that must reflect other professions such as diplomacy, 
history and economics. The basic problem of hasbara is that the professionals - 
diplomats, historians and economists – tend not to devote most of their time to it, 
whilst the ‘professional explainers’ don’t have a profession of their own’.36 Dismissive 
of ‘PR firms and communications experts’, Hareven proposed that three or four 
‘excellent’ experts in their fields – Israel, past, present and future; Israel-Arab and 
Israel-great power relations; Jewish identity; and culture and economy – were 
sufficient to generate the necessary content with which to engage Israel’s 
international audiences.37  
                                            
 
34 Hareven was also frustrated by the lack of progress he had made on these issues whilst 
working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview with Alouph Hareven, 8.7.2005 
35 ‘Basic Problems of Hasbara’, 17.3.1974. Personal papers of Alouph Hareven. 
36 Interview with Alouph Hareven, 8.7.2005. 
37 ‘Basic Problems of Hasbara’, 17.3.1974. Personal papers of Alouph Hareven. 
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On the same day, Hareven also sent the new minister a proposed 
organisational structure for the ministry.38 Consistent with his earlier thinking on the 
problems of co-ordination and influenced by his work at the foreign ministry, 
Hareven proposed that the senior management team of the ministry include not only 
the minister and director-general, but also permanent representatives from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IDF. Seven functional departments – feedback, 
content, audiences, dissemination, press liaison, training and administration – were to 
carry out the work of the ministry. He also outlined a format for a ‘war room’, to be 
activated during crises and to comprise the minister, his director-general, the IDF 
Spokesman, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representatives of 
other bodies.    
The formal decision to establish a Ministry of Information was taken by the 
cabinet three weeks later, on 31 March 1974, as Cabinet Decision 402 under Article 
33(a) of Basic Law: The Government (1968).39 The following day, the Cabinet 
Secretary wrote to the new minister, detailing the areas for which his ministry was 
now responsible: 
Decided: 
 
In accordance with Section 33(a) of Basic Law: The Government, to establish 
a Ministry of Information, headed by a Minister of Information.  
 
In accordance with Section 33(a) of Basic Law: The Government, to take the 
following areas of responsibility and their budgets from the Prime Minister’s 
Office, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture: 
From the Prime Minister’s Office: the Government Press Office;  
                                            
 
38 ‘Ministry of Information – Organisational Outline’, 17.3.1974. Personal papers of Alouph 
Hareven.  
39 ‘33. (a) The Government may merge, divide and abolish Ministries and set up new 
Ministries. A decision under this provision shall require the approval of the Knesset.’  
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From the Ministry of Finance: the Government Publications department;  
From the Ministry of Defence: the publishing house; 
From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the publications department, the 
department dealing with visiting journalists and permanent foreign 
correspondents, the foreign guests’ department (apart from state guests and 
political figures invited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the film and 
television department, the professional training department and the 
exhibitions department; 
From the Ministry of Education and Culture: the Government Hasbara 
Centre, the Israeli Film Service.40 
 
The same day, Justice Minister Chaim Zadok informed the Knesset of the 
decision, telling the House that the Government has decided ‘to create a Ministry of 
Information, to coordinate all hasbara activity in Israel and overseas.  Clearly, those 
working overseas on hasbara issues will continue to be subordinate to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and his ministry’.41 
However, on the same day that the Knesset was informed of the cabinet’s 
decision to establish the ministry, the Agranat Commission published its interim 
report into the decisions leading up to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War and 
during the first three days of fighting. The report found that ‘the activities of the 
prime minister in the decisive days which preceded the war indicate an approach 
appropriate to the heavy responsibility which the prime minister shouldered’. On 
Dayan’s performance, the commission absolved him of any responsibility, since ‘the 
defence minister …was not responsible for the operation of the deployment of 
forces and that this was under the jurisdiction of the chief of staff’. 42 The report did 
                                            
 
40 Michael Arnon, Cabinet Secretary, to Minister of Information, 1.4.1974. ISA/RG 
44/G/5269/3 
41 Chaim Zadok to the Knesset, 1.4.1974. Divrei HaKnesset, vol. 69, col. 974.  
42 Agranat Commission: Initial Report, 1 April 1974. Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, 
Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations 
1948-Present, 2nd Edition ed. (Lebanon, NH: Brandeis University Press, 2008) 278-83. 
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not even mention Dayan by name. Bewildered, Israelis demanded that Dayan go, and 
that Meir go with him. For ten days, the Labour Party was in disarray, but on 10 
April 1974, Meir resigned and her government fell. This time, her decision was 
irrevocable. ‘I want to get up in the mornings without consulting my diary,’ she told 
interviewers in a farewell television interview. ‘I will not be homesick for my seat in 
the Cabinet or the Knesset’.43 
Meir’s resignation triggered leadership elections in the Labour Party. Two 
candidates, Minister of Labour Yitzhak Rabin, and Minister of Information Shimon 
Peres emerged from a larger field.44 They were a generation younger than the party’s 
old guard, and neither of them from the dominant Mapai faction. Rabin, with roots in 
Ahdut Ha’Avoda, won the contest and, somewhat unwillingly, nominated Peres, ‘an 
incorrigible saboteur’ as defence minister.45 Peres’ stock had risen rapidly since the 
start of the year, and the result was closer than had been expected. His request to 
be appointed Minister of Information had given him extra visibility and public profile, 
as he had hoped. His plan paid dividends; the Ministry of Information had been the 
ideal launchpad to high political office and a position of power within the Labour 
Party.  
                                            
 
43 "Sons of the Founders," Time May 6 1974. 
44 Rabin’s candidacy was put under pressure on April 22nd by the sensational leak of a 
memorandum written by Ezer Weizman immediately before the outbreak of war in June 
1967. Weizman recorded his misgivings about Rabin’s competency, and described a near 
breakdown by the Chief of Staff on 23 May, which had remained a secret until this point. 
Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy  123.  Terence Smith, "Rabin's New 
Government: Control Passes Irrevocably from Generation of Founcers to the Native-Born," 
New York Times 5 June 1974. 
45 ‘I did not consider Shimon Peres suitable, since he had never fought in the IDF and his 
expertise in arms purchasing did not make up for that lack of field experience. …I accepted 
Peres as defence minister – albeit with a heavy heart. It was an error I would regret and 
whose price I would pay in full.’ Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs  189. 
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Whilst Rabin negotiated the new coalition agreement, the Meir government 
remained in power. Rabin and Peres, prime minister-designate and defence minister- 
designate, joined the Israeli delegation to the negotiations with Syria. Its last act was 
the separation of forces agreement, signed with Syria at the Palais des Nations in 
Geneva on 31 May. Yet alongside his considerable other obligations, both around the 
leadership contest and now as a participant at the Geneva talks, Peres continued to 
lay the groundwork for his new ministry. Despite Abba Eban’s considerable 
misgivings about the creation of a new ministry, he and Peres met several times in 
March and April to delineate the responsibilities of their ministries. Their discussions 
were unsurprisingly tense, with Peres demanding to take all information work, 
domestic and foreign, out of the hands of the foreign ministry.46 Eban refused, 
arguing that it was inefficient to replicate an already existing system, but they did 
make some progress, producing a draft ‘Peres-Eban paper’.47 The gaps between their 
positions remained significant, and they handed the paper over to a small group of 
officials from both ministries to attempt to find agreement.48 These talks were 
intended to create, for the first time, a clear division of labour for Israeli government 
communications efforts. They failed to do so. The draft Peres-Eban paper 
determined in the broadest terms that the foreign ministry would be responsible for 
all overseas information efforts, apart from press relations, contact with foreign 
press representatives in Israel and the preparation of information material to be 
distributed overseas. The Ministry of Information would be responsible for these 
                                            
 
46 Interview with Eytan Bentsur, 19.7.2010.  
47 Yegar, History of the Israeli Foreign Information System [Hebrew]  99. 
48 ‘Interim Conclusions of the Meetings on Relations Between the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and Information’, n.d.; ‘Interim Conclusions (2) on Relations Between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Information’, 19.7.1974, ISA/RG 44/G/5269/3 
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areas, as well as all domestic information work.49 However, the professional 
discussions were unable to find a workable division of labour based on these 
principles, and the matter was brought back to the cabinet for discussion in 
September 1974.  
Peres set to work as minister. He appointed David Farhi, a talented former 
IDF intelligence officer with a background in Arabic, as his director-general.50 In 
March, only two days after he was appointed as minister, he presented the budget of 
the Israel Broadcasting Authority, for which he was also responsible, to the cabinet, 
and answered questions about television broadcasts on the Sabbath, which had been 
introduced during the war to the displeasure of the religious parties.51 In early May, 
he brought the question of funding for his ministry to the cabinet. In 1972 actual 
expenditure on the various bodies dealing with information efforts had been I£6.5m, 
and the budget for 1973 was set at I£9m. The budget he now sought for the new 
ministry was significantly higher, at I£24m. Of this, existing budget headings for the 
Government Press Office and the Hasbara Centre were I£10.8m, and nearly the 
same amount was transferred from the foreign ministry budget allocations for 
information work. In effect, he requested I£2.7m of new funding. This was largely 
                                            
 
49 Yegar, History of the Israeli Foreign Information System [Hebrew]  99. 
50 Interview with Dan Pattir, 3.8.2010. See also: Rafi Israeli, Flowers for David: In Memory of 
David Farhi [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Raphael Chaim HaCohen, 1981) 138. 
51 Landau, "Premier Meir Unable to Form Government; Due to Return Mandate to 
Katzir."Peres had been given authority for the Israel Broadcasting Authority with Cabinet 
Decision 387 of 24.3.1974. See: Michael Arnon, Cabinet Secretary to Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Education and Culture, and Minister of Information, 25 March 1974. ISA/RG 
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earmarked to establish a ‘content and feedback’ division under Alouph Hareven, 
whose 15 staff members were to form the backbone of the new ministry’s HQ.52  
By the time he left the Ministry of Information, after only two months, Peres 
had laid its early foundations, making progress on both budgets and mandate. Peres 
may have sought the position because of the opportunity it presented him 
personally, but he was dedicated to ensuring its success. Under his successor, the 
flaws that were responsible for the birth of the Ministry of Information would 
become clearer. They would also result in its quick dismantling.  
 
The Ministry of Information at work, June 1974-January 1975 
On 3 June, the Knesset gave its vote of confidence to Rabin’s new government. 
Amongst its new line up was Aharon Yariv as Minister of Information.53 Yariv was a 
natural choice, ‘a scholar and a gentleman, approachable, friendly and 
straightforward’.54 In the 1950s he had served as a military attaché at the Israeli 
embassy in Washington D.C., and remained in touch with American officials and 
journalists he had met then. He was literate, well-travelled, and an excellent speaker. 
55 A long posting as IDF Director of Military Intelligence between 1965 and 1972 
included the triumph of 1967 but avoided the stain of 1973. Since retiring from the 
IDF, he had advised the government on counter-terrorism and earned at least one 
                                            
 
52 ‘Budget Proposal  for Budget Year 1974 With Explanatory Notes Presented to the Eighth 
Knesset, May 1974’. ISA/RG 44/G/5269/3. The new unit went through a series of proposed 
names, eventually settling as the Analysis and Research Branch, whose Hebrew acronym 
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53 L Daniel, "Israeli Cabinet Named," Financial Times 29 May 1974. 
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foreign observer’s approval as ‘Golda Meir’s Kissinger’.56 His relationship with 
Yitzhak Rabin stretched back to the Palmach of the 1940s, and included serving on 
Rabin’s IDF General Staff. The two remained on good terms and he was a welcome 
new face to an otherwise largely unchanged cabinet. Although not an information 
professional, and with only a cursory understanding of press affairs, Yariv had 
valuable recent experience in the field of government communications, having been 
brought in to improve Israel’s damaged credibility in the early days of the Yom 
Kippur War. 
He was not the only possible appointee for the job. There was some talk that 
Chaim Herzog, whose radio talks had distinguished him as the ‘national soother’ of 
1967 and 1973, would take the position.57 Instead, he was sent to New York to 
represent Israel at the United Nations. Yosef Tekoa, Israel’s ambassador to the 
United Nations, was summoned to Jerusalem for consultations, and there was brief 
speculation that he, too, might be offered the job.58 More significant was Rabin’s offer 
that Abba Eban replace Peres.59 Peres had pulled off a minor coup by enlisting Eban’s 
support during the Labour party leadership campaign. Eban had seen himself as a 
possible leader, but was offended by Mapai strongman Pinchas Sapir’s blunt dismissal 
of his candidacy. Peres, seeking the support of the Mapai faction of the party, knew 
Eban’s pride was dented, and offered him a leading role in his campaign team. It was 
clear that Eban could expect little if Rabin became prime minister, and he accepted 
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Peres’ offer in the hope that together they could prevent Rabin’s election.60 Eban and 
Rabin had clashed continuously when Rabin was Ambassador in Washington, with 
Rabin later dismissing Eban as someone who had ‘essentially explained policies 
formulated by others, rather than generate his own political thinking’.61 When Rabin 
won the leadership vote, Eban was still hopeful that Peres would lobby for him to 
keep his position of foreign minister. However, that position went to Allon, Rabin’s 
former commander from Palmach days. Like Rabin, Allon was dismissive of his 
predecessor’s scholarly demeanour, and envious of Eban’s easy relations with the 
international press.62   
The position offered to Eban – a sign of its relative significance to Rabin – was 
Minister of Information, for which Rabin archly regarded him ‘well-matched to the 
task I had in mind for him’.63 Eban was enraged, refused the appointment, and 
effectively ended his front-line political career. Eban, the most consistent opponent 
of a separate Ministry of Information, later wrote:  
 
I had always maintained, as was later to become evident to Shimon Peres and 
Aharon Yariv, that a separate Ministry of Information was not viable within a 
Cabinet system under which all department heads were responsible for 
informing the public about their own responsibilities and problems. A 
separate Information Ministry was bound to fail, as it subsequently did after 
Yariv’s brief tenure.64  
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‘What is the Information Minister supposed to do?’ 
Rabin retained the Ministry of Information in his new government largely by default, 
although there were also several identifiable reasons for him doing so. Firstly, his 
ambassadorial posting to Washington had exposed him to the American media and 
to the power of modern political communications. His long military career, as well as 
his somewhat shy personality, had made him diffident in his relations with journalists.  
However, he returned to Israel more confident in this regard.  ‘If I’m ever in any 
position of power,’ he told his embassy spokesman, ‘I will do as the Americans do’.65 
This outlook, apparently, included retaining the Ministry of Information.  
Rabin also wanted a clean break from Golda’s ‘kitchen’ cabinet style of 
government, where a nominated group of senior ministers and unelected advisers 
determined policy away from the public eye.66 The change in style was both 
generational and political; Rabin was the first of the native-born leaders, unlike the 
older Meir and her contemporaries, and was from the smaller Ahdut Ha’Avoda 
political faction within the Labour Party. He had inherited neither the informal and 
collaborative political culture of the pre-state leadership, nor the support of the 
Mapai mainstream of the party.67 His government would communicate its business 
clearly; his ministers would have a clear and visible mandate.68  
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Perhaps most important, though, was the fact that Rabin was new to politics. 
He had only returned to Israel a year earlier, and had been catapulted into 
ministerial office, and then to party leadership and the premiership. Finding his feet, 
and with significantly more pressing matters to address, the continued existence of 
the Ministry of Information resulted primarily from a lack of decision to the contrary.   
Yariv was a natural choice for the role, but he unfortunately did not want the job. 
He had agreed to join the Labour list for the Knesset in 1973 in order to add some 
new faces to a largely unchanged party, but hoped to continue behind the scenes, 
advising on counter-terrorism affairs.69 He did not hide his discomfort at agreeing to 
serve as Minister of Information. Within weeks of taking office, the gossip columnists 
were describing him as part of a ‘frustrated minority’ in the government, whilst 
leader writers noted that he was ‘having very serious second thoughts about the 
point of having an Information Ministry at all’.70 To his credit, his doubts and 
frustrations did not interfere with the work of establishing the ministry.  
He successfully averted the first challenge, a pay dispute at the Israel Broadcasting 
Authority that threatened to halt television and radio broadcasts.71 He faced two 
much more serious problems, though, on the question of his ministry’s budget and 
on the implementation of the Peres-Eban agreement with the foreign ministry, now 
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headed by Yigal Allon.72 Underlying these was the unanswered question of the 
mandate Ministry of Information was to have, and the role of the Minister of 
Information himself. ‘What is the information minister supposed to do?’, he quizzed a 
senior foreign ministry official.73 
In early August, the new cabinet approved proposals to reduce government 
spending by IL940m, a 15 percent cut across all government departments.74 With 
Israel’s foreign currency reserves badly depleted after the war, cuts were necessary 
to fund additional defence expenditure, including construction of fortifications on the 
new front lines, shelters and bunkers in border settlements and security fences in 
the north. The finance minister, Yehoshua Rabinowitz, also called on Israeli citizens 
to moderate their consumption in order to prevent a further round of cuts.75 The 
Ministry of Information alone survived, Yariv having asked for a separate discussion 
of the proposed I£3m reduction of his ministry’s budget.76 In the meanwhile, the 
public debate continued over the fate of the ministry: 
‘The noose is tightening around Aharon Yariv’s neck. Ever since he took the 
appointment that he asked not to receive, he has been fighting with 
shortages: no office accommodation, no budget, no staff, and worst of all – 
no authority’.77 
 
At the end of the month, he argued his case, re-reading the text of 
government decisions to remind his cabinet colleagues that they had agreed to 
create a ministry that would ‘coordinate domestic and foreign hasbara activities’, that 
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would ‘coordinate all hasbara activities’ and that would be given ‘all the necessary 
tools’ to carry out this task.78 If that were the case, he argued, he needed a clear 
allocation of responsibility for overseas information work, appropriate budgets and 
agreed work structures to ensure proper coordination. Losing I£3m from his budget 
would leave the ministry able only to fund its existing units. Rather, he claimed, the 
new ministry would need a budget increase of I£10-11m, if it were to do what the 
government and Knesset had said it should.79 The cabinet agreed that there would 
indeed be an increase to the ministry’s budget, the size to be determined by the 
prime minister. Yariv continued to battle for his ministry, appealing to the Ministerial 
Manpower Committee to define the ministry as an ‘essential service’, exempting it 
from a whole-government freeze on recruitment.80  
On relations with the foreign ministry, Yariv initially stood firm: ‘I am not 
ignoring the problematic nature of this issue, given that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is principally responsible for government activities overseas,’ he told the 
cabinet in August. ‘But I have no doubt that the cabinet and the Prime Minister were 
aware of this difficulty when they took the decision, despite everything, to create the 
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Ministry of Information’.81 He also charged that to strip his ministry of meaningful 
foreign information work was to subvert the wishes of Knesset members who had 
voted for the creation of the ministry in the clear understanding that it would deal 
with foreign, and not just domestic, information. ‘Whether explicitly or implicitly, 
they opposed a ministry that would deal only with domestic audiences, for fear that 
it would become a “ministry of propaganda”,’ he argued.82  
Foreign Minister Yigal Allon was determined not to allow his ministry’s 
position to be eroded by the new creation, but he had no particular enthusiasm for 
engaging foreign opinion-formers.83 This was a missed opportunity for Israel’s 
information efforts. Following the Six Day War, Allon had formulated a pragmatic 
approach to the question of the Palestinian territories, rejecting both the Greater 
Land of Israel camp’s messianically-infused territorial maximalism and the advocates 
of full withdrawal on the left. His concept of defensible borders, neither a return to 
the borders of 5 June 1967 nor full annexation, was the only one to be named for its 
inventor as the Allon Plan, indicating both his and its credibility.84 Although never 
formally adopted by the Israeli government, it formed the basis of Israel’s diplomacy 
with King Hussein and with the wider international community.85 Thus Allon’s 
natural reticence to engage foreign opinion-formers, borne of a the disappointments 
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of a career which peaked in 1948 at the age of only 31, denied Israel of an important 
voice at a critical period.86 
According to the Peres-Eban document, the Ministry of Information was to 
give ‘professional direction’ to Israeli diplomats on issues of information work. In the 
ongoing discussions of the document, information ministry officials took an 
ambitiously wide view, proposing that ‘professional direction’ should mean 
‘overseeing, advising and directing the content and working methods of all issues that 
the Ministry of Information deals with’. Here, again, the hand of Hareven can be 
seen. A year earlier, whilst heading the Foreign Ministry’s information department, 
Hareven had drafted a paper on ‘Israel’s Foreign Delegations’, in which he argued for 
a radical change in approach: 
 
The traditional concepts with regard to diplomatic work are those of 
representation and liaison. However, the particular problems that the State 
of Israel faces require a significant change in this thinking. States generally act 
according interests. Israeli diplomats who restrict their work only to 
representation and liaison will find it difficult to achieve their objectives, since 
the interests of the states in which they are serving will determine how that 
state acts. ...in order to influence decisions, their work must change from 
formal contacts with foreign ministries to informal contact with target 
audiences.87 
 
Allon rejected Hareven’s proposal, instructing his officials maintain their 
traditional work patterns. He also worked to limit the influence of the Ministry of 
Information, which would undoubtedly have sought to engage wider audiences in the 
kind of ‘informal’ contact envisaged by Hareven. The foreign ministry’s position was 
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that the information ministry should have a far more limited role of ‘technical 
training, guidance and advice in working methods such as the organisation of a card 
index, and improving distribution of material to different target audiences’.88 This was 
hardly surprising, given the deep-rooted hostility towards the idea of a separate 
ministry, described by one diplomat as ‘an exercise in futility, a sign of weakness, an 
abdication of responsibility’.89  
The decision on defining the scope of each ministry’s work was taken at the 
meeting of the cabinet on 1 September, with Rabin deciding to maintain the status 
quo. The situation was formalised in a meeting between Rabin and Yariv two days 
later, with Yariv agreeing to the following division of labour: ‘Ministry of Information 
to coordinate domestic hasbara; Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be responsible for all 
hasbara overseas. Ministry of Information to assist by providing hasbara materials.’90 
This was a major blow for Yariv, and for the successful establishment of a 
separate ministry of information. Both he and Peres had rightly insisted that the 
ministry’s mandate, as agreed by both cabinet and Knesset, included both foreign and 
domestic information affairs. His failure to wrest any meaningful responsibility for 
overseas information efforts from the foreign ministry resulted in its demise only a 
few months later. 
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‘We should not have unrealistic expectations’ 
Yariv’s negotiations had resulted in a highly circumscribed mandate for his ministry, 
but he had succeeded in preserving, and even extending its budget despite Israel’s 
dire post-war economic situation. With this, he got to work, instructing his 
Director-General, David Farhi, to set about establishing the bones of the ministry. 
Farhi established a bewildering array of discussion fora – the Government Hasbara 
Forum, the Ministerial Management Forum, the Heads of Branches Forum, the Film 
Committee, the Foreign and Domestic Journalists’ Monitoring Committee, the 
Publications Committee and the Project Authorisation Committee.91 Some met as 
scheduled, others met only once. There was some progress in coordination between 
the Ministry of Information and other ministries.92 He then submitted an outline of 
the proposed organisational structure to the minister in early September, based on 
four divisions. Three already existed – the Hasbara Centre and the Israeli Film 
Service, from the Ministry of Education and the Government Press Office from the 
Prime Minister’s Office. The new unit, an analysis and research branch, was 
established under Alouph Hareven. Strongly influenced by the IDF intelligence 
research and production division from which he, Farhi and Yariv had all come, the 
unit was to be a 24-hour newsroom that collated and analysed domestic and 
international media output, and disseminated its findings to government ministries 
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and other official bodies.93  Fudging the delineation of responsibilities with the 
Foreign Ministry, Hareven proposed to analyse both the domestic and the 
international press using both the wire services and military intelligence’s open-
source collections unit, Hatzav.  
Another innovation was the establishment of an Israeli news agency, the 
Israel News Service, whose target audience was the 120 permanent foreign 
correspondents and the 200 part-time local ‘stringers’ who were registered with the 
Government Press Office.94 The service would provide a daily bulletin of ‘quotable 
semi-official thinking’, competing with the Egyptian news agency MENA, and the 
Palestinian news agency WAFA.95 The material would be produced by an impressive 
team of Israeli journalists: Ari Rath and Erwin Frankel of the Jerusalem Post as news 
editors, Hagai Eshed of Davar as political commentator, Daniel Bloch of Davar 
covering domestic and economic affairs, Ehud Yaari of Davar and Galei Zahal radio as 
Middle East and Palestinian affairs and Zeev Schiff of Haaretz as military and security 
correspondent. A regular stream of credible analysis, independent of government 
thinking but with good access to government sources, would have been a valuable 
resource for foreign correspondents. However, no proper budget was drawn up and 
the project never got further than a discussion paper before the Information Ministry 
folded in early 1975.96 
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Alouph Hareven, the creative force behind the ministry, continued to 
confront the issues that others had avoided, quietly, sensibly and without any 
prospect of success. In December, he wrote a note to Yariv about the tendency of 
the Israeli media to write about hasbara in a negative light. He drew up a plan of 
action, scheduling a series of meetings with editors and leading journalists. ‘It is clear 
to me that we should not have unrealistic expectations in this field,’ he wrote, ‘but 
instead of arguing with a tough customer it would be better to try and develop a 
conversation with him.’97 He re-established the relationship with the Institute of 
Applied Social Research and the Hebrew University, commissioning research on the 
‘average Israeli’. His conclusion was that, since ‘I do not know who the “average 
Israeli” is’, it was important to find the ‘abnormal’ Israelis – those whose resilience 
would make them useful opinion-leaders, and those whose vulnerabilities needed 
special attention. He recommended that the Prime Minister or Minister of 
Information appear at least once a month on television and, ‘in simple language 
explain where we are and where we are going in the two areas that most worry the 
public: the conflict and the economic system.’98 He also received polling data from 
Gallup on European attitudes towards Israel and the Arabs.99  
Despite Hareven’s work, the ministry was wilting for lack of political 
patronage, and Rabin’s reticence was deliberate. In July 1974, in an interview on Galei 
Zahal radio, Yariv had made the startling declaration that Israel did not exclude the 
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possibility of negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organisation if it recognised 
Israel, accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for negotiations and 
renounced terrorism.100 He repeated his remarks on his first official visit as 
information minister to Washington.101 This was a marked departure from the policy 
of Meir’s government, which had denied that Palestinians had a distinct national 
identity, let alone described terms for negotiations. ‘The claim that such a people 
existed was, in her eyes, an underhand ruse whose aim was the elimination of the 
State of Israel by creating in its place the secular democratic state that the PLO was 
fighting for,’102 recalled one government minister. 
Yariv’s position had developed over time, and was particularly influenced by 
his term as counter-terrorism adviser to Meir. He found it increasingly unrealistic 
that Israel would be able to defeat Palestinian terrorism without entering political 
dialogue with the more moderate Palestinians. He found an ally in health minister 
Victor Shem-Tov, leader of the left-leaning Mapam faction of the Labour Party, 
although their thinking developed quite separately.103 The Shem-Tov-Yariv formula, 
as it became known, was powerful because its two sponsors brought different, 
complementary strengths to the idea: 
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‘Gen. (ret.) Aharon Yariv brought the formula the depth of strategic thinking, 
his credentials as a military man – a former Director of Military Intelligence, 
and the credibility of an academic researcher. I added the ideological, 
principal and historical perspective on the Arab-Jewish conflict from the 
school of Hashomer HaTzair and Mapam’.104   
 
Yariv’s statement on talks with the PLO was immediately dismissed by Rabin 
who told the Foreign Press Association ‘I see no reason why Israel should negotiate 
with any organization that is its worst enemy and has as its aim the destruction of 
the state of Israel’.105 This single act may have wrecked a promising political career, 
so strongly was he associated with it.106 A week later, the Palestinian issue was 
brought to the cabinet, which unanimously reaffirmed its policy of negotiating with 
Jordan in pursuit of a two-state solution – Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian 
confederation - and rejected negotiations with the PLO outright.107  
 
Dismantling the Ministry 
Yariv now spoke openly of his willingness to leave government, although he 
continued to defend the work of his ministry, calling for greater efforts in the United 
States to counter an erosion of support for Israel.108 His speech to the Knesset on 
22 January was both an encomium on the work the ministry had done in 1974, and a 
thinly-veiled complaint about the frustrating process of securing both a clear 
                                            
 
104 Shem-Tov, One of Them [Hebrew]  88. 
105 Terence Smith, "Rabin Bars Any Talks with Palestinians," New York Times 16 July 1974. 
106 Interview with Mike Herzog, 28.6.2006. 
107 Interview with Victor Shem-Tov, 5.7.2010. See also: Shem-Tov, One of Them [Hebrew]  
98-101. 
108 Yoel Dar, "Yariv Prepared to Leave Government and Return to Army [Hebrew]," Yediot 
Ahronot 20 December 1974, "Yariv: Information in US Must Be Improved," The Jerusalem 
Post 20 December 1974. 
Chapter 6 
249 
 
mandate and a budget for the ministry: ‘When I was appointed as Minister of 
Information I found it was necessary to clarify and confirm once again the sphere of 
authority of the Ministry of Information, the resources that would be made available 
to it and even the fact of its very existence’.109 It was also his final formal act as 
minister. 
 His disagreements with Rabin ran far deeper than the vicissitudes of 
establishing the ministry. Yariv’s short parliamentary career showed him to be 
intellectually honest, innovative and inclined towards reform on one hand, and, on 
the other, a rebel unwilling to accept the ‘eunuch’s role in Israeli policymaking’ that a 
cabinet seat gave him.110 In both regards, he was not content to ‘muddle through’, 
implementing incremental reforms from a limited set of options.111 
Within weeks of taking his Knesset seat, Yariv co-sponsored a bill for far-reaching 
reforms to the Israeli electoral system.112 Authored by Minister of Transport Gad 
Yaakoby, the proposals included diluting Israel’s pure system of proportional 
representation in order to concentrate votes in a smaller number of parties.113 
Yaakoby and Yariv also brought proposals to the Cabinet for ‘procedures for 
systematic follow-up of Cabinet decisions, detailed examinations of major foreign 
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[Hebrew] (Jerusalem: The Knesset, Centre for Research and Information, 2010), 12. 
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policy and defence issues and the submission of prepared position papers, including 
options and alternatives, prior to Cabinet meetings’, which were discussed and 
adopted, but not implemented.114  
Thus far for Yariv the reformer. Yariv the rebel infuriated Rabin by working 
privately and publicly to widen the coalition by bringing Gahal back into government, 
against the prime minister’s wishes.115 In early December, he signed a public petition 
calling for a national unity government, noting that the government had not formally 
ruled out such a move in his defence.116 Yariv objected to Rabin’s reticence in 
clarifying the relationships between the prime minister, defence minister and IDF 
chief of staff, a failure which had been strongly criticised by the Agranat Commission. 
Despite a commitment to create a ministerial defence committee that would 
oversee important decisions, Rabin dragged his feet, fearing that it would encumber 
policy-making, rather than make it more efficient. In the meanwhile, ‘Israel’s top-level 
security decision-making machinery remained as rickety as ever’.117 Yariv was also 
sceptical about Rabin’s pursuit of further interim agreements with Egypt and, as 
noted earlier, had articulated clear conditions for opening dialogue with the PLO, to 
Rabin’s fury.  
There was also a personal element to Yariv’s impatience. Despite his dislike 
of Meir’s ‘kitchen cabinet’ politics, Rabin had replicated the system in his own 
administration. His inner circle of advisers – of whom only Allon and Galili remained 
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from Meir’s administration – did not include Yariv. Frustration at being excluded 
from the highest levels of decision-making was an additional factor in his decision to 
quit. For his part, Rabin found fewer reasons to side with Yariv than with Allon, his 
Palmach comrade-commander. It was, according to one observer, no choice at all.118 
Yariv was bitterly disappointed, describing Rabin as ‘not a mentsch.119 He called a 
press conference on 30 January, and was excoriating in his criticism, describing 
Rabin’s leadership as ‘inappropriate and inadequate to meet the needs of the current 
situation’.120 The next day, he wrote formal letters of resignation from the 
government to the Prime Minister and to the Cabinet Secretary, invoking paragraph 
21(a) of Basic Law: The Government.121 He also wrote personal letters to his senior 
staff, including admitting to Alouph Hareven that he had ‘a feeling of guilt’ about the 
way Hareven’s work had been so little appreciated.122 His personal aide, Michael 
Hauchner, wrote to a colleague ‘indeed, Arahle’s leaving the government is a loss to 
the entire people of Israel’. As for the ministry, he wrote, only time will tell. ‘My 
feeling is that the whole thing will fall apart. I’d be happy to be proven wrong’.123 He 
was not.  
The dismantling of the ministry was swift: on February 2, Government 
Decision 431 dealt with Yariv’s resignation. Exactly a month later, Government 
Decision 511 dissolved the Ministry of Information, and shortly after that 
Government Decision 535 returned the various units that had comprised the 
                                            
 
118 Interview with Meron Medzini, 30.12.2011. 
119 Interview with Meron Medzini, 30.12.2011. 
120 Smith, "Yariv Resigns Israeli Information Post." 
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ministry, largely to their original homes.124 The debate following the final decision 
described ‘the parcelling out of the sad remains of the Ministry of Information, which 
breathed its last after a short existence that was short on results’. Yitzhak Shamir 
(Likud) continued: ‘No-one is under the illusion that this division of the spoils will 
give our hasbara strength and power’. According to Yehuda Ben-Meir (National 
Religious Party) ‘In a country where each minister sees himself as a spokesman on 
every issues, whether relevant to his ministry or not, no one minister could properly 
carry out the duties of Minister of Information, which include acting as spokesman 
for all ministers’. 
In its short life, the Ministry of Information did more to expose the obstacles 
to cogent policy-making than it did to resolve them. ‘The possibility of establishing an 
efficient and coordinated ministry as a central authority for hasbara in the country 
turned out to be unobtainable given the Israeli reality of internal rivalries, 
bureaucratic competition, personal and party political power struggles and inter-
ministerial competition.’125 
 
Conclusions 
The creation of the Ministry of Information in early 1974 was unexpected. However, 
neither its failure to thrive nor its quick dismantling was a surprise. Several good 
reasons for not establishing the ministry were ignored, whilst several against it were 
dismissed. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the short life of the ministry was 
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influenced more by personal politics than by cogent policy-making, a theme 
introduced at the start of this thesis.  
Firstly, Meir had long believed in the importance of Israel’s international 
image. From her years in the foreign ministry, as Ambassador and as Foreign 
Minister, she had fought – often in vain, and against her own instincts for secrecy and 
distrust of the press - for a greater appreciation of Israel’s international standing. As 
her power waned, she was able to implement a policy she had long believed in. For 
his part, Peres saw the new ministry as a springboard to greater things. He was right 
to do so. From the unenviable position of junior partner to the popular, charismatic 
and powerful Moshe Dayan in the small Rafi faction, Peres found taking Dayan’s place 
at cabinet and recognised as second only to Rabin in the Labour Party. His term at 
the Ministry of Information was a stepping-stone, giving him important public profile 
at a critical moment.  
Thirdly, Meir’s patience with Abba Eban had run out after the Yom Kippur 
War. Less reliant on him than she had been in 1970, when she was close to taking 
responsibility for foreign information efforts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she 
now moved against him. Eban, who had fought valiantly for the principle that the 
Foreign Ministry should retain responsibility, was defeated. Indeed, in a matter of 
weeks, he had been swept out of political life by Rabin, Peres and Allon, native-born, 
security-minded and from outside of the Mapai mainstream.  
But the Ministry, born in such unpromising circumstances, was never likely to 
flourish. Peres’ early work in defining its mandate and budget were initially 
impressive, particularly given the very significant other responsibilities he bore, but 
ultimately insufficient. Yariv, who took the ministry unwillingly and as an indication of 
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loyalty to his former commander, Rabin, soon found that the mission was impossible. 
He soon relented on the critical issue of handing international information, leaving 
him with a collection of already-existing units – the Government Press Office, the 
Israeli Film Service, the Hasbara Centre and the semi-autonomous Israel 
Broadcasting Authority – for whom a change of minister was no great novelty.  
Were it not for Alouph Hareven, and – to a far lesser extent – David Farhi – 
the Ministry of Information would have achieved no original thought at all during its 
short existence. Hareven brought the rigour and precision of an intelligence officer 
and a Mossad operative to the Ministry of Information with great enthusiasm in early 
1974. It was effort largely wasted. Hareven, who had been formulating the most 
original thinking in Israel on these issues for most of the preceding decade, in the IDF 
Intelligence Branch, in the Mossad, in the Foreign Ministry and in the Ministry of 
Information, turned his professional attention elsewhere.  
Israel’s failure to articulate effective policy in support of its national image is 
not an obscure, complex detail of Israeli political history. The problem of hasbara 
was then, and remains now, a real-life obstacle to advancing Israel’s foreign policy 
interests. Reviewing the predicted death of the Ministry of Information, Nachum 
Barnea, then the Washington correspondent of Davar, wrote a prescient obituary: 
We are, in effect, cutting the branch on which we are sitting. The political, 
military and economic aid we receive is closely linked to our ability to explain 
our policy to Jewish and non-Jewish audiences.  The chance of creating 
hostile and effective public opinion to the rise of the Arab bloc is dependent 
on our ability to help those who think as we do. Money that goes to this is 
one of the safest investments that the Government of Israel can make at 
present.  
The main problem of our hasbara in the United States is, therefore, not the 
creation of a new post for a hasbara ambassador, as minister for information 
Aharon Yariv has repeatedly been saying recently. When there is no fixed 
policy on important issues, and there is no money, the most charismatic 
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ambassador cannot help. When there is policy and there are means, even the 
least of Israel’s consuls, without over-exerting himself, can help.126 
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Conclusions 
 
This thesis has examined the implicit challenge presented by the Israeli formulation 
of hasbara as an approach to communicating its national image to international 
audiences. The essentially reactive and passive nature of hasbara, described here as 
‘an imperfect lens’ hampered decision making. The thesis largely points to the 
failures, rather than successes of the three Israeli governments in the period under 
review to communicate Israel’s national image more effectively. Through focussing 
on five significant events in the period – the appointment of a minister with 
responsibility for information policy, the initiation of television broadcasts, the wars 
of 1967 and 1973 and the creation and dismantling of the Ministry of Information - 
the thesis has established the domestic sources of the two major obstacles to cogent 
policy-making. Firstly, certain features of Israel’s political system, namely the 
opposing forces of ‘activists’ and ‘diplomats’ and a sense of ‘perpetual crisis’, allowed 
individuals to exert significant influence on policy-making, though not enough to 
determine clear policy. Secondly, and as a consequence, policy-making was often 
characterised by ‘muddling through’, a process of incremental changes taken from a 
limited series of options. 
The essentially reactive and defensive nature of hasbara is a constant theme 
through this thesis. Galili’s sharp policy turn on the nature of Israeli television, the 
establishment of a government commission of inquiry into hasbara in 1969 and Meir’s 
decision to establish the Ministry of Information in 1974 illustrate this kind of 
thinking. Here, the deficiencies of hasbara are clear. It is difficult to achieve long-term 
aims from reactive, defensive policy initiatives. ‘Television as a weapon’, Galili’s 
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preferred choice, was soon replaced by the kind of Israeli television Elihu Katz had 
proposed, prioritising domestic social development over the dubious pursuit of 
engaging Arab opinion. Elad Peled’s report, intended as a saviour for Eshkol’s 
domestic reputation, almost entirely ignored domestic information efforts in favour 
of confronting Israel’s international image problem, for which Galili had no ministerial 
responsibility. Meir’s decision to establish the ministry are less clear, but its short-
sightedness was immediately apparent. It is rare, on the other hand, to find examples 
of hasbara as a positive, constructive aid to policy-making and -thinking. The 
‘imperfect lens’ of hasbara hampered clear thinking.  
It is worth noting that the Peled Commission, the most comprehensive and 
still the most accurate analysis of the problems of hasbara and the limited options 
available within existing Israeli political structures, has been entirely ignored by 
researchers. A comprehensive search produced nothing more than tangential 
references to the report, and no scholarly analysis.1  The same is true for the short 
and unhappy life of the Ministry of Information, which has yet to be the subject of 
scholarly review. 
Hasbara has been badly treated by academia, reflecting a public and political 
discourse which dismisses hasbara as separate from, and sometimes as opposed to, 
Israeli foreign policy.2 Hasbara is not a component of Israeli foreign policy in the 
scholarly literature. Brecher, ‘perhaps the single most important study of the 
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structure of the Israel’s foreign policy setting’ largely sidesteps the issue.3 Where it is 
mentioned, it is an ethereal reminder of diaspora Jewish culture in contemporary 
Israeli affairs, often as disquieting and unwelcome as Banquo’s ghost.4 Given the way 
in which the political culture of hasbara impacted on policy-making on the issues 
covered by this thesis – a distraction, a distortion and an obstacle - this may not be 
entirely surprising. However, to focus on the deficiencies of hasbara – itself a national 
obsession in Israel - carries the risk of dismissing Israel’s rational attempts to project 
a positive national image on the international stage. That, as Gilboa has also noted, is 
grave mistake.5 This thesis contends, then, that the period under review illustrates 
that whilst the political culture of hasbara as discussed in the Introduction was a 
poor guide for that that attempt, and whilst policy may have been poorly conceived 
and implemented, the attempt to secure international support was and remains an 
authentic expression of a paradox in Israeli political culture, an authentic element of 
Israeli foreign policy.  
As Femenia reminds us, we ignore the ‘emotional’ elements of foreign policy, 
including those regarding national image, at our peril.6 As this thesis has illustrated, 
there is no question regarding the seriousness with which Israel took the questions 
of its international image in the decade of intensive, unsuccessful, attempts to 
formulate policy. Despite early attempts by the Zionist movement to diminish the 
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connection between the Jewish people and the wider world by ending the 
dependency of one on the other, the history of Zionism ran in the opposite 
direction. Israel never aspired to isolation, splendid or otherwise. Yet, Israel was 
unable to shake off one element of the legacy of Jewish history, its suspicion of 
external forces. It is in this paradox, amongst the ‘emotional’ elements of foreign 
policy, that Israel’s troubled pursuit of international support must be located.  
Policy-makers will have to address the ways in which Israel can rid itself of 
the problematic elements – the instincts of defensiveness, for apologetics, for 
reactiveness, whilst preserving the essential and rational impulse for seeking and 
maintaining a positive national image on the international scene. In the meanwhile, 
scholarly study of hasbara which accepts its rightful place in the context of Israeli 
foreign policy is appropriate and overdue. 
The second argument of this thesis is that the political system acted as a 
further, domestic, constraint on foreign policy making. Here, the case is somewhat 
simpler. Firstly, within Mapai and its ideological orbit, dominant throughout the 
period under review, the ‘activists’ were powerful enough to block the ‘diplomats’, 
but not enough to entirely disregard them. This case is well established in the 
scholarly literature.7 Yet, as Shlaim and Yaniv note, whilst Israel’s chosen electoral 
system may have replicated and amplified the vibrant but gridlocked politics of the 
diaspora and produced governments that were mathematically representative but 
lacking in executive authority, it did not doom Israel to foreign policy failure.8  
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This thesis applies the established activist-diplomat split to a new area, that of 
national image-making policy. There are identifiable echoes of diaspora Jewish 
political culture, where consensus and inclusiveness were an important guard when 
facing outside powers. More significant, though, is that indecision and deadlock were 
indicators that hasbara was not perceived as sufficiently important to fight over. 
When, as in the case of Meir’s decision to establish the Ministry of Information, she 
was easily able to overcome these structural restraints.  
This indicates a second feature of the political system that was at play. As 
Jensen has noted, there is greater latitude for personalities to impact on foreign 
policy-making when they are interested in foreign affairs and have the authority to 
make policy. Additionally, ‘non-routine’ situations and ambiguous, insufficient or 
overwhelming information increase the possibility that individuals will exert a 
significant impact on policy.9 These conditions were routinely met with regard to 
policy-making in the period under review, as a result of both Israel’s political 
structure, which grants high levels of autonomy to individual ministers, as well as the 
often uncertain and ambiguous political environment, where expertise in foreign and 
defence matters are prized. Amongst the personal interventions that hampered 
cogent policy-making, we should mention Eshkol’s decision to appoint Galili to 
oversee only domestic information efforts, a distinction which was impossible to 
change later. Indeed, the appointment of Galili himself proved a greater obstacle than 
an aid to policy-making. Abba Eban was the principal block to the creation of a single 
hasbara authority, a step that could have addressed the fundamental problem of 
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hasbara. In the credit column, Gazit gripped the issue firmly during the 1973 war, 
Hareven, an Eban appointee, produced some of the most sensible - if largely ignored 
- policy proposals, whilst Peres’ early work on the Ministry of Information in 1974 
laid the groundwork for far greater success than events allowed.  
Given the restraints on policy-making, it is unsurprising that ‘muddling 
through’ was a consistent theme during the period under review. As noted in the 
Introduction, the salient feature of Lindblom’s model is that ‘policy does not move in 
leaps and bounds’, but rather by a series of incremental steps.10 This ‘never-ending 
series of attacks’ on the problem of hasbara, sometimes in parallel, should be familiar 
from reading this thesis.11 It worth reiterating here that this thesis does not side with 
the critics of ‘muddling through’ as a preferred alternative to more radical change. 
Firstly, concerns that such thinking would be exploited by the ‘pro-inertia and anti-
innovation forces prevalent in all human organizations’, and that ‘muddling through’ 
would indicate ‘a complacent acceptance of our imperfections’ are roundly disproven 
by the evidence in this thesis.12 Indeed, despite a consistent ‘muddling through’ of 
policy decisions, Israelis remained highly critical, refusing to accept the deficiencies of 
hasbara. Innovative forces, such as Elad Peled, Shlomo Gazit and Alouph Hareven 
were undoubtedly disappointed that their work was not more fully appreciated, but 
they continued to innovate nonetheless.  
‘Muddling through’ was, in fact, often an effective approach to making 
government information policy. Given the considerable limitations on Israel in the 
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1960s and 1970s, comprehensive and scientific policy planning exercises were 
neither possible nor desirable. Israel’s press relations during the two wars in the 
period under crisis showed the benefits of ‘muddle’ – dynamic and responsive, and 
aware of the limited resources available. This is a new aspect of Israeli policy-making 
in wartime, which has largely escaped scholarly attention. Gazit’s appointment as de 
facto minister of information in 1973 is the most extreme example of ‘muddling 
through’ encountered in this thesis; it could equally form the basis for a study of 
civil-military relations during national emergencies.  
It is impossible to conclude this thesis without a glance to contemporary 
Israel and to current events. The historian’s challenge is to find the essential nature 
of things, wie es eigentlich gewesen, without judgement or prejudice. It is to have von 
Ranke’s eye for the universal as well as ‘a pleasure in the particular for itself’.13 This 
study offers an extra challenge to that undertaking. The study of hasbara is no dry 
academic subject, insulated from contemporary reality. It is, and will continue to be, 
a highly emotionally and ideologically-charged issue for Israel. No less than in the 
period under review, it occupies an important place in contemporary discourse. It is 
more than likely that Israel will continue to search for still elusive answers to the 
challenges of articulating and implementing an effective approach to government 
communications so long as no alternative is found to the restrictions, the distortions 
and the diversions offered by hasbara.
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Appendix I – Interviews held by the Peled Committee, 19691 
 
Interviews held by the committee in full, or by sub-committees 
Name   Position     Date 
1. Abba Eban   Foreign Minister    17.6.69 
2. Yehuda Ilan  Head, Hasbara Centre   6.11.69 
3. Michael Elkins  Foreign Correspondent (BBC, Newsweek) 9.9.69 
4. Shmuel Almog  Director-General, IBA   14.8.69 
5. Col. Rafael Efrat  IDF Spokesman    3.9.69 
6. Michael Arnon  Cabinet Secretary    23.7.69 
7. Chaim Baltzan  Manager, Itim Agency    6.11.69 
8. Yehuda Ben-Dor  Head, Instruction Centre   21.8.69 
9. Eliyashiv Ben-Horin Deputy Director-General, MFA  21.3.69 
10. Mordechai Bar-On Head of Youth and Hechalutz, JAFI  16.7.69 
11. Arthur Bar-Natan  Israeli Ambassador, Bonn   24.6.69 
12. Moshe Brilliant  Journalist (New York Times, Times)  28.8.69 
13. Brig. Shlomo Gazit Coordinator of Activities,   29.9.69 
Occupied Territories 
14. Yisrael Galili  Minister responsible for Hasbara  6.7.69 
15. Simcha Dinitz  Hasbara attaché, Washington DC  24.6.69 
16. Gen (ret) Chaim Herzog Military commentator    28.8.69 
17. Dr Yaakov Herzog D-G, Prime Minister’s Office   10.6.69 
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18. Aryeh Wallenstein Journalist (Reuters)    28.8.69 
19. Yaakov Hezma  Lawyer     29.9.69 
20. Rabbi Arthur Lelyweld American Jewish Congress   31.7.69 
21. David Landor  Director, Government Press Office  30.7.69 
22. Dr Meron Medzini Head, Government Press Office, Jerusalem 9.9.69 
23. Yaakov Morris  Deputy Head, Hasbara Department, MFA 1.10.69 
24. Eliyahu Salpeter  Journalist (Haaretz)    23.7.69 
25. Nachum Pundak  Journalist and foreign correspondent  9.7.69 
(Davar and Scandinavian press) 
26. Teddy Preuss  Journalist (Davar)    23.7.69 
27. Rabbi Joachim Prinz American Jewish Congress   31.7.69 
28. David Kimche  Lecturer     21.8.69 
29. Dr Yaakov Reuveni Lecturer     24.8.69 
30. Gen (res) Yitzhak Rabin Ambassador to Washington   18.5.69 
31. Daniel Rosolio  Head of Hasbara services   13.5.69 
32. Moshe Rivlin  Secretary-General, JAFI   4.11.69 
33. Gideon Rafael  Director-General, MFA   27.5.69 
34. Rabbi Herschel Schecter Chairman, Conference of Presidents  29.7.69 
of Major Jewish Organisations 
35. Moshe Sasson  PM’s adviser on Arabs   29.9.69 
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Appendix II – Peled’s proposal for an Information Agency2 
 
Proposal for reorganisation 
The Commission formed the impression that the current situation is one of 
the deficient elements of hasbara activities, and has come to the conclusion 
that there is a need for reorganisation of the hasbara system.  
 
Assumptions 
The assumptions for organising the hasbara system are: 
 
1. The State of Israel is a democratic regime 
2. One of the characteristics of a democratic state is the absence of ‘national 
guidance’ from a government ministry created for this purpose 
3. The state of war that Israel finds it itself in requires a system that is 
efficient, quick and coordinated 
4. The staff of the government communications system must be mostly 
professional 
5. There is no distinction between hasbara in Israel and hasbara overseas 
6. All hasbara activities overseas must be under the authority of the heads of 
the delegations, and guided by the central hasbara body in Israel 
7. There must be an ongoing assessment of Israel’s international image, 
undertaken by a central body which will be responsible for bringing this 
assessment to the notice of the Prime Minister and the government. 
 
Responsibilities of the ‘Information Authority’ 
In light of these assumptions, the Commission recommends the establishment of an 
‘Information Authority’, alongside the Prime Minister’s Office, whose responsibilities 
will be: 
1. Collection of information regarding Israel’s position in international public 
opinion and presenting a regular assessment from the point of view of 
hasbara, to the Prime Minister and relevant ministers.  
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2. Establishing major hasbara talking points and formulating main hasbara 
points according to different target audiences and diplomatic and security 
considerations.  
3. Distribution of briefings and background material to operative hasbara 
bodies at home and overseas.  
4. Ongoing research and continuous monitoring of our position in 
international public opinion with particular emphasis on checking the 
effectiveness, form, means and methods of hasbara. 
5. Identification and enlistment of opinion-formers in different countries for 
individual, special hasbara. 
6. Preparation of hasbara material for distribution at home and overseas 
(written material, audio material and different film clips for television and 
cinema). 
7. Direction of different hasbara bodies (official and semi-official) at home 
and overseas (mass communications, Jewish communities, Jewish 
intellectuals, Jewish and Israeli students overseas, etc.) and encouraging 
hasbara activity by non-official bodies.  
8. Preparation of material for explaining basic ideological questions. 
9. Direction of hasbara ‘responses’ to ongoing events, 24 hours a day, 7 days 
a week.  
10. Responsibility for hosting foreign visitors to Israel where it is important 
to brief them on hasbara matters.  
11. Handling all representatives of the foreign press, television and radio 
stationed in Israel. 
12. Direction of the hasbara bodies of each government ministry and of semi-
official organisations, such as the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut etc., in the 
framework of general hasbara guidelines.  
 
Management of the ‘Information Authority’ 
The head of the ‘Information Authority’ will participate in Cabinet meetings and in 
meetings of relevant ministerial committees. 
 
The head of the Authority will have ongoing, direct contact with the prime minister, 
foreign minister and the defence minister. It is possible that he will also be 
nominated as ‘government spokesperson’.  
 
It is possible that the prime minister will devolve some of his authority to another 
minister (deputy prime minister or minister without portfolio) who will be 
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responsible for the issue of hasbara, without being called Minister of Hasbara, and 
without creating an independent ministry for that purpose (just as Minister Galili was 
given responsibility for the Israeli Broadcasting Authority). 
 
The Authority will be managed by its senior managers, alongside which will be 
established a public advisory council, comprising professionals (newspaper editors, 
print, television and radio journalists, government spokespeople) and others.  
 
The management of the Authority will comprise: the head of the Authority, the 
Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Director-General of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives from the security establishment, the 
Director-General of the Israeli Broadcasting Authority. 
 
Structure of the ‘Information Authority’ 
The Information Authority will comprise the following units: 
1. Management 
2. Overseas hasbara department: split into geographic units and functional 
units (for example: New Left, churches, etc.) Will work on overseas 
hasbara activity. 
3. Domestic hasbara department: Will work on hasbara activity for Jewish 
residents of Israel. Will also have responsibility for events.  
4. Arab hasbara department: Will work on hasbara for Arab residents of 
Israel and for Arab states. 
5. Hasbara services department: Will include: Film Service, Publications 
Service, distribution and publishing services, performances department 
etc. 
6. Press and hospitality department: Will deal with foreign journalists 
stationed in Israel and with those visiting Israel. Will incorporate the 
work of the Government Press Office, and some of the visits work of the 
Foreign Ministry in connection with hasbara officials. 
7. Research department: Will collect information regarding Israel’s image in 
international public opinion, identify global opinion-formers, etc. 
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Appendix III – The Ministry of Information3 
 
General 
1. The following proposed structure is based on the existing units and the tasks 
given to the Ministry according to the authorities defined for it by the 
Cabinet meeting of 1 September 1974. 
Management of the Ministry 
3. The management of the Ministry will comprise the Director-General, Deputy 
Director-General (Administration), Comptroller and Spokesman.  
Departments of the Ministry 
4. Below is a list of the departments and description of their responsibilities. 
The detail below refers only to changes to current description of 
responsibilities: 
a. Hasbara Centre 
b. Monitoring and Research Department: The head of the department 
will be responsible for the following units and for ‘grey hasbara’: 
i. Monitoring and Feedback Unit: Will collate current 
information on Israel’s image at home and abroad, will analyse 
the information daily and periodically and will present it to the 
management of the Ministry. 
ii. Research Unit: Will implement and initiate research projects 
on issues of hasbara, its aims and its methods.  
iii. Overseas Hasbara Materials Unit: Will prepare written hasbara 
materials for use overseas, as well as on placing radio and 
television programmes on foreign networks. The unit will 
operate the Israel Information Centres. 
iv. Government Press Office: Will absorb the units dealing with 
foreign journalists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
v. Film Service 
See the appended diagram for structure 
 
Work patterns for management of the Ministry 
5. The management of the Ministry will work according to the following fora:  
                                            
 
3 ISA/RG 44/G/5266/12. ‘Structure of the Ministry of Information – Proposal for Discussion’, 
4.9.1974. 
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a. Daily Information Forum: Meets daily each morning, headed by the 
Minister or the Director-General, to deal with the daily hasbara status 
and setting objectives, with the participation of: 
i. Minister’s personal aide 
ii. Head of the Hasbara Centre 
iii. Head of the Monitoring and Research Department 
iv. Head of the Monitoring Unit 
v. Director of the Government Press Office 
vi. Ministry Spokesman 
b. Government Hasbara Forum: The Minister or the Director-General, 
heading government information work, will deal with questions of 
principle regarding hasbara policy and will convene the group every 
two weeks: 
i. All participants in the Daily Information Forum 
ii. Deputy-Director General for Hasbara, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
iii. Director-General, Israeli Broadcasting Authority 
iv. IDF Spokesperson 
v. Chief Education Officer, IDF 
vi. Spokesman, Ministry of Defence 
vii. Representative from the Jewish Agency 
viii. Deputy-Director General (Administration) 
ix. Representative from Prime Minister’s Bureau 
c. Ministerial Management Forum: Will convene monthly headed by the 
Minister or Director-General and will deal with the activities of the 
various departments of the Ministry, discuss administrative, 
organisations and operational matters. The forum will comprise:  
i. Minister’s personal aide 
ii. Head of the Hasbara Centre 
iii. Head of the Monitoring and Research Department 
iv. Director of the Government Press Office 
v. Head of the Film Service 
vi. Ministry Spokesman 
vii. Deputy-Director General (Administration) 
viii. Comptroller 
d. Heads of Units’ Forum: Will convene bi-monthly headed by the 
Minister or Director-General for general briefings on hasbara 
problems and reporting on the work of the units. The forum will 
comprise all heads of departments and units of the Ministry.  
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